Care, Control, or Criminalization? Discourses on Homelessness and Social Responses by Upton, Lindsey L.
Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
Sociology & Criminal Justice Theses &
Dissertations Sociology & Criminal Justice
Fall 2016
Care, Control, or Criminalization? Discourses on
Homelessness and Social Responses
Lindsey L. Upton
Old Dominion University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/
sociology_criminaljustice_etds
Part of the Criminology Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology & Criminal Justice at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Sociology & Criminal Justice Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Upton, Lindsey L.. "Care, Control, or Criminalization? Discourses on Homelessness and Social Responses" (2016). Doctor of
Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, Sociology/Criminal Justice, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/q5an-ey21
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/sociology_criminaljustice_etds/9
CARE, CONTROL, OR CRIMINALIZATION? DISCOURSES ON HOMELESSNESS AND 
SOCIAL RESPONSES 
by 
Lindsey L. Upton 
B.S. May 2009, Iowa State University 
M.S. May 2011, Eastern Kentucky University 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of 
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 
December 2016 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
Ruth A. Triplett (Director) 
Randolph R. Myers (Member) 
Travis W. Linnemann (Member) 
ABSTRACT 
CARE, CONTROL, OR CRIMINALIZATION? DISCOURSES ON HOMELESSNESS AND 
SOCIAL RESPONSES  
 
Lindsey L. Upton 
Old Dominion University, 2016 
Director: Dr. Ruth A. Triplett  
 
There has been a resurgence of political and media interest in homelessness, particularly 
in major urban areas throughout the United States. This interest is credited to a number of cities 
that declared a State of Emergency (SOE) due to their homelessness crisis in 2015. The 
motivation to declare homelessness as an urgent priority of local politics assists cities in 
temporarily overcoming longstanding budget and bureaucratic barriers. Undoubtedly, the 
criminal justice system is part of social response following a declared SOE, and homelessness is 
not an exception. Little attention has explored the historical, social, and political processes of 
problematizing homelessness from a criminological perspective. Drawing on theoretical insight 
from David Garland, Jonathan Simon, and Loïc Wacquant, the politics of homelessness and 
crime found in New York City (NYC) is interrogated through discourses in the New York Times 
(NYT) from 1970-2012. This research examines how talk about homelessness responses creates, 
enacts, and enforces technologies of the criminal justice system. This study finds the 
politicization of homelessness over time produces and legitimates increased controls and 
management of marginalized groups, where state authorities are experts, and the boundaries of 
care and criminalization are blurred. This study has implications for the management of 
homelessness and policies that further socially exclude the homeless from overcoming such 
conditions. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Homelessness is a social problem long studied by scholars across multiple disciplines and 
contexts (Bahr 1973; Lindelius and Salum 1976; Stoner 1983; Lamb 1984; Brahams and Weller 
1985; Quigly 1989). Recently, there has been a resurgence in scholarly interest about 
homelessness in the United States (Mitchell 2003; Lee, Tyler, and Wright 2010; Willse 2015), 
and in Western countries, such as Canada (Layton 2000; Lenon 2000; Cloke, Milbourne, and 
Widdowfield 2003; Gaetz 2010), England (Pleace, Fitzpatrick, Johnsen, Quilgars, and Sanderson 
2008; Fitzpatrick and Jones 2005), Germany (Busch-Geertsema and Fitzpatrick 2008), and 
Australia (Minnery and Greenhalgh 2007). An extension of renewed interest is in scholarship on 
the politicization of social problems (Beck 2015) and social justice issues surrounding struggles 
over public space in the United States (Mitchell 2003; Harvey 2009; Fainstein 2010). By 
politicization, scholars refer to the social, economic, scientific, legal, and religious interest on the 
topic (Cohen 1996).  
Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi’s (2013) in Contemporary States of Emergency 
provide examples of politicization through SOEs. This collection of works examines political 
and historical conditions that make state intervention possible as social problems are framed as 
natural disasters in need of intervention. A relevant topic for this study includes recent state of 
emergency (SOE) regarding the homelessness crisis declared by several U.S. communities, 
including Seattle (WA), Los Angeles (CA), Oakland (CA), Eugene (OR), and the state of 
Hawaii. Despite the urgency framed using state of emergency, homelessness is not new, and 
certainly not to the urban areas that declared SOE.  
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In fact, annual reports provided by major agencies in charge of responding to 
homelessness provide statistical estimates regularly where inconsistency is an accepted fact of 
any statistical attempt. For example, the National Alliance to End Homelessness (NAEH) cited 
little to no change in homelessness statistics over time and frequently report overall declines of 
homelessness in cities across the United States in recent years. Though, a report by the Coalition 
for Homelessness (2016) included rhetoric that indicated a “catastrophe of homelessness” is 
occurring the U.S and that homelessness is rising for certain subpopulations of homeless. 
Additionally, the most recent data from the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) provided in the agency’s 2015 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress (see 
Henry, Shivji, de Sousa, Cohen, Khadduri, and Culhane 2015) stated homelessness had 
increased, citing New York as the city with the greatest increase followed by California. 
Inconsistencies surrounding the rise and fall of homelessness are theorized as a matter of 
political and social factors that have long socially constructed the problem and the numbers 
produced (Barak 1991; Chelimsky 1991).  
A state of emergency regarding the homelessness crisis is declared in order to reduce 
bureaucratic barriers faced and to push the issue into the political forefront for immediate 
increased resources and services. For example, a recent report provided by the National Alliance 
to End Homelessness (2016) summarized the recent trend toward declaring a SOE. It revealed 
the declared SOE temporarily: shifted zoning barriers that prohibited shelters and short term 
housing assistance for the homeless; furthered statutes and regulations that facilitated public-
private partnerships and promoted contracts; prioritized homelessness to the top of budgetary and 
emergency resource lists; and further highlighted the issues of affordable housing that has long 
been discussed (NAEH 2016).  
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Undoubtedly, a state of emergency creates urgency in action and legitimizes state powers 
to intervene in social problems. It enables intervention in the form of care and control, or as 
others have conceptualized it in global contexts - militaristic and humanitarian aid (Fassin and 
Pandolfi 2013). This is illustrated in a brief provided by the City of Seattle (2016) that described 
the move to provide “more administration authority and flexibility in contracting for services and 
allocating resources in response to the homelessness crisis” and specifically addressed recent 
critical issues faced by homeless children. In this brief, we are directed to the politics behind 
declaring a SOE situated in a context of reports of increased homelessness. For example, 
Seattle/King County Coalition for Homelessness (2016) reported a 21% increase in 
homelessness from 2014-2015. The report further stated, “this number is always assumed an 
undercount, because we do not count everywhere, and because many people take great care not 
to be visible.” In this particular county, homelessness counts were conducted on one night of the 
year from 2am-5am, primarily focused in shelters. Thus, cities respond to visible indicators of 
homelessness such as encampments and tent cities as indicative of rising homelessness. 
Similarly, in San Francisco, Supervisor David Campos stated a SOE enabled city response to 
complaints of encampments and homelessness visibility, which have “appeared in [greater] size 
and visibility in the past year” (“Campos Calls For…” March 8, 2016). Seattle and San Francisco 
are just two examples of cities that declared SOEs and cited homelessness visibility as 
problematic, thus necessitating the declared SOE. Moreover, it is reported that some cities, such 
as New York City (NYC), similar increases were faced however they did not declare a SOE 
(Markee 2016).  
In constructing a crisis, the problem is publicized and a new light is cast on old issues 
(Beitsch 2015). The reproduction of a crisis works to produce resources and results. Cities 
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openly stated the declaration extends state authority to control and intervene. Though advocates 
see potential benefits in temporarily increased fiscal budgets and temporary authority over local 
bureaucratic matters, the full extent of consequences faced is undetermined. Advocates expected 
the extended authority cities knowingly called for in this political move could result in increased 
coercion and control that negatively impacts the homeless (Wogan 2015). 
A declared SOE is an escalated example of moral and political urgency used to further 
state intervention strategies in the form of increased social control by authority figures. Another 
related and pervasive example is the extension of quality of life measures in that policing 
resulted from declared wars on urban crime and disorder. From the Johnson Administration’s 
War on Poverty to the Reagan Administration’s War on Drugs, Hinton (2016) connects the rise 
of mass incarceration to a conceptually different welfare system that connects care and control. 
Notions of care, equality, and economic opportunity were connected to cleaning up the streets 
from urban crime, disorder, and poverty as early as the Johnson [1963-1969] and Reagan 
Administrations [1969-1974]. The act of clearing encampments in order to address urban 
disorder involves partnership between the criminal justice system and social services. NYC 
(Willse 2015) and Seattle (Beckett and Herbert 2009) are two U.S. cities that implemented new 
control strategies linked to a host of perpetuated inequalities and exclusionary consequences long 
faced by marginalized groups under the guise of care and progressive movement. Declared SOEs 
and quality of life policing are then conceptualized as separate and not readily connected, though 
when operationalized we see an overlap in how their goals are enacted. Each is connected to 
national politics that wage a war on drugs and crime. 
Like other social problems, then, homelessness is “as much created as it is discovered” 
(Cronley 2010: 320). Joel Best (1990:11) argued politics provide an avenue for bringing forth 
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conditions the public consider social problems. Homelessness symbolizes the threat of insecurity 
and instability to society that is recently repackaged as an emerging crisis despite its ongoing 
existence and perhaps gradual, rather than sudden, growth. It becomes politically and socially 
productive to garner public attention, motivation for action, and resources. Encampments have 
long existed and been controlled by police, however, what is unique to the study of homelessness 
today is a declared state of emergency around the issue.  
Relatively little criminological attention links care, control, and criminalization in studies 
of homelessness and crime. To my knowledge, none exists that examines homelessness as a 
subject and brings together care, control, and criminalization. More specifically, there has been 
little criminological scholarship focused on the processes and practices that stem from 
constructing homelessness as a crime and disorder problem. Beyond criminology, homelessness 
is more frequently a focal point concerning poverty and crime studies (Watson 2000; Klodawsky 
2006; Parsell 2010; Whiteford 2010; Willse 2015) and a concern given the rise in criminalization 
of homelessness (Mitchell 1997; Wright 2009). However, a great deal of existing literature 
popular among criminology scholars fits in the analysis of homelessness as a historical and 
political subject. Specifically, David Garland’s (2001) Culture of Control, Jonathan Simon’s 
(2007) Governing Through Crime, and Loïc Wacquant’s (2009) Punishing the Poor provide 
theoretical insight to the study of homelessness and its responses of care and control today. In 
addition, other scholars explore crime and poverty in the contexts of an eroded economic and 
social welfare system, a lack of access to affordable housing, stable employment, health care, 
and the control of public space (also see, Friedrichs, Galster & Musterd 2003; Beckett and 
Herbert 2009).  
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This study adds to criminological literature on the sociology of punishment by examining 
the processes of problematizing homelessness, including policies and practices created, enacted, 
and targeted at responding to homelessness. Specifically, it argues a new logic of social control 
that has emerged that blurs the boundaries of care and criminalization, and conflates moral and 
political urgency to legitimize state intervention. Importantly, this study adds to the field of 
criminology where it is focused on homelessness at the intersection of crime and poverty. The 
current study has implications for sociology of punishment insights found in the work of David 
Garland, Jonathan Simon, and Loïc Wacquant.  
I explore three ideas related to research on the shifting governing forces of care and crime 
control. First, I provide a genealogy for historical and political unraveling of homelessness. I 
interrogate the historical developments of homelessness and responses to it through examining 
images and language over time. Second, we see how the mediated construction of homelessness 
and its responses rest in notions of care, control, and criminalization as attention is paid to 
various homeless subjects, particularly in defining who are the homeless other and who is 
deserving of varied responses. In tracing a genealogy of homelessness through a media source, a 
third element emerges that explores the connection between the politics of poverty, 
homelessness, crime, and care found in the governing forces of State authority. This study adds 
to scholarship that spans the “varieties of punitiveness” (Sylvestre 2013) based on “distinctive 
cultural, historical, constitutional, and political conditions (Tonry 2007: 1) across time, place, 
and perspective.  
This analysis is focused on New York City (NYC), New York, USA from 1970-2012. 
Recently, New York witnessed the greatest increase among states in the U.S. for rates of 
homelessness in 2015 (AHAR 2016). Additionally, during the 1990s, crime rates dropped 
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dramatically in the United States, where NYC had the most significant crime drop. The politics 
of zero tolerance practices and quality of life policing are situated in NYC (Mcardle and Erzen 
2001; Kusmer 2003; Vitale 2008). NYC Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s (1994-2001) tough on crime 
strategies that arrested New Yorkers for minor crimes gained global attention when his NYC 
zero tolerance quality of life policing was applied to Mexico City and determined a failure 
(Shapiro 2007; Mountz and Curran 2009). Mountz and Curran (2009: 1033) argue Giuliani’s 
ideas gained popularity due to their “currency in public discourse” where they “produced a ‘cult 
of personality’ that masks the very real failures of neoliberalism in everyday life,” or as Bourdieu 
and Wacquant (1999) refer, the idea of the expert. In regard to homelessness and responses to it, 
the creation of multiple coalitions, organizations, and alliances centered on ending homelessness 
fall in line with the argument that the role of the expert has been created that furthers state power 
and extends control.  
This research is situated in NYC from the 1970s forward. In order to provide a critical 
historical reflection on the politicization of the homeless subject I used a highly consumed source 
located in the city of study, the New York Times (NYT). Baumgartner and Jones (1991: 1045) 
argued the “prevailing image of the policy problem through the use of rhetoric, symbols and 
policy analysis” is often captured in the media. News discourse on social problems is impactful 
and consequential. The NYT is a powerful avenue for organizations, politicians, and others to 
capture mass attention on the issue, thus it is an important site for deconstructing the framing of 
public policy issues used to legitimize state intervention. Framing analysis is a valuable tool to 
understand how homelessness and crime are problematized. Using a constructivist approach to 
examine news discourse from the NYT, texts are conceptualized and operationalized to provide 
empirical evidence of historical constructions of homelessness and crime. Constructivism is 
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further used to provide a theoretical framework to understand “crisis-making” of longstanding 
social problems.  
This dissertation starts with a literature review that covers the topics of governance and 
criminalization of poverty, specifically on the convergence of criminalization and poverty 
through homelessness. Method and data are outlined in the next chapter to detail the use of 
ethnographic content analysis (Altheide 1987). In the chapters to follow, a history of the present 
is laid out by decade in one of the most highlighted cities in punishment literature, NYC. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The current study interrogates the perception of homelessness and its response through 
discourse found in the media. This study draws from literature on crime and poverty studies 
specifically as it relates to social control of crime and deviance. It is located in scholarship that 
understands media as a force in the social construction process. 
As this chapter will show, homelessness is a topic of study relevant to criminology. 
Studying homelessness furthers our understanding of issues of poverty and crime but to do so 
best it requires specific attention paid to historical and political underpinnings, and examination 
of the relationship between control of both crime and poverty. As of this time, a gap in 
criminological literature exists on homelessness as a subject to understand crime control. 
However, insights from scholars interested in control such as Garland (2001), Simon (2007), and 
Wacquant (2009), provide a framework for examining homelessness. 
In this chapter, I examine two key areas of the literature. First, I begin with the 
assumption of homelessness as socially constructed. I introduce important literature that provides 
the foundations for analysis of social problems through news media accounts. Next, I provide 
key insights from sociology of punishment theorists that are applied to scholarly exploration of 
homelessness and its response. Specifically, I outline significant contributions of critical 
sociologists David Garland, Jonathan Simon, and Loïc Wacquant that guided theoretical 
foundations of this study. 
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THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
For the purpose of this work, homelessness is a social problem that is understood as 
socially constructed. A constructivist assumption allows scholars to engage with the processes 
that enable social problems to become public concerns (Best 2013). Scholars who work from a 
constructivist perspective argue that defining a social problem is highly susceptible to historical 
conditions and forces of moral economy (Spector and Kitsuse 1977; Best 2013). History is a 
mode of analysis that extends beyond understanding history as archival past that leads up to the 
contemporary. Rather, historical insights are used to reconsider the present through analysis of 
the past (Garland 2014). Moral economy is a concept that expresses the idea that communities 
share a set of normative attitudes about the social relations and social behaviors that surround the 
local economy (Thompson 1961). Further, Spector and Kitsuse (1977:75), two important 
scholars who work from a constructionist perspective, argue social problems are created when 
individuals or a group “make assertions of grievances and claims” about a condition with which 
the public is more readily and easily concerned. According to Best (1990:11), “conditions must 
be brought to [public attention] in order to become social problems.” Therefore, social conditions 
are subject to political, economic, historical, and cultural underpinnings. Media are a “central 
institution of modern life” where political and public agendas are traced (Garland 2001: 85). 
Thus, scholars argue media help generate public agendas on issues that are deemed important, 
problematic, and prioritized (Garland 2001).  
Within this social constructionist perspective, the media then are understood as 
communications that offer understanding of the cultural place social issues occupy (Stevenson 
2002). Berger and Luckmann (1967) argue a central important aspect of communication is the 
role of language. The development of knowledge and language are core to understanding the 
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dialectics of social organization and social problems (Carter 2013). Thus, media are one site to 
analyze the reproduction of perceptions of social problems across time and place. Under this 
perspective then the media provide important cultural artifacts – such as news reports- that 
provide insights into social constructions of historical and political processes over time. 
Criminologists realize the importance of media to understanding crime and now there is an area 
within criminology of crime and media studies. One area found in crime and media studies 
deconstructs discourse found in news media accounts on crime and justice subjects (Barak 1995; 
Hope and Sparks 2000). Scholars in this area argue that cultural assumptions and political 
interests shape discourses that frame urgency to control a social problem. Key to understanding 
the power of the media is that these assumptions and interests are reproduced through mediated 
images of the subjects connected to particular social problems (Garland 2001).  
Importantly, mediated images reproduce cultural imaginaries of marginalized 
populations, such as the homeless, as socially problematic and in need of intervention. Since the 
1970s, critical scholars have examined news representations of crime and justice situated in the 
politics of fear of crime (Altheide 2002; Best 2013). Their analyses provided evidence for 
understanding news as cultural products that reproduce insecurities of real crime experienced and 
notions of punishment, law, and order. Such scholars demonstrated how media shape and 
circulate emerging knowledge of social problems. In addition, each provided insight into the 
process of claims making about crime and justice issues. McMullan (2005: 18) argued, “truth 
claims are anchored in discourse and discursive formations that produce particular ways of 
organizing thinking, talking and doing in regard to selected topics.” By examining crime and 
justice discourse, these scholars provided insight into how “power is exercised” through the 
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representation of social issues in the media (McMullan 2005: 23) and frameworks used to garner 
public concern for social problems (Altheide 2015).  
This study seeks to understand the social construction of a particular social problem – 
homelessness – as a public concern. It uses homelessness as an example of a social problem 
historically subjected to policies that promote control of marginalized groups. It is to existing 
literature on the social construction of homelessness that we now turn. 
 
UNDERSTANDING HOMELESSNESS  
Social constructionists argue that, like other social issues, homelessness is “as much 
created as it is discovered” (Cronley 2010: 320). A social problem such as homelessness violates 
communities’ shared set of normative attitudes and behaviors, and in turn, it impacts social 
relations. In this section, we explore how homelessness is constructed particularly in its 
connection to crime. We then see how these images, particularly those constructed in the media, 
are important for they in turn are used to develop policies. 
Understanding homelessness in the media starts with a recognition that the homeless 
subject is frequently constructed as deviant, criminal, or diseased. In a number of ways, the 
homeless are often identified as a fringe group on the edges of society. For example, Blau (1992) 
argued the dominant image of the homeless as “lazy misfits” and drug addicts. Additionally, to 
these depictions of the homeless as lazy, misfits, drug addicts, etc. are individual level 
explanations for these social problems.  
The construction of homelessness as a marginalized, fringe group that falls under similar 
stigmatizations and socially exclusionary processes of the criminal and deviant other is important 
to understanding the social construction of homelessness and responses to it. The image of the 
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criminal and deviant other are often those negatively constructed and found at the fringe of 
society (Ferrell and Sanders 1995). Such groups are often less powerful fringe groups that have 
been marginalized (Ferrell and Sanders 1995; Young 2007). Young (2007) described the process 
of constructing marginalized groups where social norms are reproduced and reiterated. Young 
(2007) specifically refers to the constructed distinctions or “false binaries” between the majority 
and the minority productive. They work to reproduce practices of social exclusion and hierarchal 
order in providing services. Such constructions are politically and culturally situated, and enable 
social exclusion through hierarchies of morality (Young 2007). Therefore, constructing the 
homeless as a marginalized other is subject to underlying political and social processes and 
works to create deserving and undeserving populations for resources and services provided. 
Framing homelessness as a social problem in need of normalization, intervention, and correction 
then is connected to the ideas of who the homeless are and which category they fit in terms of 
those that deserve services and those that do not (Ravenhill 2016). Here, we see the construction 
of individual and structural factors assigned responsibility and blame, thus shaping our social 
definitions of response and treatment for their homelessness. Causes and the corresponding 
responsibility are intimately connected to the constructed image, and are then related to policy 
and practice. 
Often, logics are operationalized as oppositions where responsibility and blame is placed 
on those who participated in criminal or deviant behavior that led to homelessness, versus those 
who are diseased or fall through the cracks of structural failure (Neal 1997). Neal (1997) argued 
binary oppositions produced ideas of responsibility and deservedness that translated into “less 
than adequate” policy and practice. Furthermore, scholars argue this serves as a “critical point of 
entry for academics and activists interested in challenging the presumptive normalization of 
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homeless policies that cleave apart homeless communities.” Notions of homelessness, its causes, 
and its responses are continually reproduced to maintain “boundaries between chronic/non-
chronic, productive/unproductive, and ‘old’ (e.g. male, single)/’new’ (e.g. female, families, 
children, youth) homeless—and marginalize our cities’ most disenfranchised populations” (Del 
Casino and Jocoy 2008: 193). In summary, it is important to study how we construct 
homelessness as strictly a housing, health, or crime problem. Such constructions translate into 
policies that impact entire homeless populations, perpetuating stereotypes, stigmas, and divisions 
among worthy versus unworthy marginalized groups. Nonetheless, homelessness and its 
responses have been conflated to issues of crime, disorder, and disease that follow distinct 
narratives in deservedness of resources (Cronley 2010). When we turn to criminology, however 
we see a gap in the study of homelessness where care, control and criminalization are 
simultaneously conceptualized. Next, we turn to the way sociologists and criminologists look at 
homelessness and issues of crime and poverty. 
 
HOMELESSNESS IN CONTEXT OF CRIME AND POVERTY 
Since the 1970s, scholars have examined control of space in the United States and Great 
Britain. In particular, scholars have applied this to changing urban landscape that imposes 
increased control and criminalization of homelessness (Amster 2003). This attention has sparked 
some interest among criminologists in documenting the increasing ways we have criminalized 
behaviors particular to the homeless (Becket and Herbert 2009). In addition, when criminologists 
study homelessness in the United States they often do so alongside other social problems 
connected to broad discussions of crime, poverty, and punishment (Hagan and McCarthy 1998). 
Homelessness itself is less frequently analyzed as a point of focus by criminologists. Even less 
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criminological inquiry has incorporated historical analyses into understanding the relationship 
between homelessness and crime over time (see, Chambliss 1964).  
In addition to these problems with the way criminology approaches or does not approach 
the study of homelessness, one particular area for which criminologists and sociologists that 
study crime and poverty issues are criticized is for too narrowly focusing on control strategies 
that do not incorporate forms of care in theoretical understanding. For example, DeVerteuil 
(2014) argued a “multiplicity of homeless geographies” exist that are better understood as 
“multifaceted and ambivalent rather than only punitive.” Simply stated, care, control, and 
criminalization exist in any single given community. Further, DeVerteuil (2014) argued research 
that examines criminalization of homelessness in a city has potential for broadened 
conceptualizations of “varied and complex” responses to homelessness beyond only 
punitiveness. In the topic of homelessness, such interests culminate to help us understand the 
socially constructed image, how each is reproduced over time, and the politics of control that 
simultaneously include care and criminalization of a single phenomenon. What we also need as 
we turn to study homelessness in this manner is a framework for understanding care, control and 
criminalization practices. In the following, we discuss understanding homelessness and its 
responses within existing literature that has mentioned homelessness in a cursory manner.  
 
UNDERSTANDING PUNITIVENESS AND INSECURITY 
The politicization of the social problems is often linked to what Garland (2001) called a 
new crime control field that drives the state of mass incarceration. Politicization refers to social, 
economic, scientific, legal, and religious interests on the topic (Cohen 1996). Since the 1990s, 
scholars have examined the politicization of crime and disorder in NYC in the context of a newly 
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emerged crime control field. Insecurities of crime and disorder, high crime rates, and perceptions 
of risk helped fuel politics that decreased welfarism and fueled crime control (Walsh 2015). 
During the 1980s and early 90s, police responded to rises in crime, violence, and drugs with zero 
tolerance and broken windows policing in NYC which resulted in marginalized populations 
facing police crackdowns for minor crimes as the War on Drugs became increasingly politicized. 
The War on Drugs deepened racialized tensions in urban ghettos (Wacquant 2001). Drug users 
were cast as poor, unproductive individuals that need to be socially excluded from urban space 
(Garland 2001; Young 2007; Beckett and Herbert 2009). Recently, homelessness has been 
connected by Willse (2015) to similar crime and disorder concerns that further neoliberal logics 
to clean up and end a populations’ dependency on the welfare system. 
Three prominent scholars contributed to the study of social control and punitive 
neoliberal policies found in the United States: David Garland (2001), Jonathan Simon (2007), 
and Loïc Wacquant (2009). Specifically, they understand increased governing forces found in 
institutions of everyday life connected to perceptions of fear of crime and insecurity. Scholars 
focused on the relationships between fear of crime and the culture of control (Garland 2001) or 
governmentality (Simon 2007). Simon (2007) and Garland (2001) are among scholars influenced 
by Foucauldian notions of governance. Foucault (1991) inspired scholarship that argues 
governance occurs at multiple sites, and consists of multiple actors including private and public 
actors. The technologies of governance operate through fear and insecurity.  
Wacquant (2009) argues to shift toward including conceptualizations of social insecurity, 
not just criminal insecurity, and one that pushes the state back into focus as it seeks to understand 
strategies of urban poverty management. Wacquant (2009) seeks to understand how racial 
domination and social inequality are habitual practices, and welfare retrenchment and penal 
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expansion serve the rise in a neoliberal state. Wacquant’s work is influenced by that of Pierre 
Bourdieu (1978) that assumes class is a result of “group-making” where struggles for dominant 
ideas of social division and categorization are situated here and dominate over all other 
categorizations. The overall argument is that class affords freedom for some at the cost of 
increased regulation and crackdown on the social and economic activities of the racialized caste 
and working poor (Wacquant 2009). Punishment and society scholars have provided extant 
literature on crime and poverty. Specifically, each embraced the power of politics and history in 
understanding contemporary social problems. These works provide insight into the complexities 
of homelessness and its responses.  
 
GARLAND’S CULTURE OF CONTROL 
In 2001, Garland argued a new collective experience of crime and insecurity is created 
through distinct “social, economic, and cultural arrangements of late modernity” that shifted in 
the USA and UK. He argued that a shift occurred following the 1970s toward authorities using a 
piecemeal response of prevention and punishment (i.e., preventative partnerships and punitive 
segregation), a culture of control, where punishment and containment are successful political 
strategies to address insecurities of crime and disorder. 
Garland (2001) identified these new experiences of crime and insecurity as early as the 
1970s, where he characterized decades to follow were driven by anxieties and fears of crime and 
disorder situated in urban realities of high crime. According to him, shifting attitudes are a 
product of decades where high crime rates induced real fears and insecurities about the criminal 
other. Garland (2001) argued the fear of crime is a pervasive part of daily life where modern life 
is constructed as dangerous; here media are a central institution that reproduces modern life. 
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Simply, media play a significant role in reproducing fears and anxieties of crime that exist long 
after changes in urban realities of crime are observed.  
These rising crime rates and real fears and insecurities, he then argued, interact with 
neoliberalism and conservative policies. Neoliberalism is a form of rationality where carceral 
institutions are linked to free trade, privatization, deregulation, and welfare retrenchment 
(Garland 2001; Harvey 2005). Garland (2001) argued neoliberalism is paradoxically linked to 
mass incarceration expansion. Others connect it to the contemporary ideal of a strict and severe 
police state (Harcourt 2010). In addition, Garland (2001) argued that society has shifted towards 
conservative policies where support and policies rooted in welfarism are decreased, and support 
and policies for crime control increased. These shifts produced a social re-organization in late 
modernity and neoconservative politics that increasingly dominated social life since the 1970s 
(Garland 2001).  
Specific to the United States, we understand the mass incarceration that characterizes our 
country through a rise in zero-tolerance policies and quality of life policing throughout recent 
decades. Garland argued that both address urban realities of high crime and disorder that 
characterized the 1980s and 1990s. Politicians articulated fear and risk that sparked a motivated 
public, and policy agendas shifted toward governing problems through state, corporate, and 
private entities. In this way, crime control has increasingly become a part of everyday politics 
and social life.  
Garland (2001) illustrated his points when he discussed NYC as a location where this is 
witnessed. NYC faced higher crime rates, increased media coverage of crime, and the increased 
prominence of victims from the 1970s to present. According to Garland (2001), the combination 
of these factors created a context where the politicization of crime is enabled. Consequently, new 
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understandings of crime emerged that emphasized the normalization of crime and the 
demonization of the criminal other. This perception, in conjunction with fear of crime he argued, 
has driven public and political agendas that support deterrence policies. Moreover, Garland 
(2001) argued that even crime prevention policies under the guise of social inclusion tend to play 
out in socially exclusionary ways and reproduce consequential social controls of the state. 
 
SIMON’S GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 
Jonathan Simon (2007) explores the notion that society has moved beyond governing 
crime to governing through crime, influenced by the work of Foucault. According to Simon 
(2007), governing through crime shows itself in three important ways, where crime is a strategic 
issue found across multiple institutions; it is used as a category to legitimize intervention in areas 
that were not previously conceived as criminal justice matters; and the technologies, discourses, 
and metaphors of crime and justice become more common. Simon (2007) argues fear of crime 
has transformed schools, families, and workplaces to place more emphasis on crime control. This 
transformation has shifted to areas where disruption in schools, for example, is responded to with 
zero tolerance practices such as write-ups, detentions, and expulsion. This is pervasive in the 
lives of children in the school system, where Simon (2007) argues notions of crime vulnerability 
play out daily as we view children as potential targets and potential victims. Though the reality 
of victims and offenders is relatively small compared to the entire population of children, fears 
and anxieties of potential crime are so pervasive they are applied to all. A culmination of these 
three important developments resulted in new opportunities for the governance of every day life 
through crime control technologies.  
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Much like Garland, Simon (2007) directed attention to the 1970s and 1980s for economic 
and political shifts connected to the development or rise in governing through crime rationalities. 
He argued that, an economic recession, the politicization of law and order situated in 
neoliberalism, and fear of crime were all important factors underlying a rise in the management 
of criminal behavior found in multiple institutions. “Three strikes” laws are an example of 
policies enacted through such public and political agenda that lead to mass incarceration in the 
US. In fact, Simon (2007) argued violent crime continues to be a point of public concern and a 
normalized subject that dominates contemporary politics. Simon (2007) argued, however, 
individual and social costs of mass incarceration are largely ignored in popular rhetoric and 
policy concerns.  
 
WACQUANT’S PUNISHING THE POOR 
A third and final key scholar in understanding the sociology of punishment is scholar 
Loïc Wacquant. Wacquant (2009) argued that the “ascent of the penal state” and its associated 
ills in the U.S. and other advanced societies is a response to rising social insecurity, rather than 
strictly criminal insecurity. Wacquant (2009) argued a dismantling of the welfare state and shift 
toward a political project referred to as “neoliberal governance” occurred during the 1970s. This 
shift is said to influence a punitive management of the poor, where the welfare system is 
increasingly like the criminal justice system as its processes parallel that of punishment and 
control. Specifically, he illustrates this in the rise to mass incarceration which he views as a 
manifestation of the shift toward management of society’s urban, poor, black men (Wacquant 
2009).  
	
	
	
	
	
21 
Wacquant (2009) connects social welfare and prison as two state functions that are 
manifestations of neoliberal governance. Wacquant points to the expansion and glorification of 
the police, courts, and prisons as responses to social insecurity. Such insecurities were faced 
following the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, shifting social relations around progressive 
justice, increased use of zero tolerance policing and mandatory minimums, rising inequality and 
stagnant wage labor, and racial tensions. High crime rates and struggles for social order and 
hierarchies characterized recent shifts toward punitiveness.  
Importantly, Wacquant (2009) also argued social and penal policies are two variants of 
poverty policy that are best understood as “new punitive politics of marginality.” Wacquant and 
colleagues (2011: 209) further state:  
The resurging prison has come to serve three missions that have little to do with crime 
control: to bend the fractions of the post-industrial working class to precarious wage-
work; to warehouse their most disruptive or superfluous elements; and to patrol the 
boundaries of the deserving citizenry while reasserting the authority of the state in the 
restricted domain it now assigns itself. 
Lastly, Wacquant (2009) argued simultaneous and converging logics of “workfare” and 
expansive “prisonfare” facilitated the rise of the neoliberal state. “Workfare” and “prisonfare” 
double the regulatory mechanisms and institutions in place to manage poverty. Each exacerbates 
inequalities, meanwhile conceptualizing them as separate systems that divide social insecurities. 
The result is that each seems different and separate from one another as well as the populations 
primarily impacted. 
Others who study the shifts in punitive politics and the transformation of crime control 
also argued these shifts have reshaped criminological thought, public policy, and the cultural 
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meaning of crime and criminals. Hallsworth and Lea (2011) argued the “security state” enables a 
new type of authoritarianism. Society is largely concerned with the management of marginalized 
populations through mechanisms of social exclusion. A pervasive and consequential conclusion 
is drawn where the “security state is emerging” in three important ways that continually reinforce 
overarching crime controls: the “transition from welfare to workfare and risk management; new 
measures to combat terrorism and organized crime; and the blurring of warfare and crime 
control” (Hallsworth and Lea 2011: 142).  
This important scholarship has the potential to expand our understanding of homelessness 
at a point where poverty and crime converge, and where control today manifests itself in forms 
of care and criminalization as responses that further cause disruption and have significant 
consequences.  
 
THIS STUDY 
To further criminological voice in studies on homelessness and crime, and situated in 
work that seeks to understand care, control, and criminalization as simultaneously acting forces, I 
provide a historical account of the construction of homelessness through highly consumed news 
media, the NYT. In order to address tendencies of criminology to provide ahistorical accounts of 
poverty and crime, this study offers a historical understanding of the present homelessness crisis 
through the work of Garland (2001), Simon (2007), and Wacquant (2009). Their work provides a 
framework for examining media constructions of homelessness and responses to it. 
Understanding these constructions will help us understand where we are today as some states and 
cities with the highest homelessness populations declare states of emergency, while others facing 
similar homelessness statistics and conditions do not.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD AND DATA 
This study traces the dominant cultural narratives shaping understandings of 
homelessness and crime in NYC from 1970-2012 as found in the NYT. Attention is directed to 
the framing of the social problem and responses to it. The research design allows for an 
inductively built qualitative examination of discursive practices found in a highly consumed 
news source. Three key points, with theoretical underpinnings traced to Michel Foucault, guide 
the discourse analysis. They include: genealogy of the subject, technologies of power, and 
constructing the homeless subject. The following chapter describes the research design, analytic 
techniques, and data used to trace narratives found. Each is described below.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN  
In order to trace the historical and political processes found in dominant cultural 
narratives on homelessness and the response to it, critical theory is the paradigm chosen. A 
paradigm is defined as “the set of common beliefs and agreements shared between scientists 
about how problem should be understood and addressed” (Kuhn 1962:45). Critical theory as a 
paradigm allows knowledge to be explored inductively, in order to build themes and 
interpretation from grounded data (Creswell 2003). It allows the researcher to understand social 
reality in a subjective and suspicious, yet scientific way (Guba and Lincoln 1994). This approach 
allows the researcher to explain why and how, rather than how much (Rourke and Szabo 2002).  
The critical paradigm is focused in historical realism. Guba and Lincoln (1994) define 
historical realism as reality shaped by social, political, culture, economic, ethnic, and gender 
values that are crystallized over time. A critical endeavor maintains focus on value and meaning 
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directed at understanding power and politics. Critical theory then is concerned with power 
relations and patterns of dominance. Critical theory looks at the world through a political lens, in 
which certain groups exert power and influence over other groups. It seeks to understand cultural 
aspects of power through narratives found in media. One method to examine narratives in the 
media from this paradigm using qualitative methods is through discourse analysis (Fairclough 
2001).  
Discourse analysis allows for in depth interrogation of language and the function it 
performs. Thus, I examine discursive practices that provide insight into power relations, social 
order, and practices surrounding homelessness and crime. Punishment and society theorists (i.e., 
Garland, Simon, and Wacquant) that situate their work in similarly critical endeavors use 
discourse analysis. Specifically, Garland (2014) discussed the method of writing a “history of the 
present” using Michel Foucault’s discourse analysis (FDA). The following outlines discourse 
analysis, specifically Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA), and the appropriate connection to 
this study. I then provide details of the data collection process, followed by coding and analytic 
techniques used.  
 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
Discourse is described as written texts, conversations, interviews, and multi-modal texts 
such as language and visual image (Fairclough 2001). Discourses represent particular ways of 
understanding and talking about the world (White and Stoneman 2012). Fairclough (2001) 
argues discourses are constitutive features of social interactions that produce and position people 
within social practices. Titscher and Jenner (2000) argue that understanding discursive practices 
is important to interrogating normalized and unquestioned “talk” around a subject over time.  
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Discourse analysis (DA), then, analyzes language situated in broad social, economic, 
political and culture contexts (van Dijk 1993; Fairclough 2001; Garland 2014). Specifically, DA 
is concerned with the dialectical relationship between language, ideology, and power (Fairclough 
2001). Henry and Milovanovic (1996) argue such an analysis enables the researcher to 
deconstruct and reconstruct meaning found in discourse, while maintaining sensitivity for 
dialectics of struggle. Various ways of doing DA exist. The particular DA method considers the 
intent of focus as either micro or macro (Fairclough 2001). This study seeks to examine social 
and institutional practices surrounding homelessness and crime. Thus, it falls under methods of 
DA that lean toward macro level analysis. DA is used to confront seemingly normalized, 
common sense, and logical understandings produced about a subject.  
Discourse analysis provides a useful method to connect texts, contexts, and practices in 
criminology. Particularly, it sheds light on the power of rhetorical constructs on creating realities 
and the reproduction of politics. DA connects discourse practices (i.e., the language, signs, 
meaning making) with the broad social, cultural, political contexts in which the discourse 
circulates (Henry and Milovanovic 1996; Fairclough 2001). This study extends criminological 
literature on homelessness and crime using discourse analysis. 
 
FOUCAULDIAN DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
One method of DA is Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA). FDA is recommended when 
examining social and institutional practices; whereas other methods of DA focus more on 
naturally occurring conversations or talk at an individual level (Edwards and Potter 1992). 
Additionally, Garland (2014), whose work drives theoretical understanding for this study, uses 
FDA in his own work and has produced knowledge based on its methods. As Garland (2014) 
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writes, FDA is used in studies that examine exclusionary or dividing practices, processes of 
“making” subjects and social problems productive, the dialectics of power-knowledge, and 
studies that seek to understand discourse as “productive of subjects and productive of truth” 
(Garland 2014: 367).  
Furthermore, Garland (2014) uses FDA as “a method of writing critical history: a way of 
using historical materials to bring about a ‘revaluing of values’ in the present day” in punishment 
and society studies. As found in his work, FDA is concerned with deconstructing language found 
exercising power and knowledge over governed subjects through disciplinary practices in 
institutions (Garland 2014). According to Garland (2014), influenced by Foucauldian work, 
history over time is important to understanding the present. Such scholars refer to this study of 
history as genealogy that embraces “the struggles, displacements, and processes” that reproduce 
practices over time and place (Garland 2014: 373). FDA is concerned with how the past is traced 
in power struggles identified and observed by scholars today (Garland 2014). To conduct this 
method, researchers first identify and problematize the practice. Then, a history of the present is 
traced to provoke or problematize normalized processes. Problematization refers to the method 
of highlighting the “power struggles that produced” processes and “the forces that gave birth to 
our present-day practices” (Garland 2014: 373).  
According to Howe (2014), a genealogy is conducted using three dimensions of 
Foucauldian thought (called specificities) to interrogate discursive practices using FDA. They 
include: veridiction (or historical truth at work or genealogy of the subject), governmentality (or 
the technologies, mechanisms, and functions of power), and subjectivations (construction of the 
subject through relation to veridiction and governmentality).  
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Foucault’s use of genealogies helps us expand notions of governance beyond the state to 
include a “myriad practices of governance within civil society” and the dialectical relations 
between governing practices (Howe 2014). Howe (2014: 223) describes the important work 
genealogy does in the study of the dialectics as it relates to a socially constructed world. 
“Genealogy proceeds by critically delineating and then comparing constructions over different 
periods in history, thus eschewing global generalizations about human life in favor of specific 
historical delineations of, say, practices of selfhood or relations of power” (Howe 2014: 223). 
Furthermore, veridiction refers to the “historical truth game at work in a given discourse” or 
historical truth at work (Howe 2014: 223). Governmentality refers to authority, control, and the 
creation of more “consensual” regimes of governance. This includes both, “those who govern 
and those who are governed” (Howe 2014: 223). Subjectivations refers to the practices in which 
the subject is created and situated in life in relation to veridiction and governmentality (Howe 
2014).  
Through a genealogy of homelessness, we understand how the homeless other is 
constructed (subjectivation), who and what governs homelessness (governmentality) and what 
historical truths are at work in their given contexts (veridiction). Importantly, we are able to see 
how the three specificities are constructed individually, but interactively, revealing the historical 
and political processes I discussed as important to this study. In terms of this study, I refer to 
each simply as genealogy of the subject, technologies of power, and constructing the homeless 
subject. 
The current study then is influenced by David Garland’s work (2014) in two ways: 
theoretically and methodologically. Theoretically, insights from the “discourse of fear” about 
crime and disorder are connected to broader shifts in crime controls are used to understand 
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homelessness and its responses in news media. Methodologically, FDA provokes a study of “the 
history of systems of thought” (Garland 2014: 369) around homelessness and its response. In 
combination, the strong theory and method connection seek to uncover the normalized and 
legitimized meanings reproduced, meanwhile exposing contradictions found, and making sense 
of homelessness and its responses in the present. Importantly, Garland’s (2014) theoretical and 
methodological use of FDA offers criminologists a method to study care and criminalization, 
forces that simultaneously exist in governing the homeless (see criticisms, Wolch and 
DeVeurtieul 2001).  
The methods used in this research design have now been outlined. The following details 
the data used to conduct the method and analysis. The data comes from one media source, in 
order to narrow the area of study and address issues of overgeneralization critiqued in past 
writings of Garland, Simon, and Wacquant’s theoretical contributions (Huey 2014). Below, I 
discuss parameters used in order to scientifically situate the process of data collection within 
theory and method. Parameters included location, source, and time frame. The following 
describes reasoning for the parameters chosen.  
 
PARAMETERS OF THE STUDY 
First, the location chosen for the study is NYC, New York, USA. In the late 1970s to mid 
1980s, the United States faced significant social change related to crime and its control. A 
prominent place often discussed is NYC, largely because it was discredited as a battleground of 
crime, violence, and disorder. Though cities across the United States began to see rises in crime 
and violence, NYC is among the major metropolitan areas thrust into the national media 
spotlight. However, within a short decade of seeing rising crime rates, politicians such as NYC 
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Mayor Rudolph Giuliani celebrated New York Police Department’s (NYPD) success in 
impacting high crime rates through strategies of broken windows and zero tolerance policing 
(White 2011). NYC was then referred to as the “city that became safe” through practiced 
crackdowns on crime and quality-of-life policing. Years later, in the investigation of the response 
to crime and disorder across America, scholars uncovered crime statistics manipulations, thus 
discrediting some of NYC’s celebrated strategies (Zimring 2012). Nonetheless, scholars focused 
on NYC to discuss the rise in high crime and the significant crime drop in the 1990s (Zimring 
2012). In the process, NYC became known for discriminatory practices such as arrests of the 
homeless (Smith 1998). Given the subject of this dissertation - homelessness and crime - NYC is 
an important, valuable location to confront discourse and politics of crime and poverty.  
Second, the source chosen is the NYT. The NYT is selected due to two reasons. First, it 
has an archival database available to conduct a historical analysis from the 1970s to recent. 
Second, it is highly consumed media across time and place, and it is situated in a notorious city 
(i.e., NYC) for crime and poverty studies. The NYT is highly consumed and given the proximity 
to NYC, it is a viable option to conduct such an analysis.  
Lastly, I chose the time frame 1970-2012 for two reasons. First, literature on punishment 
and society, specifically Garland (2001), Simon (2007), and Wacquant (2009), marks a shift in 
punitive practices within neoliberalism in the 1970s. During the 1970s, the mark of a neoliberal 
turn in U.S. history is connected to decline in the welfare system and increases in crime control 
(Harvey 1989; Harvey 2007; Garland 2001) that are also linked shifts in the experiences of crime 
and disorder in cities. Loïc Wacquant (2009) argued the scale of penal expansion over the 
decades since 1970 has shifted toward an increasingly profit-driven and privatized context in 
American politics. Such shifts increased measures to manage, control, and administer justice 
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through incoherent, exclusionary policies characterized by neoliberalism (Wacquant 2009). 
Thus, the 1970s mark a crucial point in studies of crime and poverty that provide opportunities to 
trace the “evisceration” of the welfare state and growth of the criminal justice institution 
(Wacquant 2009). Second, 2012 is chosen as the end date as it is the latest date available in the 
archives found in ProQuest Historical Newspapers: New York Times. I did not find a theoretical 
argument as to why this would change other parameters or negatively impact the study; 
therefore, the data are through the last day of the year 2012.  
 
DATA 
The data for this study are news articles, chosen for a few reasons. First, significant 
studies show media are influential in constructing our understanding of the social problems 
(Altheide 2001). Second, punishment and society scholars Garland (2001) and Simon (2007) 
specifically argue media are influential and use the news as specific source where power of 
political and public agendas are reproduced across time and space.  
Next, I chose to conduct discourse analysis on a news source that is highly consumed 
throughout time and provides historical archives in order to meet the parameters of the study. 
Therefore, I chose to use the NYT. The NYT is also available using Pro Quest Historical 
Newspapers at my educational institution without additional cost. This meets criteria for 
conducting a historically based study.  
ProQuest Historical Newspapers is a database that allows the user to search articles over 
time using key terms. Additionally, I was able to specify returned articles that were published in 
a particular time frame. Provided this tool, I used the terms “homeless” and “crime” and selected 
parameters to return articles from the year 1970 to the latest date available on the database, 
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which is the year 2012. The number of articles in the sample from 1970-2012, using key terms 
“homeless” and “crime” was 4,495.  
In the next steps, the large sample was narrowed down using ProQuest database to ensure 
articles were pertinent to this research. Three pre-defined categories allowed me to exclude 
articles that did not fit based on “document type,” “subject,” and “location.” First, I narrowed 
results based on pre-defined category “document type” provided by ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers: NYT. I excluded the following from the articles returned based on “document 
type”: table of contents, summaries, classified ads, real estate transactions, marriages, and 
obituaries. Second, I excluded the following from the articles returned based on “subject”: book 
reviews, theater, television, music, motion pictures, other productions, title indexes and 
summaries. Third, I excluded the following from the articles returned based on “location”: 
locations outside of the United States, locations outside of the State of New York. I included 
those filed under locations categorized in the State of New York in order read through the 
articles more intimately to determine if they are related to NYC’s homelessness and crime as I 
conduct the discourse analysis. NYC is a large metropolitan of the State of New York; therefore, 
an article that discussed homelessness and crime in surrounding cities may also discuss 
homelessness and crime in NYC or discuss statewide discussions relevant to NYC. Using the 
pre-defined categories provided by ProQuest Historical Newspapers: NYT, I narrowed the results 
using ProQuest to a sample that would next be examined by the researcher to double check 
parameters (N= 1,831).  
Next, I organized articles in chronological order and downloaded all from the sample 
narrowed down using ProQuest Historical Newspapers: NYT. In this next phase, I read the 
sample to determine that three parameters are met. They include: location is relevant/situated in 
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NYC, New York, USA, result is a news article or editorial, and articles discussed homelessness 
and crime. Then I conducted a preliminary read for general themes and codes regarding the topic 
focused on in the articles. I continued the study intimately engaged with the data, where a 
codebook was created to note all qualified and unqualified articles. The final articles analyzed 
for this study represented homelessness and crime in NYC, New York, in the United States (N= 
1,264; by decade 1970-1979: N=30, 1980-1989: N=172, 1990-1999: N=490, 2000-2012: N=572. 
Percentages for each theme that emerged are presented within the respective decades at the 
beginning of each chapter in the analysis. 
 
CODING  
Discourse analysis requires a researcher to reflexively engage with the data continually 
throughout the process. The coding strategy requires the researcher to become intimately 
knowledgeable of the data. The data chosen for this study is purposive and theoretical, and the 
data collection, analysis, and interpretation process of the final articles (N=1,264) analyzed was 
continually reflexive and circular (Altheide 1987: 67).  
The sample of news articles were analyzed for themes that emerged in an open coding 
strategy. In a preliminary read, I developed broad themes based upon discursive patterns that 
emerged on news coverage of homelessness and crime. Discourse analysis involves an open 
coding strategy where the researcher reads the data and assigns attributes to specific units of 
analysis, such as paragraphs, sentences, or individual words (Altheide 1987; Saldaña 2015). 
Plummer (1983) refers to this as a reflexive analysis of documents. I reflexively approached the 
data through analysis of textual and narrative descriptions. In the codebook, I maintained 
paragraphs, sentences, and individual words as comments of the data to refer to before 
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conducting a second and third review of the data (Altheide 1987:67). In the preliminary read, 
topics emerged in several major themes that related to FDA.  
Specifically, three overarching narratives appeared around governance and policing, 
housing, and the homeless other. Governance and policing included actors that administer 
surveillance and safety in the city and provide management of various spaces that connected to 
Foucault’s governmentality. Similarly, the emergent narrative around housing appeared that 
included shelters and hotels, which connected to Foucault’s governmentality. In addition, the 
emergent narratives constructing the homeless other, typically as criminal, victim, or other, 
connected to Foucault’s notion of subjectivations. These points emerged in the preliminary read 
of the data. 
The preliminary read conducted helped categorize data into narratives, or as Fairclough 
(2001) referred tropes or narratives. The narratives are used as a start for further investigating the 
data. Hatch (2002: 152) argued it is essential to first read the data in early stages in order to begin 
to “divide it into elements (i.e., disaggregate it from the whole) based on predetermined 
categories.” While narratives are shaped by existing literature and knowledge, reflexivity is 
maintained and continued engagement with the data is achieved through open coding throughout 
the continually interactive process. The second and third read provide ensure the researcher is 
thorough in the investigation. 
Next, I conducted a second and third read of the data in order to deconstruct normalized 
narratives about homelessness and crime. This phase takes the researcher beyond general coding 
and word or phrase count, to examine hidden meaning found in discursive practices. This phase 
further builds Foucault’s specificities (i.e., veridiction, governmentality, and subjectivation) and 
was used in order to trace a genealogy of homelessness and its responses. The second and third 
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read of the data are different from the first read. In the first read of the data, noting key phrases 
and ideas is used to provide a map of how the content in the data are discussed. Hermann 
(2015:85) further argued the use of initial typologies as “essential” in cases where thousands of 
articles, or pages, are found. However, this process becomes a more “sophisticated system” in 
the second and third examinations of the data. 
 
SUMMARY OF DESIGN, DATA, AND ANALYSIS 
The analytic techniques of discourse analysis, specifically Foucauldian discourse analysis 
(FDA), lie in the pragmatic goals of Michel Foucault. David Garland (2014) expanded 
knowledge of FDA in the field of criminology in order to broaden theoretical understandings of 
society’s governance through crime control and an increasing penal state. Discourse analysis, 
specifically FDA, is useful for scholars that seek to trace a “history of the present” of social 
problems. Garland (1992; 2001; 2010) and Harcourt (2011) provided critical histories of crime 
and punishment that used elements of this method. What is often criticized is the focus on theory 
rather then strict methodology. In fact, Foucault is noted for the development of unconventional 
historical method, or even “anti-method” (Shriner 1982).  
Nonetheless, this study traces some of the dominant cultural narratives shaping 
understandings of homelessness and crime from 1970-2012 (N=1,264) found in the NYT. It is 
appropriately situated in NYC, NY (USA) given the source and the literature on crime and 
disorder frequented in criminology. The research design allows for an inductively built 
qualitative examination that is guided by three key points in order to conduct a discourse 
analysis, specifically a Foucauldian discourse analysis: genealogy of the subject (veridiction), 
mechanisms or technologies of power (governmentality), and constructions of the homeless other 
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(subjectivation). The proceeding chapters (iv, v, vi, vii) provide the analysis and results of each 
decade. Though the chapters are divided based on decade, it is important to note the narrative 
continues and these are arbitrary boundaries set for organizing purpose. The first analysis chapter 
begins with analysis provided from the 1970s. 
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CHAPTER IV 
GENTRIFICATION AND DISPLACEMENT IN THE 1970s 
There are 30 NYT articles analyzed in this chapter. They include articles between 1970-
1979 that fit the parameters outlined in the methods chapter. In short, the articles focused on 
homelessness and crime found in the United States, specifically those addressing the politics of 
NYC as it relates to state and federal movements. Approximately 73% of the sample from this 
decade constructed the homeless subject. This is found both within articles that describe 
homelessness through descriptors of homeless subjects in addition to articles focused on 
describing the homeless subject. Narratives around the homeless other varied as homeless 
subjects are constructed as criminals, victims, or witnesses of crime. In this decade, we see 
homelessness as an issue that coexists with crime and disorder. Attention to homeless youth in 
gangs illustrates the need for social response to social problems in order to prevent further 
deterioration. In the 1970s, we see the emergence of forms of governance found in the 
community as responses to the socially constructed homeless subject.  
In addition, nearly 53% of the articles analyzed discussed Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality or technologies and mechanisms of power through the role of the police and 
policing surrounding homeless and crime in NYC. For example, one story shared police 
commentary on the youth gang problem as police apprehended two youth charged in the 
“slaying” of a Brooklyn man (Haff 1971). Nearly 47% discuss technologies of power found in 
housing, shelters, and neighborhood or residential concern with various homeless housing as 
experts and systems are tasked with their responses to homelessness. Additionally, narratives 
emerged around budgetary concerns (26%), as well as families and youth (26%). 
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As the analysis shows, the role of police and housing dominate the discussion. During the 
1970s, NYC witnessed great social change. The narrative advocated for increased police 
protection in the City to address crime and disorder. In addition, police are the authority that 
provides information on crime relevant to NYC. Police are a significant actor then in shaping 
knowledge of NYC’s crime problem and in turn, response to the problem calls for more police 
protection. Narratives on housing and residential concern in neighborhoods included a number of 
actors from the community, including police. Residents’ voices dominated discussion of 
deteriorating neighborhoods, specifically business and homeowners that demanded social 
concerns of homelessness and crime be addressed by the city. The blurred image of the homeless 
and criminal is found throughout narratives which calls for removal of the homeless criminal 
other in order to address issues of crime and disorder. It also calls for removal of the deserving 
homeless other to housing programs. Both are desired to address the crime and disorder problem 
generally.  
During the 1970s, the responsibility to address problems of crime and disorder fell to 
politicians for response. In addition to reports of residents and business owners demanding police 
response, politicians were pressured to provide more funding and laws that enabled police 
powers, such as zoning ordinance changes. The narrative in the 1970s included demanding more 
from the city and its various extensions through complaints and criticism for past shortcomings. 
This is illustrated through stories of city non-profits that are unable to provide for the needs of 
homelessness and poverty as actors engaged in the public debate of what to do about the 
homelessness and crime problem. Two themes emerge, one that discusses the eviction of those 
who commit criminal and deviant acts from housing supported by the housing authority, and 
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another which shifts toward the role of private property developers to clean up housing offered to 
homeless. This narrative escalates in future decades.  
A common discussion point throughout the 1970s is the deterioration of neighborhoods 
and city conditions where the urgency of the social problem is illustrated in stories of 
deterioration found in symbolically powerful public places. Specifically, stories share how crime 
and disorder are regularly found within the systems set up to manage such problems, including in 
the halls of court houses and in a broken system that does not provide for juveniles. Here, we see 
care control and criminalization converge most clearly and powerfully as the narrative advocates 
a cleaning up of crime and disorder in the streets and within the system to provide better justice 
for all. Ideas of rehabilitation and prevention, versus classical notions of swift and severe 
punishment, are represented in the way this is talked about.  
Throughout these discussions, another dominant narrative emerges centered on the 
legitimization and necessity of state governance over urban space. The framing of issues of 
crime and disorder as neighborhood concerns that need immediate response is centered on the 
visibility of crime and stories of victimization witnessed in NYC. The homeless are a subject 
linked to stories of crime and violence. Additionally, homelessness is a visual symbol of crime 
and disorder in neighborhoods as residents and business owners call for increased measures to 
clean up the city. In this sense, constructing the homeless subject as one of crime and disorder is 
justified as an indicator of the pervasiveness of social problems in the neighborhood. The extent 
to which this is a concern is further legitimized through the symbolic nature of a courthouse 
becoming home to the homeless. The convergence of two powerful subjects, the homeless and 
the criminal other, in space – whether it is the neighborhood or the courthouse – frames an 
urgency for city’s to change NYC’s deteriorating conditions.  
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Finally, in this decade we will see an adjoining narrative that reiterates the need for 
increased social control of marginally excluded who live in slum areas of NYC by specifically 
placing responsibility of governments to provide urban renewal strategies. These strategies for 
redevelopment of neighborhoods are presented in an equal opportunity guise that allows the 
middle and upper class residents of the neighborhoods to overcome struggles with which they are 
faced. Throughout, the rhetoric of a need for urban renewal and gentrification, which better 
serves an “urban elite” whose voices are prioritized, overshadows the social harm caused by 
these processes.  
The broader politics of gentrification and policing urban space unfold in two 
communities: Greenwich Village and its neighbor NoHo. Greenwich and NoHo are 
neighborhoods discussed as those caught in the shuffle of NYC urban renewal projects. 
Narratives on housing and policing are found in this discourse surrounding homelessness and 
crime in the neighborhoods. 
 
GENTRIFYING GREENWICH VILLAGE AND NOHO 
In the 1970s, Greenwich Village (the Village) and North of Houston (NoHo) are a 
battleground of the politics of homelessness and the attendant forces of gentrification. Greenwich 
and NoHo emerge as a location where voices of residents and business owners demand 
improvement in the conditions faced, how improvement is achieved through urban renewal 
supported by the city and police, and how acknowledging the pervasive and problematic realities 
of homelessness as poverty and crime concerns impacts safety and security of the community. 
The narrative of the homeless subject found works here to justify and necessitate state control 
over urban space by managing the population through strict housing and police controls over the 
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homeless criminal other. It expresses neighbors’ concerns, politicians’ concerns, the police, and 
explicit zoning of space to address issues of crime and disorder through the social problem of 
homelessness.  
Attention is focused on Greenwich, as “angry shopkeepers and residents” are among 
voices of the neighborhoods shared in the NYT. Greenwich residents indicate a long struggle in 
the neighborhood as it is “being made a ‘dumping ground’ for undesirables by the city’s 
Department of Social Services” (Hudson 1970). Powerful civic leagues and community leaders 
argued (Hudson 1970: 27):  
…muggers, rapists, thieves, and addicts plague the Village, making it unsafe to work or 
live in or to visit. The city had been referring homeless clients, including those just out of 
prison, to the Greenwich and other transient hotels for men.  
Greenwich Village, described in one article as the “once Bohemian community”, faced 
significant changes following World War II and now its residents strive to rebuild its “liberal and 
historic” status. Residents share they are unfairly threatened by issues of crime and disorder 
brought about by homeless and other marginalized groups (Lichtenstein 1970). The “presence of 
1,500 to 2,000 homeless single men on welfare, 90 percent of them black, many of them recently 
released convicts” that, according to police, are a “major cause of the area’s crime” further 
constructed the image of who is to blame for the deterioration of the neighborhood (Lichtenstein 
1970: 1). Here, we see a powerful statement where residents provide the extent to which 
concerns of homelessness and crime in their neighborhood have risen and the authority of the 
police is used to further draw attention to the demands. 
Additionally, we see Greenwich residents continually blurred the image of the homeless 
subject with the criminal and disorderly other in the neighborhood. For example, a differentiation 
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between “hippies” and the homeless other is indicated that constructs a difference between the 
harmless, free subject versus those who are unemployed and engage in deviant and criminal 
behavior, the latter as a nuisance. One article stated “hippies were appalled” at the shift in the 
neighborhood to include more residents that were “heroin addicts” diseased from “rampant” 
hepatitis and venereal disease, and the “thousands of other jobless and homeless young” who 
moved to the area “threatening” the peace of the neighborhood (Wooten 1971). Low income, 
welfare recipients, and transient populations are constructed then as threats to Greenwich in their 
quest to rebuild from less ideal times. 
The voices of residents and business owners are well represented in the NYT during this 
decade. However, we begin to see a shift toward the voices of politicians and community leaders 
with recognized authority. One example is the Village Action Alliance, a Republican political 
committee, mostly comprised of business owners and residents that organized protests and 
advocated rights for Greenwich as a neighborhood. It’s activities ranged from drawing attention 
to deteriorating physical conditions of streets and parks to removing various attractions of danger 
and crime. Ralph de Blasio commented, on behalf of the Village Action Alliance, that the 
community “cannot live under this situation” and the effects of “undesirables ‘has to stop’” 
(Hudson 1970). Here, we begin to see voices appear on behalf of entire political organizations 
that represent key productive populations found within the city. Leaders of political community 
organizations engage with city officials and state politicians as the discussion plays out in the 
NYT. 
In another example, political leader, Edward Koch, at the time Democratic representative 
for the 17th District, reflected on conditions in Greenwich that supported concerns by de Blasio 
and the Village Action Alliance. Koch described the recent rise in homelessness and crime 
	
	
	
	
	
42 
problem as a “horde of locusts … descending on us” and linked the fear of crime and disorder in 
neighborhoods to changes in low and mixed income housing (Lichtenstein 1970). Representative 
Koch framed the current rise in homelessness as a negative consequence stemming from rent 
controlled housing in NYC (Lichtenstein 1970). One reporter shared the story of Greenwich as a 
process of slow deterioration resulting from the changing housing situations (Lichtenstein 1970): 
The police, who were already anxious, have become even more unnerved, and now the 
fear flows freely, like the sweet smell of hemp becoming ash, seeping into the very bricks 
and mortar, lurking malevolently around the corner of every day… By the summer of 
1970, it was estimated that as many as 5,000 hippies had taken up permanent residence in 
The [Village], and in addition to them were the hundreds of ‘street people,’ the passers 
through, on their way from nothing to nowhere.  
Concerns were shared with city officials and political leaders who responded. For 
example, Mayor Lindsey’s (1966-1973) Administration responded to Greenwich residents with 
“extreme concern” and supported the notion that increased police patrols were the necessary to 
fix the city’s “acute problem[s].” Here, we see city officials and Greenwich residents agree that 
police response would end the issues of crime and disorder. Organizations like de Blasio’s 
Village Action Alliance specifically indicate control of the homeless criminal other is necessary 
for the neighborhood to “get [their] parks and community back.” Greenwich residents continued 
to demand, “better police protection” against a “tidal wave of crime” that occurred nationally. 
This is reflected in an article that covered Greenwich and linked it to national political agendas. 
Mayor John Lindsay commented (Hudson 1970), “The war on crime will continue to be the first 
priority of my administration.” 
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In the NYT articles, Greenwich was a prioritized space where the conflict over issues of poverty, 
crime, and gentrification garnered political attention and action. 
Police presence was not the only solution suggested by politicians and residents however. 
Articles primarily covered demands of the Greenwich residents for “more police protection and 
[for the city to] stop housing single men on welfare in local transient hotels” (Hudson 1970:27). 
Longstanding efforts to provide housing for “homeless clients, including those just out of prison” 
under direction of the Social Services Department in Greenwich continued to be largely 
contested (Hudson 1970). Further and unsurprisingly, the demand for changes in zoning 
ordinances emerged as a topic. This is illustrated through targeted efforts to remove welfare 
hotels from neighborhoods such as North of Houston Street (NoHo). One strategy to clean up 
welfare housing (Metropolitan Briefs 1974): 
Midtown Realty Owners Association opposed use of [a] hotel for homeless…former New 
Yorker hotel [to] be used to house the temporarily homeless. The association, in a letter 
to Mayor Beame [1974-1977] on Friday, said, the ‘influx of homeless families’ at the 
hotel, at Eighth Avenue and 34th Street would ‘disrupt the vital business services’ that are 
essential to the area.  
In the articles, private development and business are prioritized and their voices emerged 
to discuss the unequal and slow pace of zoning changes across NYC. This is illustrated in one 
story where NoHo residents said they felt “slated” compared to neighboring communities, such 
as South of Houston Street (SoHo), that benefited from the zoning changes (Blumenthal 1972). 
NoHo faced a lack of zoning changes that left residents and business owners in NoHo “deserted 
neighborhood of locked warehouses” where they faced the impacts of welfare hotels and 
displaced populations. In being “left behind,” NoHo residents voiced they were left “targets of 
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muggers, burglars and other predators” that were displaced from their neighbors, such as SoHo 
and Greenwich (Blumenthal 1972).  
Responsibility for unequal and slow paced changes across the city is placed on the City 
and residents expressed concerns that the community was left to protect itself. Residents shared 
they were forced to “come together and create a nightly presence in the area that serves to deter 
crime”(Blumenthal 1972). The problem had become so pervasive, one article indicated, that 
NoHo business owners were forced to “scrutinize” customers through “locked door[s] before 
they [were] admitted” into local businesses (Blumenthal 1972). The answer to this undesirable 
dynamic of threat and victimization of crime and disorder faced by NoHo’s residents and 
business owners rested in zoning ordinance changes. Residents and business owners did not have 
an interest in leaving, as they “always liked it here” however “there was the feeling at night of 
stepping over bodies” (Blumenthal 1972).  
The narrative further prioritized businesses, shoppers, and consumers actively engaged in 
NoHo as NYC attempted to rebuild it. The problematic population needed to change and the 
residents or business owners did not entertain leaving. Therefore, removing the source of the 
problem through police and zoning was the solution to issues faced in NoHo, much like 
Greenwich. Essential to this narrative is the construction of the homeless other as a problematic 
population. Stories illustrate how homelessness and poverty are blurred with crime and disorder 
to define the population and justify removal from productive neighborhoods.  
A counter narrative emerged less frequently that challenged the dominant imagery that 
constructed homelessness as a cause of crime and disorder in neighborhoods. Occasionally, 
police reported that their crime records did not agree with residents’ perceptions of crime and 
disorder faced. This is illustrated in stories that shed light on the contentious topic of single room 
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occupancy hotels in neighborhoods. Residents looked to single-room-occupancy hotels that 
“cater” to welfare recipients in the 1970s as “centers of crime.” This explanation reproduced 
support for gentrification and zoning changes in order to remove populations from certain places. 
For example, NoHo residents discussed hotels that now “receive[d] men discharged from city 
prisons and other homeless poor” that caused issues in NoHo. The pervasiveness of this is further 
framed as a social problem that impacted surrounding areas as “crime spreads to the surrounding 
streets, seriously downgrading neighborhoods and threatening to destroy them” (Shumach 1970). 
The counter narrative emerges when police officers, such as Captain Edward Roberts, reported 
that NoHo actually witnessed a decline in robberies and burglaries. These types of 
acknowledgement are less frequent and certainly overshadowed by resident perceptions that 
portrayed a dirty and dangerous NYC and worked in favor of gentrification and urban renewal 
strategies. One commentator equated recent conditions to that of major European cities, framing 
the problem as something that is only temporary and has potential to achieve that of iconic 
European cities if proper response occurs (Blumenthal 1972), “…New York in the nineteen-
seventies is like Restoration London or Francois Villon’s Paris. It’s dirty and dangerous but 
people will talk of this era.”  
 
SOLUTIONS FOR HOUSING ISSUES 
The previous section illustrated how mediated images of crime and disorder framed 
urgency to find an immediate solution. During the 1970s, gentrification and urban renewal were 
powerful solutions to the crime and disorder problem situated in politics that prioritized private 
development for residents and business owners. Additionally, notions of private development as 
a solution to the city’s problems emerge in discussions to find solutions for deteriorating welfare 
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hotels. In this context, the city is framed as failing in the management of low incoming housing 
in NYC. NYC public officials are criticized and labeled as “careless, indifferent landlord” who is 
“worse than profiteering slumlords” (Weisman 1971). Such a criticism fueled the argument for 
private development, by both businesses and residents, as necessary in “cleaning up” areas that 
formerly housed low income; the known “meccas” for the homeless and supposedly criminal 
residents of NYC (Weisman 1971).  
The narrative of privatized housing services emerged in the 1970s as a solution to issues 
of low-income housing and “slum communities” (Weisman 1971). This narrative is further 
legitimized as the city is framed as a failure in low incoming housing management. This is 
illustrated in stories that covered three topics throughout the decade including discussion about 
the role of the city and non-profits, stories of evictions imposed by housing authorities and 
opposed by community members, and the debated impact of S.R.Os in effectively addressing 
homelessness and poverty. We begin with efforts by the city and non-profits to clean up housing 
and address urban renewal demands. 
In 1962, NYC placed responsibility of the city housing and development on the City 
Urban Renewal Management Corporation (CURMCO), a domestic not-for-profit corporation 
that included city partnerships. Specifically, CURMCO’s role was to provide housing to 
displaced and homeless following city’s recent condemnation of deteriorating buildings. In the 
1970s, CURMCO was charged with providing 3,800 units for housing displaced families from 
neighborhoods where emergencies were declared and rapid condemnation of “severe and 
unwarranted hardships” faced in “slum” communities occurred (Weisman 1971). Moreover, 
CURMCO promoted ideas of reinvestment from the private sector through federally subsidized 
incentives. NYC received a majority of New York State’s federal funding for redevelopment 
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under support of the Committee on Slum Clearance. CURMCO was specifically charged with 
redevelopment in order to “eradicate rampant deterioration and to stimulate private investment.”  
During the 1970s, CURMCO and the City Housing Authority faced jeopardized relations 
with property management as neighborhoods dealt with condemned public housing. CURMCO 
was criticized for being “guided by a desire to balance its books than by the need to provide even 
minimal services” (Weisman 1970) and for running the city into a $16.5 million deficit while 
“managing city owned properties on urban renewal sites” in NYC (Ashbury 1973).  
Incompetence was met with race and class conflict as NYC faced rapidly shifting 
migration across the city’s boroughs during the 1970s. For example, among the criticisms of 
CURMCO is rhetoric that attributes its shortcomings to 150 of its men who “were specially 
chosen untrained blacks and Puerto Ricans from local communities affected by urban renewal” 
(Weisman 1970). Conflicts over race and class were at the forefront of New Yorkers concerns as 
they adjusted to pre-1970s migration of Puerto Ricans, Haitians, and African Americans. Areas 
of Manhattan became associated with poverty and crime, which certainly stigmatized and 
deepened race and class conflicts. The 1970s marked a shift where the city increasingly 
supported the growth of retail and privately managed services that would attract wealthier 
population as NYC sought to move toward the image of productivity and success. 
Racialized comments concerning unskilled labor and low-income housing appeared and 
fueled stereotyped images of the homeless, criminal other. They further framed the need to 
improve conditions of the city through corporate, private developers from the wealthier, more 
successful areas of NYC that were predominantly white. Through narratives that discussed an 
unsuccessful CURMCO run by “unskilled” and “migrant” residents, the private sector was 
further framed as a more viable option to revive neighborhoods and address issues of safety and 
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security. A dominant narrative emerged that prioritized property value and protection of 
businesses over the rights of the city’s criminal and poor. This is illustrated in a story that shared 
outrage over recent burglary of private developers’ maintenance shops several times per week. 
One resident reflected on the negative impact these crimes have in rebuilding and driving away 
private developers, “We’ve lost control. There’s no security at all” (Weisman 1971).  
Another side to the narrative seeks to further displacement found in condemned and 
deteriorated spaces across NYC. In 1973, the Broadway Central Hotel, which temporarily 
housed low income “transients and welfare recipients”, collapsed following a noted “back and 
forth” between the owners and the city. The city cited the hotel for structural instability; 
meanwhile the owner and property manager said they faced resistance from the city in any 
efforts to address the citations. Shumach (1973) and Montgomery (1973) covered the story of the 
collapsed building, as 5 out of 308 residents remained unaccounted for after debris was removed 
during the search. The collapse left many displaced and some were relocated to temporary 
housing elsewhere as politics surrounding the irresponsibility of the landowner’s and city played 
out and neutralized the harm caused to transient residents. One article stated (Montgomery 
1973), “…For some of them, who were welfare clients, the shifting from hotel to hotel was a 
familiar part of their lives.” 
The story of displacement following actions of NYC Housing Authority, the “nation’s 
largest landlord,” continued as the city faced budget cuts and rising rent costs (Schuman 1975). 
The NYC Housing Authority discussed rising rent, electric, heat, gas, and police force budget 
cuts that impacted their ability to provide public housing facilities. This economic and financial 
deficit was compounded by city efforts to crack down on crime and deviance found in public 
housing. The question of where to put families and who is responsible for providing their 
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housing, is raised and also included how to decide who received limited services of public 
housing. One strategy cited in the 1970s included eviction based on “undesirability.”  
In 1973, the NYT reported the NYC Housing Authority for evicting three families for 
undesirability on grounds the children committed crimes. As reported, Cynthia Bryant and her 
four children were threatened with eviction and faced a long battle in court to fight to stay in the 
neighborhood after her youngest plead guilty to criminal trespassing. Following an arrest for 
burglary and possession of burglary tools, Bryant’s son was sentenced to Riker’s Island. The 
Housing Authority “battled” to evict the family in three separate hearings, and stated the eviction 
was “necessary” as the family was “a danger to the health and safety of your project neighbors 
and the surrounding community.” Reporters stated the “neighbors petitioned asking that the 
family be allowed to remain in the home” (Fraser 1973). Eventually, the New York State 
Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order against the Housing Authority from evicting 
Bryant’s family. Cynthia Bryant’s comment from court papers stated (Fraser 1973), “…to punish 
an entire family by rendering it homeless because one member of that family has pleaded guilty 
to a criminal act is to operate on an irrational theory of guilty by association.” 
During this time, a case like the Bryants caught media attention and called for revising 
the City’s approach to “problem families.” Though clearly receiving some sympathy, not all 
agreed. Many saw such families as severe social problems that “monopolize the time of building 
managers and personnel” and “tax the legal and administrative staff during the lengthy evictions 
process” (Schuman 1975). Some fellow residents blamed the “single mother with too many 
children and no control” for new problems faced in the low-income neighborhoods (Schuman 
1975). Joseph Christian, chairman of the Housing Authority, reported (Schuman 1975), 
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“…Problem families constitute a small percentage of public housing tenants. They can really 
destroy a project.” 
This story shares the complicated relationship between the resistance to the practiced 
evictions that is protested by some locals and that is placed on hold by the New York State 
Supreme Court. However, it provided a mediated image of powerful authorities blaming a small 
percentage of problem families on the deterioration of the city’s project areas.  
Finally, stories discuss incompetence by city management in the handling of single room 
occupancy (S.R.O) hotels. A common goal shared across the decade included finding the 
individuals, particularly congregations of individuals, who caused problems in the 
neighborhoods, then using City strategies discussed above to evict and/or confine such problems. 
It is here that the movement to dismantle single-room-occupancy hotels in NYC is discussed. 
During the 1970s, NYC experienced significant cuts in the availability of low-income housing, 
primarily because of the processes surrounding building deterioration, gentrification and reduced 
federal funding for housing. During this time, many New Yorkers faced difficulty finding 
affordable housing and apartments of single room occupancy hotels were used as a primary 
source of housing for populations who faced hardship. The dramatic reduction of S.R.O units 
witnessed in the 1960s and 1970s had an impact faced in the rhetoric found here. Though, 
S.R.Os were used by many populations, including migrants and artists, for affordability and 
convenience purposes, an image is constructed that suggests individuals in S.R.Os caused the 
NYC crime problem. Thus, the city was further legitimated in finding ways to remove single 
room occupancy hotels from the city landscape. 
The sentiments felt about NYC S.R.Os were not universal across time or place. For 
example, the NYT featured criticisms by the Philadelphia Department of Public Assistance that 
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stated the existence of S.R.Os, homelessness, and crime did not mean a “cause and effect” 
relationship existed. Furthermore, NYC is referred to as unique in the relationship between 
S.R.Os homelessness and crime because those who stayed in the S.R.Os are attributed to crime 
and disorder problems. However, this narrative found in NYC is not consistent with others across 
the United States as cities struggle with the image of S.R.Os as crime infested. For example, in 
Indianapolis and San Francisco police explained the phenomenon of more crime as a “condition 
of the hotel, its location and the minor unlawful activities common to cheap hotels,” not 
necessarily transient or homeless people that temporarily reside there. In the same story, NYC is 
criticized for how it used hotels as “foster homes” for “its 4,000 or so released mental patients 
each year” and the use of S.R.Os as “hotels for prisoners”, or those released from Riker’s Island 
and other city penal institutions. One Pittsburgh management personnel commented on his 
“operation” – the S.R.O he ran - with fondness: “We never cease to amaze the police with the 
serenity of our operation… [NYC S.R.Os] are dreadful” (Siegel 1972).  
The juxtaposition of NYC’s S.R.Os compared to other major cities, particularly framed in 
a negative light, and served as fuel for neighborhood alliances to call for increased security 
measures. These security measures included calls for increased police presence and for NYC to 
take control of neighborhoods. Ralph de Blasio, at the time Chairman of the businessmen’s 
organization called Village Action Alliance, argued the crime “has to stop.” It is constructed that 
the increased number of holdups and harassments of citizens’ areas like Greenwich and NoHo 
created a barrier to the city cleaning up its image and addressing crime and disorder. 
Specifically, stories report that the transient populations that resided in S.R.Os were the problem 
and removing their presence, both the individuals and the hotels themselves, would make NYC 
“more livable and to encourage businesses to relocate there.”  
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The powerful imagery of chaos, mayhem, and a broken neighborhood was used to further 
ideas of gentrification, as well as displacement and eviction of undesirables. Locals expressed 
the concern that those who lived in provided housing needed to be “broken up”, dispersed, and 
further controlled by the police. One resident commented, “the history of dumping is mainly a 
chronicle of bureaucratic maneuvering and mistakes” (Koenig 1978). Here, the bureaucratic 
maneuvering and mistakes are considered issues with city housing officials and political leaders. 
Meanwhile, the need to increase local alternative responses to the social problem through the 
police and community is continually advocated. In doing so, it is argued that the local 
community knows how to handle this, therefore releasing city controls of services and disperse 
resources that specifically deal with the issues of poverty, crime, and homelessness found in 
places like the S.R.Os. 
Concerns about the S.R.Os, as well as the stories of eviction and city and non-profits, 
played a significant role in the construction of private development as a viable option. Generally, 
public services and city organizations were cited for the failures to address the problem now and 
criticized for their efforts that led to the conditions faced in NYC. NYC Mayor Lindsay’s (1966-
1973) administration discussed the necessity to cater to private developers in the city in order to 
continue construction of new housing units and the rebuilding of NYC. This shifted focus on the 
part of political leaders mirrored sentiments provided in residential demands to ensure private 
development as residents and businesses joined in neighborhoods. Mayor Lindsay stated the city 
needed to ensure “its future neighbors” (i.e., private developers) were welcomed and that those 
neighbors must “[play] a significant role in designing it” (Starr 1970).  
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DETERIORATING SPACES IN NYC 
The image of deteriorated spaces in NYC and urgency to clean up the city was 
particularly illustrated in stories about the NYC Criminal Courts Building and the justice system 
generally. The powerful imagery of the Courthouse included homeless sleeping on benches with 
heroin needles spread about the floor. The symbolic power of the Courthouse connected images 
of deterioration, crime, and homelessness as a normalized occurrence was reflected on as 
unacceptable and fueled the argument that urgent and serious interventions were needed. 
NYC Criminal Courts Building in Manhattan was referred to as a “sordid setting” 
(Chambers 1974), where a homeless man sat on a bench with his belongings. One officer 
commented in the article, “In the halls of justice there’s no respect – even for property” as 
multiple stories outline how homelessness, heroin addiction, and crime infested behaviors have 
taken over the Criminal Courts Building. Such powerful imagery continues to blur homelessness 
with crime, disorder, and expresses threats to the legitimacy of the justice system and NYC 
authority faced in the 1970s. An article in the NYT stated (Chambers 1974) 
Enter the lobby at 100 Centre Street. Half dozen vagrants who have spent the night in the 
building wander up and back, up and back. A spaced-out addict dances by, bumping into 
people…At the information desk, prostitutes, pimps and well known pickpockets drink 
soda pop and grind cigarettes into the filthy floor. No information is dispensed at the 
information desk. It has not been staffed for years.  
Anyone who walks the halls, reports one article, faced a “treacherous” path and scene, likened to 
that of a “zoo.” The conditions faced are not safe and are no longer secure.  
One NYT reporter provided criminal justice practitioners’ descriptive details of the Courts 
“today” where drug paraphernalia and addicts lined the halls of the Courthouse. Police, lawyers, 
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judges, legal aides, among other authorities described the court’s atmosphere as “degrading”, 
“disturbing”, “a pigsty”, “a hangout for vagrants”, and “a depressing, sad place”. Supreme Court 
Justice David Ross commented (Chambers 1974), “…The building looks like a stable. But after 
awhile, if you work in a stable long enough, you don’t smell the horse manure…How do you 
have respect for the law when you start out with dirty courtrooms?” 
The courthouse and its “disappearance of dignity and the atmosphere of degradation and 
hopelessness” are said to have increased in the late 1960s and into the 1970s. Importantly, it is 
framed that the current bad conditions are new. The designation of its deterioration as a new 
problem provides a sense of rapid deterioration by referring to “better times” when average 
people could regularly participate in viewing the Courts in action without fear.  
The homeless are powerfully connected to issues of crime and disorder in these stories of 
the courthouse. The need for urgency in state intervention through City and private management 
groups benefits from the conflation of homelessness to a crime and disorder problem. A narrative 
emerged in these stories that social problems had existed and were so normalized in the halls of 
the courthouse that people stopped responding to them. This is framed as problematic and a 
serious indicator of dire circumstances. The article further commented (Chambers 1974):  
Outside the fourth-floor complain and docket room, another courthouse habitué was 
happily snoring as he sat sprawled on a bench, his shoes and socks drying out from the 
snow on the bench besides him, and the remainder of his worldly possessions – jackets, 
shirts, hat and cane in a shopping bag near by. Police officers and lawyers passed by 
never noticing him. He returned the following night, too. His threadbare overcoat and 
torn trousers are filled with lice. He said he needed a bath. He tries hard not to get in 
anybody’s way, and several court officers and luncheonette employees look after him. 
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Larry, said… ‘If you’re quiet about it and don't raise hell, you can spend the night’…at 
11pm, as he sat in a phone booth. 
We see here the discussion of crime, disorder, and other violations of our social standards 
as every day experiences found in the Court Building. This image furthers the notion that NYC 
in fact has experienced a serious shift in deterioration. Whereas private development is the 
solution to housing, the response to deterioration in the criminal justice system is addressed 
through security measures. This narrative advocated increased security in trained officials to 
provide management of entrances and exits in places like NYC Criminal Courts Building. An 
officer found in the Criminal Courts Building commented (Chambers 1974):  
There is simply not enough security. Once there was great dignity here… at any time of 
the day or night, derelicts, usually drunk, sleep in window alcoves along the court’s 
corridors. Remnants of food are everywhere – on floors, spilling over receptacles, 
sometimes in courtrooms. 
The same article further connected homelessness to deterioration in the Court (Chambers 1974): 
 No court officers check identification, as in Federal court, and often it is difficult if not 
impossible to distinguish between a vagrant seeking shelter and a vagrant arriving for his 
court case. Nonetheless, after three days of observation, it became clear that the building 
is home for six or seven lonely and sick men and women, who usually spend the night 
sleeping in bathrooms and corridors on the second floor. 
The image of the homeless and criminal others is blurred as rhetoric reports on the need 
to and attempts to clean up the image of NYC. Vagrancy, filth, and drugs are cited as symbols of 
disorder and crime that have made it into the halls of the Manhattan Criminal Courts Building. 
This image is symbolic of NYC’s deteriorating power over all elements of the City. Thus, the 
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need to garner social control, particularly through crime control strategies, is further legitimated 
and made necessary. The message is also that to change NYC, it rests in better management and 
control of all elements of the landscape – from housing to the streets to the halls of the 
Courthouse, particularly certain populations within each, and through social exclusion measures.  
 
DETERIORATING YOUTH 
The narrative around control provided by authorities and private developers through 
displacement and eviction of crime and disorder is furthered in discussions of homeless youth. 
During the 1970s, the construction of homeless as criminal and disorderly others enabled 
narratives that supported cleaning up the many deteriorating places in NYC. However, in the 
1970s, the construction of homeless youth worked to further ideas of care and control that were 
necessary to improve conditions faced. Stories shared increased fear of crime and disorder, 
however this fear in turn enabled state and private entities to intervene in serious conditions 
through extensions of care and control. Crime and disorder are so problematic the narrative 
asserts that it has impacted youth, and better programs are needed to provide care and protection 
for youth in the justice system. The narrative further argues a society must provide systems of 
control specific to youth in order to prevent and intervene at early stages where youth commit 
minor offenses. These interventions are framed as prevention in order to avoid hardened, serious 
criminals illustrated in stories of homeless youth gangs who are considered abandoned by society 
and the system. 
These narratives are found in stories of the 1970s, officials are cited for removing 
children from their homes and youth being “jailed for playing hookey, being wayward, running 
away from home, or being likely to fall into evil ways” (NYT 1973). The juvenile justice system 
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is criticized for administering tough on crime policies “almost exclusively with poor children” 
while it overlooked “the rise of the suburban drug problem few white middle-class or wealthy 
children were brought before the juvenile courts” (NYT 1973).  
Despite such criticisms present in news articles, the crackdown on urban youth is further 
made necessary and legitimate. Narratives depicted a rise in homeless youth gangs. These 
images of youths in gangs on the streets sleeping in abandoned buildings further overshadowed 
acknowledgement of such practices that were disproportionately faced across race and class.  
In addition though, the system, at the time, provided “little to no protection to children,” 
and it was still seen as necessary for providing protection and prevention to children who were 
otherwise neglected or abandoned (Forer 1971). Importantly, in reports on what the justice 
system needed to do, there is a distinction drawn between types of youth in need of court 
services and the types of services they need. Youth who ended up in the juvenile justice system 
or shelter systems are considered those who are “neglected, abused, runaway or disobedient 
children”, as well as children from child-support disputes (Kaufman 1979). Specialized courts to 
“deal” with these juveniles were framed as positive avenues that afforded youth better 
circumstances. These courts could use diversion programs in order for youth to stand a chance in 
“redeem”-ing their criminal and antisocial behaviors. Homeless youth in particular were noted 
would benefit from the specialized court systems the most, according to the narrative. These 
diversion programs would prevent future delinquency through court order placed youth in 
“villages, or group foster homes for homeless children” as alternatives to institutions that 
mirrored adult corrections facilities (NYT 1973).  
In clearly identifying those youth for whom the specialized courts were intended, the city 
advocated use of courts for youth that more adequately address their circumstances and life 
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chances, diverting and deterring future delinquency through controlled and management 
authorities. In these stories, juvenile justice system is framed as a positive, necessary response to 
address minor offenses, such as situations of runaway youth and petty theft, in order to prevent 
serious offenses. Recognition is maintained however that there are two types of juveniles: low-
level offenders who we are to feel sympathy for because they come from poor backgrounds, and 
youth gang members who commit serious offenses. This narrative argues that a specialized 
justice system is needed to address growing concerns of poor, criminal youth that will impose a 
stricter system early on, and provide more deterrence than the adult facilities would. One article 
stated (Kaufman 1979):  
Removing youths accused of serious crimes from the family-court system…would result 
in stiffer penalties, and thus serve as a more powerful deterrent of juvenile crime. It is a 
fact of life that juveniles, no less than adults, are capable of killing and destruction, and 
must be punished for such deeds. Yet society is unwilling to abandon young delinquents 
to the often hopeless fate that awaits adult criminals. 
The same article further commented (Kaufman 1979): 
The New York reform society therefore recommended the establishment of specialized 
institutions for children. These homes would provide refuge not only for young criminals 
but also for those who had been dealt with by the vendue – the homeless, the neglected 
and the vagrant – and children beyond their parents’ control or whose parents were 
considered “unfit.” 
Stories argue state intervention is needed in order to protect vulnerable homeless youth. 
One story discussed homeless children from a shelter in South Jamaica in NYC. The shelter 
population was mostly African American and provided a day at the pool in a recently 
	
	
	
	
	
59 
rejuvenated area, providing a break for those who have faced the “harsh realities of urban 
America” that surrounded them with crime and disorder (Johnson 1971). Another story stated 
that the city had treated children as “slaves,” mostly poor, nonwhite, and “defenseless” against a 
deteriorating city (Forer 1971). Children across race and class are reported as restricted of 
educational opportunities and face “urban slums” of crime and disorder. The system is cited to 
have caused and set apart these children; through the “hostility” of the law that caused “hostility, 
antisocial behavior and despair” in general (Forer 1971). Forer’s (1971) article further stated, 
“…The poor, nonwhite slum child is jailed not because he has committed a crime but because he 
is poor and lives in a slum… Children are the last slaves in America, nonpersons beyond the 
ambit of constitutional protection.” 
One story illustrates youth in NYC that enter the shelter system due to deteriorating 
social supports that lead to crime and disorder. One young male age 17 faced homelessness soon 
after his family abandoned him. He entered the shelter system and soon found himself as a 
“drunk” and a “drop-out” (Potter 1977). He stayed at Mount Vernon Youth Shelter, which 
housed youth ages 16-18 as an alternative to incarceration. He cycled in and out of the shelters in 
order to stay out of jail. His time spent in the shelter was a familiar story for juvenile delinquents 
in the 1970s, for those who could not make bail while they awaited trial for non-violent crimes, 
crimes other than murder, rape, arson, or serious assaults (Potter 1977; Fink 1979).  
The shelter the boy stayed at was Mount Vernon Youth Shelter (MVYS). MVYS opened 
in January 1977 and served as an alternative to jail for about 300 boys – many of them homeless. 
The shelter is discussed as a tool for deterring youth from time spent in jail and being “exposed 
to older, hardened criminals who might have physically or mentally abused them” (Fink 1979). 
MVYS “enabled many of these youths to resume their work or education. It has also found jobs 
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for the unemployed and has provided psychological and drug treatment where necessary” and 
one of the residents commented he was “getting it all together” through the program (Fink 1979).  
As reported in the NYT in the late 1970s, the Mount Vernon Youth Shelter faced 
significant budget cuts projected for 1980s. However, support and concern for youth is criticized 
for having a narrow vision that is not connected to results. “The trouble is you can’t get the 
money when you have a plan that works” (Fink 1979). In 1977, NYC’s Youth Board provided 
$2.3 million in state grant to implement 90 new programs on existing projects to “combat 
juvenile delinquency”, further commenting (NYT 1977): 
These new programs will balance our strict law-enforcement efforts with services which 
provide alternatives to idleness and delinquency. The programs will give young people in 
the city more opportunity to develop their skills and talents in a positive way…The new 
programs include bolstering services to runaway and homeless youths through the use of 
hotlines, expanded shelters and counseling; reopening some schools and centers closed 
during the fiscal crisis for after-school and evening programs and underutilized public 
schools on Housing Authority community centers. 
The imagery of homeless, violent youth street gangs in NYC during the 1970s was 
pervasive, with messages that urged increased management of youth by authorities. Articles 
discussed the role needed by police to address the violent surge of youth gangs in the streets. 
Such individuals are “gangs [of] youth who violently attack women and children”, with nearly 
“9,500 members” who have recently “terrorized” South Bronx in their violent acts and pushing 
drugs. The narrative consisted of a broken system of homes and justice where violence and drugs 
permeated every aspect of life, to the point where it culminated into violent homeless youth 
gangs. Families were replaced by the congregation of youth in abandoned buildings, and a lack 
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of authority is cited as the cause of such disorder and decay. Further commenting (Tolchin 
1973): 
Most of them are Puerto Ricans, many are homeless and almost all are estranged from 
their families. Most gangs are headquartered in abandoned buildings, some of which were 
vacated after the gangs moved in and set fire to other apartments in search of lebensraum. 
 
CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE HOMELESS OTHER 
Homeless youth are one image of the homeless criminal other that is used to further 
legitimate notions that NYC is best served with increased control of homelessness in order to 
address the management “crisis” of crime and disorder faced. The focus on homeless youth in 
the 1970s connected with stories of random street violence against certain New Yorkers that 
constructed fear of the homeless violent criminal. The image of the homeless violent criminal 
works to justify the need for state intervention to provide youth with safety away from the crime 
and disorder on the streets. It also works to argue that the city needs to manage and control the 
homeless in order to prevent random violence from victimizing vulnerable populations.  
In one case, Henry Bell, 63, stabbed and killed James Pacheo, 23, with a hunting knife. 
Bell was a “Georgia-born vagrant” whose “only home is the NYC subway system” (Thomas, Jr. 
1979). The attack was against a group of young adults who had “severe speech and hearing 
impediments,” in which Bell argued that he “acted in self-defense after Mr. Pacheo and two 
friends had tried to rob him while he was asleep.” The 16 “handicapped young men boarded the 
train that Mr. Bell was on” and witnesses said Mr. Bell began making “derogatory remarks,” 
calling them “dummies” and shouting obscenities. Mr. Bell drew his knife and slashed out, 
cutting one of them; they attempted to hold the door shut “against the pursuing Mr. Bell, who 
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managed to push it open and slash Mr. Pacheo’s throat.” Mr. Bell’s defense states he was trying 
to hold the door shut against a group of the men who tried to take his things; the case is going to 
a grand jury. Bell’s attack is shared as “another” case of NYC residents being attacked on the 
streets and in the subway system.  
In another case, two men approached a woman on the subway and raped her, while 
another case involved teens that pushed a woman into the subway tracks (Thomas, Jr. 1979). In 
each of these stories, unknown homeless criminals commit violent crimes against seemingly 
ordinary citizens, who are innocently going home or to work when the attack occurred. Such 
stories unsurprisingly mention the police as the primary responders.  
Police are also cited as responders to cases of victimization and death experienced by the 
homeless. For example, a homeless female, Irmgard Meyer, also known as the “shopping-bag 
lady,” was murdered in 1979 as she sought shelter during the night in an entrance to the Grand 
Central Subway Station. Though there were “no strong leads,” the story was used to further the 
narrative that violent homeless persons attack on the streets and subways, and even attack their 
own. The innocence of Meyer is discussed as she “wandered the streets of midtown Manhattan 
homeless and alone” despite the fact she had “land in the Southwest and an account with 
Franklin Mint.” She is reported as having lived in NYC for 17 years and became homeless in 
1977 (Daniels 1979). Ultimately, she is represented as a victim of the overarching problem NYC 
recently faced with increased crime, disorder, and homelessness.  
The threat of the homeless, criminal other is furthered through stories of nonviolent acts 
such as stealing and “cheating” off the welfare system that further legitimizes the need to 
manage and control this problem. These stories also indicate the decline in welfare services and 
assistance programs because some are taking advantage of the programs. In one story, the 
	
	
	
	
	
63 
Orphanage, not a youth facility but a “village commune” located in East Village, was scrutinized 
for “getting its food free from wholesalers under the guise of being a Protestant home for the 
homeless” (Drosnin 1971). Under the idea that residents were homeless, the Orphanage was able 
to receive resources and services for little to no charge. In other instances, though, the residents 
at the Orphanage were framed as “thieves” and framed as lacking morals, as they “prefer to steal 
from the neighborhood A and P whatever items [residents could] hustle” (Drosnin 1971). This 
“lifestyle” of shoplifting was increasingly criticized as “acceptable” by youth who were reported 
as part of the “counterculture [that] considers private enterprise fair game, it approaches ripping 
off the government with almost a sense of mission” (Drosnin 1971). Here, we see stories reflect 
ideas that the homeless are criminal and seek to receive handouts.  
 
CONCLUSION 
During the 1970s, the stories reported in the NYT share how the force of gentrification 
shapes the control of space and people. It shapes the boundaries and territories that are 
continually fought over, and provides examples of the housing and criminal justice system’s role 
in the boundary making process. The homeless subject is blurred with images of crime and 
disorder, and is used to justify neighborhood and community politics. Fear and the desire to 
remove “undesirables” are used to garner local to federal level resources, with the ultimate 
argument that redevelopment and gentrification are the only attainable solutions to crime and 
disorder caused by social problems such as homelessness and crime. 
The imaginary created reproduces insecurities about crime and justice and social 
insecurity (Wacquant 2009) through conflating the problem of homelessness and crime. 
Particularly during the 1970s, homelessness and crime are identified as overlapping problem for 
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which various leaders such as the NYC Housing Authority and the Mayors’ administrations must 
find solutions. The common narrative works to clean up the streets through the gentrification of 
places, cleaning up interior and immediately exterior places to identified problem areas. 
Acknowledgement of the negative impacts of displacement is overshadowed by the priority to 
change physical scenery and create visibility of safety with the rest of the population in mind 
(i.e., those not marginally excluded as the deviant and criminal other). Thus, the drug addicted, 
deranged, delinquent, and dangerous vagrant other is subject to controls and efforts to move, and 
continue moving, “anywhere but here.” 
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CHAPTER V 
THE POLITICIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS DURING THE 1980s 
The previous chapter revealed discourse around the notion of a deteriorating NYC rife 
with crime and disorder. Stories during the 1970s illustrated how homelessness is conflated with 
issues of crime and disorder. Specifically, the stories worked to construct the legitimacy of 
intervention through policing and a redesigned juvenile justice system, as well as on urgency in 
the need for both. Underlying this argument is the dominant response that gentrification and 
urban renewal will provide NYC the clean up it needs in order to overcome recent social changes 
linked to homelessness, crime, and poverty. 
Similar narratives continued into the 1980s as the number of articles on homelessness and 
crime grew (N=172). Articles from the 1980s reveal discourse on homelessness as a crime and 
poverty problem in three areas: the housing problem, policing homelessness as crime and 
poverty issues, and stories of the homeless subject. Parameters for this chapter included those 
identical to the general study (i.e., NYT, NYC, specific to the topic) between 1980-1989. Within 
the three general categories, six major themes emerged. Approximately 58% of the sample 
during this time frame directly mentioned a political leader, such as Mayor Ed Koch [1978-
1989], making politicization of homelessness the dominant emergent theme. Approximately 34% 
discussed the issue of crime and crime control. The image of homelessness or constructing 
homelessness appeared in 30% of the articles analyzed in this decade. This is found both within 
articles that describe homelessness through descriptors of homeless subjects in addition to 
articles that are solely focused on describing the homeless subject through its conditions. Nearly 
27% of the articles discussed housing, including narratives around single room occupancy hotels 
or shelters in NYC. Further, 23% of the articles discussed notions of care, including providing 
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services to help and assist those facing issues of homelessness and crime. Twenty-four percent 
discussed issues of the neighborhood as it relates to homelessness and crime. Additionally, 
narratives emerged around budgetary concerns (25%) and a decline is witnessed in articles that 
discussed families, youth, and women (12% combined) as it relates to discourse on homelessness 
and crime. 
 Notably, during the 1980s the imagery of homelessness is conflated to crime and 
disorder faced in neighborhoods in discourse all throughout the decade. Foucault’s notion of 
technologies and mechanisms of power through the role of the police and policing emerged as a 
dominant discussion point in the 1980s, much like it did previously in the 1970s. Therefore I 
noted how this is talked about, including voices of those in positions of authority or those 
provided power to construct homelessness and its response through mediated images. Notions of 
techniques or mechanisms of power also emerged through discussions of neighborhood residents 
concern with various homeless housing options advocating increased management and control of 
bodies across the city landscape.  
An additional technology or mechanism of power emerges as the analysis shows signs of 
the politicization of homelessness and crime during the 1980s as the most significant theme in 
this decade. Mayor Ed Koch [1978-1989] is the most dominant voice in this category we see the 
construction of the mediated image of homelessness and crime as the Koch Administration 
provides rhetoric around knowledge of homelessness and its responses to the growing problem 
of crime and violence in NYC. Discussions of budgetary items are included in the narrative 
around politics, specifically the budget actions by the Koch Administration regarding housing 
and policing. Here, we see budgets discussed in terms of providing NYC financial resources for 
gentrification through public housing assistance and private partnerships, in addition to increased 
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police surveillance through increased monitoring tools and increased presence of policing bodies. 
The political climate is to move away from large warehousing of homeless bodies in single room 
occupancy hotels to a more displaced and dispersed shelter system. In this decade, however, the 
Koch Administration frames housing options such as single-room occupancy hotels as a viable 
option though if, and only if, they are cleaned up.  
Similar to the 1970s, policing remains an important topic of discourse. In particular, 
policing is discussed in terms of reviving the streets and later in the decade, we find policing 
through a presence in the shelter system an emergent theme.  
Families, youth, and women are discussed in terms of debating care provided through 
increased assistance through the single room occupancy hotels and shelters. Further, we see 
stories that illustrate those as worthy of assistance and those who are not. Throughout the decade, 
the image of the homeless emerges as two major constructs – the homeless other and the criminal 
other. For example, in cases where housing and assistance are discussed, we see the discussion 
shift to women, children, and youth. More often than not, though, the homeless are broadly 
categorized and conflated to issues of crime and disorder. The underlying image here is the 
homeless criminal man that the neighborhood needs relief from, both due to his crimes and due 
to his abuse of the system.  
All of this is seen in stories revolving around three topics. First, the shift between S.R.Os 
to better managed shelters is discussed. Second, a political narrative exists to securitize shelters 
through criminal justice technologies for the safety of those within and around them. Finally, the 
criminal justice role in reviving the streets is discussed. The chapter begins with the first of these 
– ending S.R.Os and shifting toward providing an improved shelter system.  
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END S.R.OS AND CLEAN UP SHELTERS 
The narratives surrounding housing in the 1980s called for a shift away from single room 
occupancy hotels toward temporary shelters and the long-term goal of permanent housing. Here 
we see the narrative emerge that prioritizes the clean up of housing assistance, particularly for 
homeless families and children. Political figures debate the budgetary concerns of housing 
assistance program cuts and expanded budgets or policing budgets as they grapple with how to 
clean up available housing for deserving populations (i.e., homeless women and children) and 
how to police non-deserving populations (i.e., homeless criminals). Weaved throughout is the 
important constructed imagery of homelessness that produces a hierarchy within the population. 
The narrative indicates a limited amount of housing translates into determining who is worthy of 
the resources and who is not. This is further illustrated by providing stories of homeless 
criminals that cause crime and disorder, and those who need housing and shelter to avoid the 
social ills faced on the streets of NYC during the 1980s.  
The analysis begins with articles which show a clear indication that the city recognized 
the range of present housing options was limited, problematic, and necessitated making 
distinctions about which type of housing was most appropriate, or least appropriate, for a given 
category of the homeless. Political discussion often includes voice of public authorities that 
debate the economic factors of housing assistance, and importantly the issues of crime and 
disorder that surrounding feasible responses to homelessness needs in NYC. For example, the 
Koch Administration’s [1978-1989] effort to address homelessness advocated homeless families 
and children deserved permanent housing and available temporary resources provided by the 
city, instead of seeking “shelter in large, overcrowded, crime-infested armories” and “awful, 
vermin-infested, rattletrap hotels” (Dunlap 1984). The narrative indicated it was important for 
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the administration to focus its efforts on providing housing for families and youth. Two means of 
doing so were identified. First, clean up of existing hotels, shelters, and buildings (Basler 1986) 
and secured moving them away from S.R.O hotels into shelter programs.  
A theme emerged that voiced struggles faced by the Koch Administration to end large 
warehousing of homeless in S.R.O hotels meanwhile facing budget concerns and rising crime 
rates at already existing hotel locations in NYC. Budget options to provide housing for homeless 
were debated. For example, one experimental proposal included a $25 million plan to provide 
housing to 1,800 homeless people. The city proposed to task “nonprofit organizations to 
rehabilitate and manage city owned buildings – most those taken for tax delinquency” (Dunlap 
1984). Here we see the Koch Administration devoting resources to cleaning up existing spaces, 
including condemned buildings, in order to accommodate large number of homeless. However, 
Mayor Koch commented, “I don't believe we can be a supplier of homes [to] every homeless 
individual in the City of New York or who comes to the City of New York” as he reflects on the 
responsibility of the city to address issues of homelessness and crime through housing assistance. 
Meanwhile he acknowledges the city is trying options out to see what works, a question Mayor 
Koch states could “only be answered after trying it out. If it works, God bless it” (Dunlap 1984). 
Here, the narrative is illustrated that the city cannot meet all demands; therefore cleaning up 
existing programs that face issues of low budgets and deteriorating space is a shot at a solution to 
this problem. During the 1980s, the NYT reported on several projects the city proposed and 
occasionally implemented. 
One city goal for housing was to divide the homeless across multiple boroughs, 
rebuilding existing buildings, in order to provide for rising number of homeless families during 
the 1980s and to appeal to neighborhood organizations that resisted large congregations of 
	
	
	
	
	
70 
homeless housing. Rhetoric however did not match action, and communities voiced their concern 
that the city was moving masses of people into one neighborhood. In one instance reported, the 
H.R.A, under direction of the Koch Administration, announced a plan to move at least 200 more 
homeless families into an area that already had the highest concentration of homeless families 
living in S.R.Os in the city. At the same time, the Koch Administration provided rhetoric that the 
large congregations of the homeless are not ideal. The struggle for the city to meet the demand is 
voiced. The city justified the move as "critical" because they had “exhausted all other options” 
(Basler 1986). Here we see the city trying to move families and youth away from S.R.Os that 
they acknowledge are crime infested and problematic. Neighborhoods protested against the 
“warehousing” of homeless that created a “crime epidemic”. David Dinkins, then Borough 
President of Manhattan, voiced resistance by neighborhoods that opposed proposals of the city to 
move 800 homeless into his neighborhoods. Dinkins further commented (Basler 1986):  
The government cannot put all the homeless families in one community. It's not fair to 
the families who are living in these hotels with no place for their children to play, no play 
to buy groceries. And it's not fair to the people who live and work in the neighborhood.  
Mayor Koch argued the city plan was to “rely less and less on the 56 welfare [S.R.O] hotels it 
has been using to house the homeless and more on its own shelters” (Basler 1986). Ultimately, 
the plan to reduce the use of S.R.Os is favored by the public and government officials, however 
due to rising family homelessness and housing budget shortages, the city had to rely on existing 
S.R.Os.  
In addition to the city and neighborhood organizations, small business owners and 
clergymen echoed the narrative to stop the use of S.R.Os. They were concerned it caused issues 
to their businesses and was unfair to families. In one article, Basler reported a coalition of varied 
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business interest groups argued to “stop placing homeless families in the hotels” due to double 
victimization that occurred in the neighborhood (Basler 1986b). Such victimization is stated as 
an issue of placing families in overcrowded conditions filled with crime at S.R.O hotels that 
caused a spillover effect and further “victimized” the community. Basler (1986) described this as 
“double victimization” where “… large families crammed into small hotel rooms - they were the 
first victims. But now the neighborhood has become the second” (Basler 1986b).Basler (1986c) 
described in another article the conditions faced by families, as they “often cannot sleep at night, 
so raucous are the hotels where the families live”. A final description comes from one of the few 
times a homeless voice is heard. Betty Chisolm, 31, reflected on her physical, mental, and 
emotional health faced while living in the S.R.Os (Nix 1985): 
 I smoke a pack-and-a-half a day. I never used to smoke more than four cigarettes. But 
I'm depressed a lot. Sometimes you've got to laugh to keep from crying. There's a lot of 
pressure in here. And it's just as bad on the kids. The city is doing a lot of injustice to the 
homeless. 
The imagery of S.R.Os as “disgraceful places to put mothers and children” perpetuated 
methods aimed to “break up” large congregations of the homeless and poor. This imagery fit the 
narrative where multiple voices called for a move away from S.R.Os due to crime and disorder 
associated with the hotels. These voices articulate the stigma of S.R.Os as one of dangerous 
conditions, drugs, and disorder. This furthered the narrative that the city needed to get rid of 
them and provide alternative housing options this ultimately served the agenda of breaking up 
congregations of homeless, providing divided and specialized shelters across the city, and moved 
homeless out of large spaces to allow growth of businesses. The imagery of increased families 
experiencing homelessness further politicized this social problem and prioritized the need for 
	
	
	
	
	
72 
housing in accordance with a number of interest groups. By framing such practices as those that 
led to “double victimization,” of homeless families and the community, narratives furthered the 
agenda to prioritize housing, specifically for homeless families.  
 
FORMAL ACTION TO END S.R.OS IN NYC 
Examples from other cities in New York State were reported in the NYT during this 
decade. They argued further to examine alternatives to NYC’s reliance on S.R.Os During the late 
1970s, the decline of the S.R.Os accelerated at a tremendous rate due to conversion and 
demolition. During the 1980s and despite rising need, one strategy that continued to lessen 
S.R.Os in NYC included changing zoning ordinances. Many of NYC’s S.R.Os were located in 
areas that faced gentrification and urban renewal. By the mid 1980s, we already saw significant 
changes in zoning prohibited land use under newly imposed guidelines of the city. During this 
time, NYC also established a “temporary moratorium” – or temporary halt - on all S.R.O 
conversions in order to pass legislation that made the conversion process more restrictive.  
Illustrations of these practices used by the city that further restricted and ultimately 
forced the removal of S.R.Os from the city landscape abound across all of New York State. For 
example, the NYT discussed the removal of homeless people from the Lakeview Motel 6 (an 
S.R.O), and other temporary housing, in Cortlandt, through changes in city zoning ordinances. 
This policy change that prohibited length of stay in a room, hotel, or place that did not have a 
stove for an extended period, was criticized for changing the rules and not providing alternatives. 
It was mostly homeless who were impacted by the change and their voices are heard describing 
the negative impact of the zoning change without planned alternatives (Brown 1987). Residents 
of the hotel pled with the city’s zoning board to allow them to stay in the temporary housing 
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options provided. However, according to Brown (1987b), city officials continued to “interpret 
zoning ordinances” that enforced removal of homeless families from certain hotels, motels, and 
other temporary housing due to common rhetoric that conflated hotels and homelessness with 
city crime problems. Martha Frye, who was homeless for three years, expressed frustration as 
she speculated why the city was motivated to change its practices (Brown 1987): 
Everybody is afraid of us. We’re just as afraid of you. We aren't drug addicts. We don't 
want to live here permanently. We don't want to bring your property values down. We're 
just asking for a little bit of help.  
Here we see the effects of fear of crime and the criminal other influence formal control 
strategies that impact who is able to access certain space across the city. Zoning ordinances 
furthered the notion that increased control is needed to “crackdown” on S.R.Os and welfare 
recipients, as they are linked to the crime and disorder problem. The varied narratives that 
surrounded single room occupancy hotels assisted in a collective local, state, and federal efforts 
to dismantle this commonly practiced response to homelessness. Rhetoric on all sides (i.e., the 
city, residents, and service providers) reiterated the image that S.R.Os were crime magnets and 
that the city needed to move toward shorter term housing assistance programs in order to 
minimize the visibility of homelessness and crime.  
 
HOUSING ASSISTANCE AND THE HOMELESS OTHER  
Constructing the urgency to provide immediate solutions that addressed rising 
homelessness and issues of crime and disorder referred to processes that identified the homeless 
subject. Framing the urgency of the S.R.O problem is further legitimated by imagery that 
constructs a need for different, and often separate, housing options for homeless families, youth, 
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and women. This is illustrated in stories that continue the narrative around the dangers of S.R.Os. 
This talk serves two functions: justify shelter for prioritized groups across social statuses (i.e., 
race, class, gender, and age) and further justify notions that a divided shelter system would serve 
the community and individual needs.  
Here we see the narrative that solutions for care are needed, however the shift is to 
provide safe options for families and children away from S.R.Os and into a divided shelter 
system. Three examples illustrate this point. First, one story brought to attention the poor 
management of women and children who fled domestic violence situations. This is identified as 
a particularly vulnerable group that often needed options away from what S.R.Os provided, as 
they are crime infested and dangerous places. Second, another story reported women who faced 
domestic abuse were re-victimized in the current shelter system and that a new system would 
provide safe options for women. The focus here advocated the need for a shelter in Chinatown, 
where “battered Korean [women] who sought security” was reported to be re-victimized in 
existing options. Women were “beaten and robbed” while forced to find shelter in the current 
options provided by the Koch administration (NYT 1986).  
A final story reported on a temporary shelter in Times Square that was forced to adapt to 
the overflow of homeless families facing eviction. Here, we clearly see current housing options 
were situated in areas of high crime and disorder (Dowd 1984). A Reverend from a homeless 
services provider referred to the hotel as one of the “rottenest places” in the City, stating it was a 
place “right out of hell” situated in a location where “every vice in the world is extant” (Dowd 
1984). In all of these examples, safe housing options for women and families are needed while 
the overall need to find space for housing the homeless remained important. Mostly, rhetoric to 
provide housing is connected to the city’s solutions to end crime and disorder.  
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SHELTERS OUTSIDE THE CITY LIMITS 
During this decade, a narrative emerged that discussed the practice of moving shelters 
outside the city limits. In the early 1980s, the city had already begun dismantling S.R.Os and 
moved forward in seeking shelter options. However, neighborhood resistance to S.R.Os also 
carried into resistance of shelters as stories of crime, violence, and drug use within shelters 
threatened neighborhoods. As Koch dedicated budgets to building new shelters, the city made 
efforts to move shelters and homeless outside of the city limits. Rhetoric remained focused on 
the importance in identifying different subpopulations of homeless, as this would play a role in 
where the homeless are better placed.  
Conflicting sentiment existed over displacing homelessness around NYC and the 
surrounding area. Stories point to the fact the Koch Administration had moved the city’s “social 
problems” to places away from areas of urban renewal in order appeal to public concern. In one 
story, a narrative emerged that expressed concern with the cost of bussing homeless shelter 
residents to the city by day and back to one location, the Wards Island shelter, by night.  
A particular interest group, the Manhattan Psychiatric Center and Children’s Psychiatric 
Center, reported on the negative consequences they faced due to the city’s “bussing-the-
homeless” system. In a Letter to the Editor (NYT 1981), a member of the Psychiatric Center 
stated, “homeless men do indeed need shelter and appropriate programs for their particular 
problems” however the group “strongly object[s] to what is a poorly thought-out and potentially 
harmful ‘solution’ to an admittedly serious problem” that has turned Wards Island into a 
“dumping ground for the city's social problems.” The letter cited “increased drug traffick[ing] 
and numerous security violations” that were “directly [attributed] to the Men's Shelter population 
on the island” (NYT 1981). In the letter, a distinction is further made between the psychiatric 
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facilities and shelter; the psychiatric facility created a “safe haven for the mentally ill” whereas 
the increasing presence of the men’s shelter is equated to a future “Devil’s Island” (NYT 1981). 
The Psychiatric Facilities are cited as unable to “protect their vulnerable patients and provide 
them with the means for rehabilitation - not to have them confined within an armed camp” due to 
the growing presence of the men’s shelter on Wards Island (NYT 1981). Here, we see resistance 
from neighborhoods outside of immediate NYC. Thus, resistance is felt within and without city 
limits, as the homelessness, crime, and disorder issues continued to remain at the political 
forefront. 
 
REVIVING THE STREETS THROUGH JOBS AND JUSTICE  
At the same time, a similar narrative is applied to addressing homelessness and crime 
problems in the city more broadly, through jobs, justice, and housing options. The narrative 
advocated for increased criminal justice spending in order to address rising crime rates and 
pervasive drug problems through two major practices: providing jobs and policing behaviors of 
at risk populations. In 1984, Mayor Ed Koch (1978-1989) and Governor Mario Cuomo (1983-
1994) introduced a plan to create a voluntary service program designed for low-income 18 year 
olds, as they were defined as an at risk population faced with temptations of crime and disorder. 
Koch referred to the morality building that “cleaning parks, helping the elderly and the homeless, 
and working with children victims of crime” would provide for youth that faced unemployment, 
poverty, and a life of crime (Goodwin 1984a). The program targeted “deprived youngsters” and 
included youth in shelters, particularly racial minority groups (Goodwin 1984a). Koch further 
argued he hoped this model would catch national attention, “How about working in NYC? With 
the elderly, the poor people, the people who need help. And you’ll get something out of it” 
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(Goodwin 1984a). Koch reflected on unemployment and lack of housing as major contributors to 
both homelessness and crime.  
The Koch Administration furthered the idea of “reviving the city” through jobs and 
justice (Goodwin 1984b) by providing “thousands” of housing units to get people off the street 
(Dunlap 1984). In the midst of this rhetoric, Mayor Koch criticized “Reagan's policies” (though 
specifics not stated), arguing the Koch administration “pulled the city out of the depths of fiscal 
crisis and given its residents new hope and opportunity” through “housing starts, minority 
employment and reduced crime” (Goodwin 1984b). In his address summary provided in the 
NYT, Mayor Koch was criticized by audience members and received mixed reviews on his 
“representation of the city” as his self-claimed accomplishments were not representative of the 
realities faced in NYC as reports argued that crime rates and drug abuse continued. City Council 
President Carol Bellamy stated, “His glasses are a little too rose colored. He has been captured 
by the fascination of percentages, not by people” (Goodwin 1984b).  
Shortly after the address where Koch proclaimed his Administration’s successes, his 
Administration shifted its focus toward implementing quality of life patrols, targeting minor and 
robberies. Narratives continued to criticize Koch for his “inflated” sense of self that 
misrepresented the conditions in NYC. Specifically, one article illustrates the contradiction by 
discussing recent budgets that funded plainclothes officers to gather information on the streets 
given crime spikes during the1980s under direction of the Koch Administration (Basler 1986). 
High crime rates were indeed witnessed as stories of the homeless violent other emerged.  
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BARRIERS FACED IN FINDING SOLUTIONS 
As we have seen somewhat already, the Koch Administration faced barriers in finding 
solutions to issues of homelessness and crime in three ways. First, rising homelessness and crime 
rates impacted housing options that existed. For example, shelters were framed as abused by 
drug users and became central points for drug trafficking. Second, neighborhoods resisted 
several proposals made by the city to build new shelters to replace old S.R.O options. Third, 
these barriers are compounded with other forms of financial and social strain faced by the city. 
Further, stories of the homeless, criminal other exacerbate the barriers faced, as the image of 
homelessness is increasingly blurred with crime and disorder and further resisted as NYC sought 
to disassociate from this image. In the following, we see illustrations of the barriers faced by the 
Koch Administration to respond to homelessness. 
Issues of rising crime and homelessness on the streets reached such a problematic turn in 
the 1980’s that shelters became described as places of drug use and crime. During the 1980s, 
crack had arrived in NYC and the public discussed solutions for the new crack era. Mediated 
images of crack and other drugs shaped city response strategies through housing and policing as 
a crack era caused a new crime wave. Barbanel (1988) reported, “crack use pervades” the 
shelters, creating “a mood of perpetual danger”. Crack is further connected to other crimes as it 
provided “motives for countless fights and petty robberies” in the shelter. Bathrooms in the 
shelters are said to have “transformed into part-time crack houses” and stories report homeless 
men in the shelter who spent their money from work to support their drug addictions. In one 
story, Leroy McCoy, 28, a shelter resident, reflected on the social problems faced in shelters due 
to crack (Barbanel 1988), “…Crack here is devastating. If you don’t know how to fight, you 
can’t make it here. We’ve got nothing but hardened criminals.” 
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The narrative emerged that drugs caused violence and crime. Further, the narrative 
continued that these problems had all escalated in the shelter system. In one story, Tyrone 
Prindle, 19, was shot and killed by a fellow unidentified homeless man in a city run shelter. The 
story details Prindle’s life as a homeless young adult who had been in the shelter system since 
youth. The threat of violence within shelters is further illustrated as the article shares the 
“unidentified man” had possession of a gun that he was able to carry “past guards and two metal 
detector systems” (Nix 1986). The case raised further concern among police and the 
neighborhood about the presence of the shelter within the community and the violence faced 
within the shelter by fellow shelter residents. Around the mid 1980s, rhetoric began to appear 
that encouraged the city to fund increased security and surveillance in the city, especially in the 
housing system, in order to respond to the reported “knifings, beatings and molestation at … city 
shelters.” 
The Koch Administration sought to address the housing crisis by building shelters in 
abandoned prisons, jails, and schools (Barbanel 1988; Barbanel 1989; Roberts 1989). Amid the 
reports of crime in shelters, city council members, and community organizers adamantly blocked 
multiple requests, stating a comprehensive plan was needed for homeless New Yorkers (Finder 
1984; Barbanel 1989) to avoid repeating plans that “carelessly destroy vital neighborhood[s]” of 
NYC (Basler 1986b). Nonetheless, the Koch Administration moved forward with budget plans to 
build 11 new shelters in NYC boroughs. Business owners and residents raised concerns that the 
proposals were not well planned and neglected to consider safety and success of neighborhoods 
and their businesses. In one story, the owner of Boston Fish Market stated, “all of us will be run 
out, because we'll be at the mercy of criminals and drug dealers” (Daley 1987). 
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Reports of the negative impacts of homelessness, shelters, and crime further illustrate 
conflicts in community that persisted over time. Basler (1986) published a series of articles that 
discussed neighborhood politics of the shelter system. He focused on hotels near midtown NYC 
where a high concentration of homeless existed and families were being placed in the middle of 
crime and disorder due to “poor” housing management. Basler (1986) reported that 
neighborhoods faced “hard and loud and dangerous” conditions as homeless families continued 
to be “crammed in tiny hotel rooms in a neighborhood without playgrounds.” Neighborhood 
residents shared that living conditions are so bad they “stunt[ed] the families and hurt the 
neighborhood” as the city tried to overcome issues of crime and disorder by moving housing 
shelters into new neighborhoods. Andrew Holbrooke, neighborhood resident and photographer, 
commented on recent city efforts, stating they “singlehandedly destroyed what was once a 
healthy, up and coming neighborhood.” Holbrooke also said, “we could have absorbed some 
families, but no area can take the huge numbers of homeless that the city has dumped here” 
(Basler 1986). Holbrooke’s wife commented on housing options from S.R.Os to shelters in NYC 
neighborhoods, stating they threatened every day life of its residents (Basler 1986). Basler 
(1986) wrote, “…Merchants would no longer venture down the blocks where the three hotels are 
situated because they fear being mugged or threatened by groups of teenagers. We have 
muggings, purse snatchings, graffiti, noise, broken glass.” 
These stories illustrate the continued struggle to find solutions to homelessness, crime 
and disorder. Further, they articulate concerns about the lack of safe options and perceived fear 
of what housing such as shelters and S.R.Os bring to a community. The resistance from 
neighborhood residents is not simply because they do not want the homeless, rather homeless 
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housing instigates anxieties of crime and disorder. The public share experiences of crime and 
disorder that perpetuate broader anxieties and fear of crime that characterized the 1980s.  
The H.R.A commented on neighborhood residents’ complicated sentiments and 
recognized that they created barriers to the options the city had. Wilbur Hicks of the H.R.A 
commented (Daley 1982), “We're caught between a rock and a hard place. Everybody says help 
the homeless; help them, help them, but somewhere else. That's become the national anthem. We 
have a large number of homeless people that nobody wants.” 
The city continued to express it had exhausted other options in current crisis faced. 
Existing buildings and hotels were the only source currently available during economic times 
(Schanberg 1984; Basler 1986) where the Federal Government is criticized for being “unfair to 
the city” through budget cuts (Levine 1989). Stella Schindler, deputy commissioner of H.R.A, 
commented (Levine 1989): 
We have great sympathy for the people in the neighborhood and for their problems. But 
we put the families where the hotels are, and that area had the hotels. We can't promise 
we won't put more families in that area. There are several other hotels there that may take 
our families and there may come a time when we will have to use them.  
 
SECURITIZING SHELTERS 
  In addition, to shaping the community response to homelessness, rising crime and 
disorder caused concern for safety and security at shelters. A narrative emerged that strongly 
advocated for increased security and surveillance measures in shelters. Often, the increase in 
quality of life measures and zero tolerance policing are traced to the Giuliani Administration in 
the 1990s. Here, we see though that the Koch Administration foreshadows the 1990s focus on 
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crime and disorder through similar policing tactics. For example, during the mid-1980s, Mayor 
Koch increased budgets to provide 24-hour security for the protection of clients and to hire a 
police crime-prevention team to inspect NYC shelters (Nix 1986). Recommendations provided 
by the team included increased television monitoring, guard presence, and use of metal detectors 
on all incoming clients (Nix 1986). In a Letter to the Editor, H.R.A Commissioner George Gross 
(1986) detailed city actions to improve security at homeless shelters, in addition to 24-hour 
security provided by Koch’s proposals (Gross 1985):  
First, to prevent homeless men and women from bringing weapons into the shelters, we 
have added metal detectors in every shelter. Second, we are planning to install television 
monitors in some shelters to bolster on-site observation of incidents. Third, we have 
asked an outside company and the Police Department to evaluate our security operations 
and to recommend improvements to us. 
Gross (1985) stated physical safety provided through increased surveillance by foot patrol and 
security devices would help shelters “feel safe” for residents, staff, and neighbors (Basler 1986). 
Increased spending was provided to employ private security companies, such as Globe Security, 
($4.9 million-a-yea) and Professional Security ($3.5 million-a-year). During 1986, the City of 
New York increased their budgets to employ 560 private agency guards and 79 H.R.A security 
guards in shelters. 
In addition to technologies used to secure shelters, Gross (1985) detailed a crackdown in 
criminal and deviant behavior in the shelter system by implementing an ejection policy. As 
commissioner of the H.R.A, he stated shelters reported and arrested clients for crimes witnessed. 
In order to address the threat of clients returned after their arrest, the shelter system then created 
and implemented an ejection policy that prohibits the return of clients arrested for criminal 
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behaviors for at least 7 days (Gross 1985). This includes ejection for arson, robberies, and drug 
use. H.R.A framed the ejection policy as necessary in order to control those who are in the 
shelter system. This policy received attention in the NYT as it is strongly opposed and fought in 
court by organizations such as Robert Hayes, attorney and founder of the not-for-profit Coalition 
for the Homeless (Daley 1987). Hayes has spent his career fighting the Koch administration and 
other city officials for violations of homeless rights, specifically starting his career in the “fight” 
against shelter policies that negatively impacted the homeless in NYC during the 1980s (Daley 
1987). Gross (1985) commented on justification for the ejection policy in his Letter to the Editor, 
specifically responding to Hayes’ activities: 
This policy, which would enable us to reduce the tensions in the shelter system, is 
contested in court by the Coalition for the Homeless. Robert M. Hayes, counsel to the 
coalition, whom you quote saying the shelters are unsafe, is the attorney suing the city to 
prevent the use of this ejection policy, which would enable us to reduce the climate of 
fear in the shelters.  
Unsurprisingly, the ejection policy is targeted at dividing the dangerous, criminal 
homeless others from those who are not. It is situated in politics that seek to find and remove the 
criminal other from shelters in order to make shelters safe as the war on drugs ascends upon 
NYC. The distinction between the “hardened criminals” becomes more crucial and is 
reproduced, as the late 1980s crack epidemic becomes a major problem in the shelter system 
(Barbanel 1988). The blurring of drug addiction and homelessness is reiterated through one 
article that discussed veterans who are “alcoholics and crack users” that have “shown little 
interest in changing their lives” (Barbanel 1988). Captain Ronald Foreman of the Salvation 
Army’s first shelter for homeless veterans in NYC commented (Barbanel 1988):  
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We found we were very naïve and liberal. We were led to believe that guys who were in 
the service and were homeless needed only a job and a place to live. 
Social hierarchy is reproduced in a way that the criminal homeless other is a threat to all, 
including homeless families and women who are deemed more worthy of social services. The 
ejection policy is a response that further seeks to remove the dangerous, drug addicted homeless 
from society. Meanwhile, the distinction between homelessness and crime is continually blurred 
throughout the decade that justifies increased management of the homeless through increased 
controls, and surveillance. However, policies are enacted that impact all residents thus 
normalizing the criminal justice system’s presence in welfare housing and shelters, regardless of 
the population.  
Part of this normalizing of criminal justice technologies found in shelters is found in 
security measures that advocated increased police presence in city housing. In one example, 
undercover police operations at the shelters and hotels were conducted as an extension of NYC 
clean up efforts. Such efforts are attributed to rumors that both the homeless and private security 
guards commit crimes dangerous, violent crimes in the shelters. In one article, undercover police 
arrested two men, charged with promoting prostitution of two boys, 14 and 15 years old, in a 
hotel that provided temporary housing. Many residents of the building reported “child 
prostitution” and using children as “bait to set up robberies” (Nix 1985):  
If they really wanted to clean this place up, they would put some undercover cops in here 
and weed out the people. What they pay in rent on this place for one month they could 
pay rent somewhere else for six months. 
Another article discussed the stabbing of homeless men by two private security guards, “who are 
not authorized to carry weapons” (Nix 1985b).  
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POLICING THE HOMELESS CRIMINAL OTHER 
The threat of the homeless other is reproduced through stories on the coverage of crimes 
by homeless, and against other homeless. This ultimately perpetuated the sense of urgency for 
increased controls of street life. Stories of violent victimization by homeless, particularly those 
staying in encampments and in the streets, work to further more broad concerns of crime and 
disorder. This advocates the need to draw attention to the crime problem and provide 
preventative solutions to address crime and poverty.  
First, in the case of Thomas Burke, Jr., 15, is discussed. He was stabbed to death in an 
area known as Old Highway, 100 feet from a shack belonging to homeless William F. Burke, 46. 
William Burke referred to as the “Man with a Mop Handle,” was not related to Thomas Burke, 
Jr. (Basler 1986; Purdum 1987). Basler (1986) reported, Burke, Jr. was “last seen roller skating 
along the old highway” by his friends when they said they were “menaced by a man wielding a 
mop handle.” However, “no one saw the actual crime” as police questioned the homeless men 
who stayed on old highway. People who work near the location said they “knew that a few 
homeless men lived there, but those men never bothered” anyone and the neighborhood 
community league had no record of complaints. Further, Suzanne Trazoff, the H.R.A said they 
did not know of the “existence of a shack or beds on the old highway.” According to Trazoff, 
Burke had been in and out of the shelter system. Suzanne Halpin, Health and Hospitals 
Corporation, who provides outreach for “street people” said the homeless who stayed on Old 
Highway do not fit the profile of fragile or potentially mentally ill. Nancy Alberto, a guard for a 
local business who lets homeless inside wire gates to collect bottles and cans, commented 
(Basler 1986): 
They look raggedy, like hobos, but they were not bad, they did not cause problems. 
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Despite these reported comments, the death of “innocent” teenager Thomas Burke by a difficult-
to-predict homeless man, William Burke, sparked discussion that reiterated the need for 
increased patrols on the streets of NYC and for police to get a handle on the crime problem. The 
Koch administration tasked police with making sure all public places frequented by residents 
was better policed.  
Second, the Koch Administration focused police efforts in response to a wave of stories 
that report on victimization of New Yorkers in the subway system by homeless. Stories shared 
cases of random murders, death of homeless, and rampant drug use in the subway system. This 
further set the stage for increased policing tactics targeted at removing homeless from the streets 
and transportation systems. The Koch Administration had stopped earlier practices of removing 
homeless, however in light of recent violence and crime, old practices emerged as new 
discussions to respond to the social problem.  
During the 1980s, the Koch Administration ordered the police to make sweeps of the 
subway system. Police collaborated with social service providers to “steer [the homeless] to 
social service workers waiting above ground with offers of food and shelter” in sweeps 
conducted after midnight. This practice was used to “entice” the homeless to seek shelters rather 
than subways and the streets (Haberman 1982). Police were tasked with being the point in 
contact in subways, that much like shelters in the 1980s were described as dangerous and crime 
ridden. They offered a point in contact between homeless and social services, hospitals, and 
outreach workers (Haberman 1982).  
In one focused sweep, police “ejected” nearly 205 homeless, 185 men and 20 women, 
from the subway system for outstanding warrants among other arrest-able offenses. According to 
rhetoric, subways were made safer in context of the idea that homeless were “a problem” and 
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needed to be removed by police to address safety and security issues. This legitimated similar 
sweeps to be conducted in shelters, where warrants were served. Fear of the homeless criminal 
other, perpetuated from stories of random acts of violence by homeless, assisted in legitimizing 
state authority that further displaced the homeless. 
Third, NYC Police commented on “commuters being attacked and menaced by 
homeless.” He argued that the city needed to end its practice that allowed, “homeless seeking 
refuge” to sleep in places like Grand Central Terminal (Daley 1985). This temporary practice of 
providing refuge from the streets in shelters was overshadowed by police stories of violent 
victimization by homeless on subways. In addition, railroad officials said the “crime rate in the 
terminal had risen sharply” in the month this practice was allowed (Daley 1985). Metro-North 
police patrolling Grand Central reported, “a commuter was severely beaten with a broomstick 
wielded by a homeless man” and another case where “a commuter was robbed by homeless 
men” (McFadden 1985). Eventually, police were provided orders from Mayor Koch, who stated, 
“I thought it was an outrageous situation that people should be placed in a dangerous situation” 
as he critiqued the practice and policy that temporarily allowed and “encouraged” homeless to 
use the terminal (Daley 1985). Koch further promised that the city would send vans to the 
terminal to remove people from it and transfer them to shelters at least three times per week 
(Daley 1985).  
The original policy practiced by Grand Central Terminal was meant to provide “refuge” 
during the night, however police officials were tasked with removing homeless during the day 
and night from Grand Central Terminal. Police presented the homeless with the ultimatum of 
jail, shelter, or hospitals as the Koch Administration instructed police to “prevent ‘loitering’ 
during the day by people who appeared to be vagrants” (Purnick 1985). For example, Metro-
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North was instructed by Mayor Koch to “resume closing the station at 1:30 A.M” due to recent 
“news accounts of increased crime and other problems associated with those who used the 
terminal as their home” (Purnick 1985). The Coalition for the Homeless stated the police were 
“acting within their legal rights” in removing “anyone who appears to be homeless [and having 
them] escorted out of the station” (Purnick 1985).  
In 1986, a spokesperson for the Port Authority stated 84 arrests were made for loitering in 
bus terminals in New York and New Jersey, which is “punishable by up to 15 days in jail”, and 
in some cases led to finding drugs, (see case of Alfred Clark by Johnson 1987). Police frequented 
the terminals “in hopes of coaxing them into city shelters and programs” and ticketing or 
arresting in cases where the efforts were not successful (Cummings 1987). Articles documented 
the controversy over recent arrests and removal of homeless made in Grand Central Terminal 
when cases landed in the NYC court system. In 1987, the courts ruled that NYC police cannot 
“arrest people for loitering in public areas” of Grand Central terminal (Johnson 1987). Mayor 
Koch’s announced police would continue management practices to prevent those from “sleeping 
in the city’s bus and train depots” (Johnson 1987).  
The homeless also faced victimizations across NYC streets and subways. This furthered 
narratives that supported the political agenda to push the homeless into the shelter system. In one 
report, six homeless individuals are reported to have frozen to death during poor weather 
conditions in a single week; “the deaths, more than one every two days, have been attributed to a 
winter chill that has pushed temperatures as low as 5 degrees in NYC”. Interviewed officials 
claimed the city had provided enough space for those who froze to death. According to Suzanne 
Trazoff, spokesperson for the H.R.A, shelters were “not near … capacity,” as they were 
“Organized and Ready” (Uhlig 1988). Trazoff further commented (Uhlig 1988), “…We have 
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more than enough beds. We were organized and ready for this winter, so there's no reason for 
anybody to be on the streets.” 
The homeless stranger in the community further constructs fear of the homeless criminal 
other in stories of random violence by criminals. Stories highlight dangers faced in new York as 
rising crime rates gain political and public attention during the 1980s. Here we see policing and 
an emergent theme that discusses police control in order to address the new era of crime. The 
early 1980s discuss pressures to the Koch Administration to increase policing measures, 
particularly quality of life measures in subways and against the homeless (NYT 1982). The 
convergence of policing crime and disorder is increasingly blurred with policing the homeless 
other as the decades move forward and quality of life becomes dominant in NYC politics.  
 
CONCLUSION 
During the 1980s, the social problem of homelessness is increasingly blurred with fears 
and anxieties about crime and disorder in NYC. Unsurprisingly, political voice on the subject is a 
common part of the narratives that seek to shape knowledge of homelessness and its responses. 
Mayor Ed Koch is faced with finding solutions to housing problems as neighborhoods resist 
S.R.Os and shelters; the same neighborhoods acknowledge the homelessness causes crime and 
disorder problems. Koch explores a number of options, including: continued use of S.R.Os, 
providing shelters both within and outside city limits, dedicating funds to reconstruct existing 
structures in order to provide housing for small, selecting groups of homeless across NYC 
appropriate or deserving of shelters, and increasing police measures available to the community 
in both the streets and in the housing system. It is here the observation is made that the problem 
of homelessness has increasingly been politicized. Though homelessness itself has long existed, 
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reference to political figures, particularly the Mayor and his Administration, is particularly 
dominant in the 1980s. At the intersection of homelessness and crime, we see sentiments of 
providing housing and shelter options that work to further administration of safety and security 
technologies adapted from the criminal justice system. Examples included increased 
management of populations using the welfare system, including housing options, through use of 
police bodies and police technologies.  
Another indicator of the political value of homelessness and crime witnessed during the 
1980s is the sheer number of articles returned for this decade and the previous decade. Perhaps 
what we see in the 1980s foreshadows the turn toward repressive policies, such as zero tolerance, 
and quality of life policies, often associated with Mayor Giuliani’s Administration. Key political 
leaders in NYC, such as Mayor Ed Koch, tended to maintain focus on finding solutions to 
housing crisis faced, particularly for homeless families and youth. The community engaged in 
discussions on options of where to house homeless families and youth amidst rapidly changing 
urban space in NYC. The rising role of police is advocated in shelters and are not far beyond 
what is often discussed as increased policing practices found in the 1990s. 
By the 1980s, gentrification and urban renewal were favored in NYC as free market 
expansion – specifically, the relations between businesses, consumers, and residents – continued 
to move toward economic growth and prosperity. The rise in the economic priority is also 
witnessed in the increase of discussions on budget and politics. Politicians included budget 
discussions in context of extending gentrification practiced in NYC. High crime rates and the 
need for crime control further legitimized efforts to displace signs of crime and disorder. 
Associating homelessness with issues of crime and disorder was used to legitimize pushing the 
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problem to the fringe of NYC limits and socially excluding problematic homeless from services 
such as housing during times of significant welfare retrenchment.  
Much like the narrowing of policies in crime control, that allowed little room for political 
difference, the politics of homelessness demanded increased rigidity, toughness, and exclusion in 
the housing system and in management strategies. Homelessness as a crime and disorder issue in 
the 1980s worked to further contain and manage populations within the city. Furthermore, it 
worked to define and reinforce social boundaries found in the city as the image of NYC shifted 
through processes of gentrification and urban renewal. Strategies are legitimized through 
technologies of crime control found in the housing system.  
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CHAPTER VI 
EXPANDING SOLUTIONS TO HOMELESSNESS AND CRIME IN THE 1990s 
The 1970s and 1980s revealed narratives on homelessness around rising crime rates and a 
deteriorating NYC. As these social problems continued over the decades, the political 
discussions continued around defining the image of homelessness and debating the available 
responses in order to address the problems. Stories of neighborhood revitalization extended 
rhetoric around the control of space and people using crime control technologies. Some of these 
narratives continued into the 1990s. Fear of crime and disorder is particularly present in the 
narrative around homelessness and housing through the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
Specifically, we see a continued focus on options for making S.R.Os and shelters safe in context 
of neighborhood revitalization and high violent crime rates. Here, as well, we continue to see a 
continued politicization of homelessness and crime as management and safety goals remain at 
the forefront of American politics. 
Narratives that began during the Koch Administration continued into the 1990s with the 
Dinkins and Giuliani Administrations. Giuliani, however, appeared “tough” on the crime and 
disorder problem. His policies were debated, but he expressed little concern with appeasing the 
public or organizations impacted by his Administration. It is unsurprising then that the number of 
articles analyzed for this decade (N=490) more than doubled from the previous decade (N=172). 
Significant stories of the homeless subject worked to further politicize homelessness as it 
advocated increased policing across urban space. Mayors David Dinkins [1990-1993] and Rudy 
Giuliani 1994-2001] play a key role in politicizing homelessness and crime in the 1990s. 
Parameters for this chapter included those identical to the general study (i.e., in the NYT, in 
NYC, specific to the topic) from 1990 to 1999. Whereas the 1980s witnessed political mention as 
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the dominant emergent theme, policing and crime control are the most dominant emergent topic 
found in the 1990s (42-43%). Approximately, 41% discussed the image of homelessness. 
Politicians in appear in 31% of the sample during this decade. Nearly 30% discussed 
neighborhoods, and 17% discussed housing such as shelters and single room occupancy hotels. 
 This is weaved throughout the decade within articles that describe homelessness in 
relation to broader goals that discuss housing and policing urban space. The construction of 
homelessness is found in stand-alone articles where homeless are involved in criminal offending 
and/or victimization. The imagery of homelessness is conflated to crime and disorder faced in 
neighborhoods in discourse.  
The role of the police and policing emerged as a dominant theme, much like it did in the 
1970s and 1980s. Therefore I noted how this is talked about, including voices of those in power 
through state and non-governmental agencies that are charged with response and management of 
the city’s social problems. Notions of technologies and mechanisms of power emerged through 
discussions focused in the neighborhood that advocated increased management and crime control 
in order to better police spaces occupied by homeless within the community. Ultimately, this 
prioritized neighborhood revitalization and safety, and we see social exclusionary practices 
advocated. 
In discussions around neighborhood revitalization and safety, we also see emergent 
narratives that focused on political administrations’ responses to homeless through the shelter 
systems (i.e., welfare hotels and temporary shelters), the construction of fear of the criminal and 
homeless other, and increased rhetoric to securitize shelters and the streets in response to this 
fear. Throughout the decade, stories of crimes committed by and against the homeless work to 
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legitimize increased controls of the criminal other that are broadly politically supported and to 
normalize efforts by the city that seek stricter surveillance of criminal and deviant populations.  
Several narratives developed throughout the decade. First, the dominant narrative 
concerned with issues of crime, disorder, violence, drugs, and disease remained at the forefront 
of public and political debate. Narratives reproduced stereotypes and practices of homeless 
management that further perpetuated notions of individualism and control of homeless subjects.  
Second, political discussions around housing and shelters, policing of the streets and 
shelters, and homelessness management discuss the necessity and urgency given recent social 
problems faced. Though often cited for zero tolerance policing, broken windows, and anti crime 
campaigns that targeted the removal and arrest of the homeless (Neil 1998; White 2011), 
Giuliani continued narratives that existed in previous administrations for the need to get tough on 
NYC’s serious crime and drug problems. As we see, Koch and Dinkins both provided rhetoric 
that advocated a crackdown on crime and poverty. Such narratives work to politicize 
homelessness and crime. 
Third, a narrative of increased surveillance and security emerged in unique ways. Stories 
of surveillance and security share an overarching militarized theme around NYC streets and 
shelters during the 1990s. The community expressed “compassion fatigue” as conditions 
continued and responses to the social problems faced are criticized. The assigned responsibility 
on the homeless and other crime groups combined with a decline in welfare services and an 
increase in crime and disorder provided a powerful context to further agendas on surveillance 
and safety.  
Fourth, what is increasingly present in the rhetoric is the Not-in-my-back-yard (NIMBY) 
phenomenon that opposed affordable and transitional housing in neighborhoods. Urban 
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development scholar, Shively (2007) described NIMBY responses as those to remove 
characteristics of deviant and criminal populations brought into a neighborhood by development. 
In scholarship, NIMBY arises out of concerns with facilities such as drug treatment, mental 
health, criminal justice, affording housing, and homeless shelters (Shively 2007). The NIMBY 
narrative arises as neighborhoods look to preserve self-interest, business interest, and further rid 
NYC of the crime and disorder image that existed in previous decades. 
Mayor Dinkins and Mayor Giuliani are at the political forefront of commentary regarding 
crime and violence issues across the narratives found. Ultimately, homelessness is blurred with 
issues of crime and disorder faced by NYC during this decade. The chapter starts then with 
political rhetoric surrounding the issues of homelessness and crime, particularly highlighting the 
narratives surrounding response to the problems by both Dinkins and Giuliani Administrations as 
the public looked to the city for solutions to the social problem. 
 
THE DINKINS ADMINISTRATION 
During the 1990s, three key topics emerged connected to the Dinkins Administration 
[1990-1993]. Much like the city’s predecessors of the 1980s, the Dinkins Administration 
discussed homelessness, crime, and poverty and gave similar responses. NYC had experienced 
significantly high crime rates and continually increased budgets to provide more policing 
through NYPD and private entities. Tensions emerged as budget cuts were announced for social 
services. As we will see, the increase in crime, an overall budget deficit, and tensions over where 
to provide funding, set the stage for Dinkins’ response to homelessness that included 
disproportionate controls of the streets and shelters. 
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In the 1980s, we see the poor conditions of NYC and a tense community provided the 
Dinkins Administration with significant obstacles and to its responses to homelessness. Sam 
Roberts, reporter for the NYT, described NYC’s conditions heading into the 1990s as wrought 
with the “city’s politically sensitive problems” and questioned NYC’s “ascent” based upon Mr. 
Dinkins’ “inclination” to make change. The problem is described in one article (Roberts 1990b):  
The number of drug-related arrests in NYC soared from 18,489 in 1979 to 89,451 in 
1988. The budget for housing homeless people multiplied from $8 million to more than 
$225 million. There were no AIDS cases diagnosed in the city in 1979; in 1989 there 
were 5,203. The proportion of children living in poverty climbed from a little more than 3 
in 10 to closer to 4 in 10. Manufacturing jobs declined from 509,000 to 356,000; 
financial, insurance and real-estate employment jumped from 436,000 to 534,000. The 
percentage of foreign-born New Yorkers increased from about 24 percent to an estimated 
30 percent.”  
He continues to discuss the crime problem unique to the 1990s faced by the new Dinkins’ 
Administration. 
Statistics tell just part of the story. The proliferation of crack, the cocaine derivative, and 
consequently of crime, arrested the revival of whole neighborhoods and dragged down 
others. It further overwhelmed a hospital already burdened by the AIDS epidemic. For a 
while, New York was building more jails cells than apartments. 
At the same time, reporters discussed the goal of the administration to make NYC “fiscally 
solvent”, and Mayor Dinkins began the 1990s facing the necessity of “draconian budget cuts”. 
Narratives emerged that acknowledged the city’s need to address issues of crime and poverty, 
and this narrative was filled with political debate over whether Mayor Dinkins and the city of 
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New York could financially afford to address the social ills witnessed in the early 1990s. For 
example, the Mayor's rhetoric indicated goals to better serve the health and mental needs of 
homeless people. Residents questioned how Dinkins would do this during faced budget 
constraints (Purdum 1991a). One noticeable narrative advocated increased crime budgets for 
safety and security, meanwhile rhetoric supported overall decline in welfare budgets.  
Eventually, the budget cut needs of the Dinkins Administration were made. The cuts 
came in the areas of welfare and social services (Barbanel 1990). In particular, social services 
found themselves competing for funding allocations offered to all public services during the 
Dinkins administration (Mitchell 1992): 
After years of recession and fiscal trauma, after more than two years of watching the 
Mayor [Dinkins] seem to dispense only things like homeless shelters, city residents 
appeared to be caught off guard last week by Mr. Dinkins's cornucopia of library 
openings, day-care centers, health clinics and development projects.  
The war on drugs and crime fueled the political movement to defund welfare services 
directly and changed the nature of funding for homeless and other services across the city. 
Increased services provided to homeless, for example, were provided through budgets directed at 
crime control and increased policing. This is illustrated in stories where shelters were provided 
increased security budgets, and support for drug and alcohol treatment. This is situated under 
notions that aimed to tighten controls within the shelter and control behaviors dangerous to the 
community both inside and outside of the shelter (Purdum 1991a). An unnamed community 
resident commented on the importance of one security measure included in the budget for 
screening for “drugs, alcohol, prior hospitalization or criminal activity.” He stated that if the city 
failed to implement stricter controls it would “[threaten] the stability and security of long-
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established neighborhoods.” However, others cited such policies as “unforgiving” (Levitas 
1990). James Wright, sociologist at Tulane University, discussed what the 1990s would look like 
given the conditions Dinkins faced (Levine 1990), where he stated, “…The drug problem is 
getting worse all the time. And I think in all honesty that we’re losing ground. The 1990’s will be 
worse than the 1980’s.” 
Clearly, here we see the war on drugs, and the attention toward the crime problem 
strengthen the connection between homelessness, crime, and poverty. We see it also during the 
early 1990s when narratives emerged that criticized Mayor Dinkins and Mayor Koch for the 
“failed” attempts by the city to find solutions to homelessness in NYC. Politicians across the city 
weighed in on how recent Mayors had failed to allocate funding to places that provided 
improvement and success. Some reports included criticism by city officials and agencies for the 
“beefing up the police” over social services (Purdum 1991a; 1991b). One article on the budget 
priorities, reported a group of men surrounded “an oil drum that served both as a fireplace and a 
grill for sandwiches” as they shared one man’s story who was a “computer technician until his 
crack addiction cost him the job” (Gonzalez 1990). Articles shared stories of drugs and crime, in 
stories on the increased need for housing and social service resources. Images of families and 
children of waiting affordable housing options were cited. However, reports continued to link 
homelessness and crime. Peter F. Vallone, City Council Speaker, said (McKinley 1993), 
“…Why haven't these problems been corrected? Crime, education, homelessness, social services: 
New Yorkers pay their taxes so that City Hall will deal with these problems. They're not getting 
their money's worth.” 
The City then continued to cite lack of finances and budget cuts on social services 
(Fritsch 1992). Housing and drug addiction services were cited as a serious problem faced, with 
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little to no resources available. The needs and demands outweighed resources available during 
Dinkins’ Administration (Levitas 1990). In fact, the fiscal problems of the city were used to 
justify the transformation of the administrations’ stated ideas of responses to homelessness. This 
is illustrated in story on Nancy Wackstein, director of the new Office on Homelessness, who was 
reported as having to find herself “trying to salvage homeless policies” she had once condemned 
before elections (Hedges 1990). Chris Hedges, NYT reporter, (1990) stated her position did not 
support shelters and hotels as appropriate solutions for families and children. Given the recent 
shift in politics faced by NYC social services, Wackstein was forced to back track and put the 
“liberal wave” political agenda that focused on permanent housing options “on ice” (Hedges 
1990):  
In the 1980's we all thought about what we would do when we had power. Now we have 
it and there is nothing to play with. The social justice agenda will have to wait another 
decade…My beliefs have not changed. I still do not believe that hotels or congregate 
shelters are good for families and children, but I have a better understanding as to why 
the prior administration had been forced to use these facilities. 
 
THE DINKINS ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE  
Despite budget cuts to social services, the Dinkins’ Administration was pressured for 
solutions. Pressure often came in the form of comparisons to the Koch Administration’s efforts 
that remained at the political forefront in the NYT. Heavily scrutinized is the “vivid symbol of 
social policy disaster” that practiced housing “desperately poor mothers and children consigned 
to squalor” in NYC hotels during the 1980s (NYT 1990). Dinkins’ Administration was pressured 
by state and national politics to remove the “welfare hotel stain” of the Koch Administration. 
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The State of New York and Washington DC for example are cited for political pressures on NYC 
to abandon the practice of housing homeless families in “crime-infested” S.R.Os. NYT reporters 
referred to the problem as one of “crisis management” that led to disbursed federal emergency 
housing funds. The crisis labeled welfare hotels as a “form of abuse of poor children” and 
“warrens of crime, drugs and prostitution” (NYT 1990).  
Shelters were viewed as a more desirable option, compared to S.R.Os, and the Dinkins 
Administration adopted a plan for “five-year overhaul of the shelter system that placed new, 
smaller shelters in many middle-class communities” in order to replace the old welfare hotel 
system (Morgan 1991c). Three narratives appear in NYT reports on the plan for shelters. First, it 
is here the narrative emerges that criticizes a history of emergency and temporary shelters that 
ended up with long term residents. Politicians and residents, among other actors, frame the use of 
shelters as appropriate only in cases of emergencies, such as for temporarily displaced children, 
women, and families. Narratives that advocated increased budgets and public attention toward 
providing more options noted the goals for a temporary nature of such services. Those homeless 
for drug addiction, alcohol abuse, and other crimes received less sympathy and were blamed for 
NYC’s crime problem.  
A second narrative found in these stories residents and business owners pressured the 
City to remove large congregations of homeless from their neighborhoods, such as those found 
in ‘shantytowns’. Michael Kharfen, Director of the Mayor's Community Assistance Unit, 
described the response, “…While the city has no official policy to move the homeless out of 
public spaces, the city would move to close such shantytowns when conditions become 
intolerable for the neighborhoods around them.” 
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These narratives legitimated the need for shelters during hard economic times as an option 
however; to be appropriately place out of sight. 
A final narrative in the reports on the shelters called for a clean up of the shelter system 
in order to provide the accommodations for the emergencies the system was geared towards. 
Frequent crime and violence were experienced in the shelter system, as it was experienced on the 
streets, and NYC was tasked with the clean up of both. The narrative to clean up the shelters is 
discussed for homeless women, children, families, and the mentally ill. This is illustrated in one 
story about Fort Washington Armory in upper Manhattan that discussed the unfortunate 
circumstances that forced “paranoid schizophrenics [to] lie nervously next to ex-convicts they 
rightfully fear” (Dugger 1992). Dugger (1992) further commented that the city acknowledged the 
dire circumstances faced by homeless, especially mentally ill, who were left threatened by 
criminals and deviants each night. Dugger (1992) stated, “…Noises arise in the darkness: the 
moans of men having sex with men, the cries of the helpless being robbed, the hacking coughs of 
the sick, the pounding of feet running through a maze of 700 cots packed into one vast room.” 
Though shelters are recognized as safer than streets, the common narrative is that neither 
streets nor shelters are safe. This narrative is further supported by comments that compare the 
streets of NYC with shelters (Gonzalez 1990). One shelter resident commented (Gonzalez 1990), 
“I feel safer here than when I was sleeping on the trains… You've got to know somebody or 
know how to fight or else you get robbed or beaten.” 
Here we see both articles acknowledge threats to safety and security faced by the 
homeless in two spaces: the shelters and streets. The emerging narrative argues the city needs to 
address both problem areas in context of an increasingly pervasive crime problem that exists in 
multiple spaces. Later in the same article, a grim image of NYC shelter system is shared that 
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works to further justify the pervasiveness of crime and disorder in spaces where the homeless are 
forced to occupy (Gonzalez 1990): 
 …[the] sharp smell of ammonia thinly disguised the pungent odor of urine at the Atlantic 
Avenue men's shelter, where the city can house as many as 990 men barracks style on the 
armory's drill floor. Many of the residents are young men whose dazed glances betray the 
emptiness of a vanishing high. Older men wear makeshift paper-bag hats and shoes. 
During the Dinkins Administration, we see narratives at work that advocate rebuilding 
aspects of the shelter system through increased security presence, and drug and alcohol 
screening. This is also illustrated in the story about “the Fort” where homeless mentally ill faced 
threatening nights. The shelter security guards are aware of the problem. However, they lack the 
resources and staff to enforce any crime control. Dugger (1992) stated, “…unarmed security 
guards are forced to look the other way” in the face of criminals who threaten other homeless in 
the shelter. 
The narrative emerges that a lack in police security and surveillance is problematic in 
shelters and in the streets. This is illustrated, as neighborhoods share success stories where 
bolstering police patrols through other homeless is an option while they wait on the city to 
provide solutions. The role of neighborhood assistance is constructed in an important series of 
stories on homeless vets who overcome substance abuse issues and rise to assist police and 
communities in addressing crime and disorder on the streets and in shelters. Such stories work in 
ways to reproduce ideas that police cannot solve the drug and crime problem alone, and that the 
idea of a community to fight the criminal and deviant other is most successful through the 
militarization of policing. In the next section, the rhetoric surrounding a particular group known 
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as VCOPS foreshadows political and public attention toward framing militarized policing 
strategies as necessary. 
 
MILITARIZING SHELTERS AND MOBILIZING CITIZEN POLICING  
During the 1990s, veteran homelessness appeared as a prioritized concern in articles of 
homelessness and crime. Furthermore, reports suggest this sub-population would benefit from 
increased control that would come from structured daily operations found within shelters. As this 
narrative emerged, enhanced military rhetoric also emerged as talk around homeless veterans 
provided justification for increasing securitization and controls that would benefit other 
homeless. Homeless veterans are presented as offering a struggling shelter system a new source 
of military expertise and social control. The need for militarization had already appeared as early 
the Koch Administration in the 1980s, particularly in discussion about shelters budgeting for 
increased physical security. During the 1990s, the creation of VCOPS, comprised of homeless 
veterans, worked to normalize safety and security. After all, surveillance and structure benefited 
homeless military men before they returned home and ended up homeless. Success stories are 
shared of homeless veterans rehabilitated through this structure. Reports portray them as so 
successful they were privileged enough to become a part of VCOPS and assist police in the fight 
against crime. These homeless veterans and their successes were among the symbolic 
revitalization efforts that played an important role in addressing the damage of crime on 
communities and individuals. The narrative emerged that if structure and productivity benefited 
these men, it could work for others and was a solution to NYC’s crime and drug problems. 
The stories that illustrate this begin with those that offer the construction of homeless 
veterans as deserving of care and compassion. This is expressed however in the structure of a 
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militarized shelter legitimizes the coercion, and crackdown of authority figures that characterized 
crime controls in the 1990s. These illustrated that homeless veterans were redeemable, and able 
to assist in the fight against the homeless criminal other. One article discussed the value of “staff 
sergeants” and “barracks rules” implemented to clean up the shelter system (NYT 1991). It is 
described as beneficial for all, though the militarized shelter system was largely directed to 
benefit homeless men, as they “compete with women and children for beds in local shelters that 
are often crime-ridden” (NYT 1991). The structure provided extensive rules, regular showers, 
strict waking hours, and an attitude of respect that was similar to the military experience. It was 
argued that the drug addiction and mental illness that impacted homeless veterans could be 
addressed through this more controlled and structured environments. Ken Smith, co-founder 
NYC Veteran shelter and former Vietnam veteran, shared (NYT 1991), “What we offer these 
guys is the kind of structure people who have been in the military are familiar with… That's what 
these guys need and aren't getting anywhere else.” 
As militarized shelters emerged and provided homeless veterans with success and 
recovery, so did the idea that homeless vets, because of their military expertise, could be a source 
themselves of control. This is illustrated most clearly in stories on a new “patrol” on the streets 
known as the Veterans Civilian Observation Patrol (VCOPs). Social services supported the 
group, comprised of homeless veterans, as a method to “reclaim the streets and subways that 
many New Yorkers think have become a war zone” (Gonzalez 1990). VCOPs purpose was to 
provide homeless veterans with two things they were assumed to need, purpose and structure, 
while at the same time utilizing their skills in bolster police efforts to clean up neighborhoods in 
NYC. 
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VCOP was built on the idea of homeless vets having skills useful to fighting crime. It 
was reported that it utilized the “same instincts honed in distant jungles” to fight the crime and 
drug problem in NYC streets (Gonzalez 1990). The power of this imagery is shown in a report 
on war veteran Otis Caldwell, founder of VCOPs, who reflected on the organization’s value to 
the crime fight. Caldwell was a recovering alcoholic who had abandoned his job, ended up in a 
detoxification center, and then found himself in a homeless shelter. The homeless veterans 
program offered him a new life and purpose. He argued specifically that military experience 
equipped VCOPs to deal with the crime and drug problems of NYC during the 1990s (Gonzalez 
1990), “Compared to Vietnam, the subways are a picnic. The difference is at least in Vietnam we 
had backup.” Caldwell further said police welcomed the idea of VCOPs assist in dealing with 
“troublemakers” where disordered behavior such as “drinking and urinating” and criminal 
behavior such as “robbery and drug-related crimes” were a problem (Gonzalez 1990).  
The image of homeless vets recovering from the strains of war to protect the community 
is a powerful one. This is found as well in the powerful stories of the death of Edward Byrne and 
the revitalization and use of his home which offer symbols of devastation occurring in 
neighborhoods as well as hope for revitalization. These images are offered in a series of stories 
on Byrne. In these stories, Officer Byrne was described as a casualty of riff between drug dealers 
(Fried 1990). Officer Byrne “guarded” the home of a witness who testified about drug dealing in 
the surrounding neighborhood when he was shot by gang members. After Byrne’s death, the 
owner fled under the Government Witness Protection Program and the house remained 
abandoned. It was referred to as a symbol of the “crack-ravaged area of poor and working-class 
families” and “of the murderous world of drug dealers” (Fried 1990). Eventually the city bought 
the house in order to transform it into a home base for anti-drug operations by police. This plan 
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was not followed so the city began work with the community group, Star of the Sea, to turn the 
house into a youth center. However, once that fell through the city proposed building a shelter in 
its place in order to symbolize “hope and help for its troubled community” (Fried 1990). The 
house Officer Byrne guarded was formally approved for affordable, mixed-use housing and 
development, and would be “staffed and secured” by three homeless veterans who lived at other 
veteran’s shelters in NYC, under auspices of Veterans Service Corps (Fried 1990). Reporters 
further stated, “Give us your tired, your hungry, your huddled masses. We welcome them,” said 
Winnie McCarthy, Roman Catholic lay missionary of Start of the Sea, to the NYT. “We are 
trying to give the house back to a community that's already suffered because of the drugs” (Fried 
1990).  
 
POLICING THE HOMELESS CRIMINAL OTHER 
While stories of homeless veterans promoted a narrative of care and compassion in order 
to help the homeless, a very different narrative existed that discussed other less prioritized 
homeless in NYC. For example, VCOPS and police partnered to improve the image of the streets 
through control of minor offenses. Criminalization of street behaviors impacted homeless 
specifically through panhandling and begging.  
The crackdown on panhandling and begging was the subject of an important article that 
illustrates that not all homeless were seen as worthy of our care. One article focused on one 
example of the crackdown, NYC’s Transit Authority which “banned panhandling in the subway 
system” and imposing a $50 fine for violations (Wilkerson 1991). Wilkerson (1991) noted 
“compassion fatigue” marked the 1990s turning empathy into “intolerance” that enabled public 
support for “harsher restrictions on homeless people to reduce their visibility or force them to go 
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out on their own” (Wilkerson 1991). The public, he reported, expressed frustration, as business 
groups and the public became intolerant of the social problem, and pushed politicians to 
effectively “regulate the homeless” and crime problems so the city could once again prosper 
(Wilkerson 1991). He argued further that the old ways of welfare and sympathy that existed 
“before crises like AIDS and crack” now “competed for the nation's compassion” as the public 
faced issues of drugs, crime, and “two recessions [that] made life tougher for everybody” 
(Wilkerson 1991).  
Here too though distinctions are made. Citizens reflected on those who asked for money 
in a “respectful” way versus those who “badger folk and [make] them feel you're going to do 
something to them if they do not give up some money.” The city needs to “regulate the 
homeless” with the police is strongly connected to the idea of “career panhandlers” that have 
“capitalized on sympathy” and aggressive panhandlers whose actions led to any “reasonable 
person to fear bodily harm” (Wilkerson 1991). The combination of compassion fatigue with the 
image of career and aggressive panhandlers led to the conclusion that social and welfare services 
alone would not resolve the problem (Wilkerson 1991), “In the early, naive days of the homeless 
crisis, people pinned their hopes on the legions of soup kitchens and armories-turned-shelters to 
reduce the number of people sleeping in doorways and soliciting money on street corners. But 
the numbers only grew.” 
Along with dealing with panhandlers and begging, police were tasked with dealing with 
indicators associated with the visibility of homelessness in public spaces such as encampments 
and public transport. This is illustrated powerfully in reports of events from 1991. In 1991, 
Mayor Dinkins ordered forced eviction of “shantytowns” after complaints of “fights, loud music, 
unsanitary conditions” such as homeless who “urinated and defecated on the streets” were made 
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(Morgan 1991c). During the event, officers wore riot gear and staged a raid in East Manhattan at 
dawn. They evicted an estimated 200 people from “shanty-towns” who had previously been 
evicted from nearby Tompkins Square Park. Powerful images of the event are found in articles 
during the early 1990s (Morgan 1991c): 
Bulldozers crushing and overrunning the makeshift quarters -- knots of shacks and tents 
that had become notorious for their squalor and a symbol of the city's inability to deal 
with its growing homeless population. About 200 police officers escorted men and 
women from their shacks and tents and told them to wait along side streets for several 
hours until the lots were cleared of people. As the makeshift quarters came tumbling 
down, rats scampered from several of them. 
The Dinkins Administration used police response to enforce the removal of “makeshift quarters” 
through unofficial policies targeted at congregations of homeless (Morgan 1991c) and motivated 
by agendas to remove signs of disorder and crime. This illustrates how pacification and 
gentrification go hand in hand.  
Forced evictions were among the multiple policing strategies used by the Dinkins 
Administration to crackdown on criminal and deviant behaviors in the city. Another strategy 
involved securing public space through crackdowns on minor offenses. A series of stories 
focused on police arrests in the bus terminal where police referred to the current homelessness 
situation as “out of control” (Morgan 1991c). The police response sought to relieve “discomfort 
and lack of security among … commuters because of the presence of the homeless” (Morgan 
1991c). The Administration further stated, “We want our customers to perceive the bus terminal 
as a clean, safe place to come to…” (Morgan 1991c). The Dinkins Administration acknowledges 
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an “unofficial policy” that did not allow “more than three or four homeless … gathered in one 
place” and instructed police to disperse and displace (Morgan 1991c). 
Another instance of police securing public space through crackdown on minor offenses 
exists in the NYC Transit System. One reporter shared the story of a problematic “homeless 
menace” near Transit Station in Brooklyn. Later, a story about suspect Ricky Dansby, 36, 
appeared when police responded to a complaint that led one officer to shoot and kill homeless 
Mr. Dansby. The article described the incident where Dansby “attacked” an officer who 
attempted to carry out daily duty to control menaces and disruptive behavior. A witness shared 
with NYT (James 1992), “The cop was standing over the guy's body, laid on his back. The cop 
was very, very shaken up. He said: ‘This has never happened to me. I've never fired my gun. I've 
got to sit down. I'm too nervous’.”  
Along with enforcing evictions and securing public spaces, police provided the homeless 
with information about shelters and services though not often effectively (Morgan 1991c). 
Morgan (1991a) commented, “Most of the people evicted refused to go to the city's homeless 
shelters. Many simply packed their belongings in boxes and shopping carts and wandered off in 
the rain. 
As early as the Dinkins Administration, it was recognized that police action to displace 
and disperse the visibility of crime and disorder negatively impacted homeless services 
providers. This narrative is illustrated in one story that discussed the impact of police 
crackdowns on prostitution and drugs. Service providers shared negative impacts this had 
particularly on young female prostitutes with drug problems seeking help and shelter (Nieves 
1993). Social service providers further share that young women are faced with limited options, 
including jail or violence by their “pimps.” This response is situated in context of measures to 
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clear the visibility of homelessness, crime, and disorder in an “anywhere but here” method that 
forced homeless into jails, shelters, or in the case of young prostitutes, into the harmful and 
violent conditions they likely ran away from in the first place. 
Issues of mental health, drug addiction, and lack of employment and social support called 
for partnership between police and social services, however, despite stories that shared the harms 
of police interaction. The police practices enable displacement from shelters and jail in order to 
improve quality of life for “everyone.” For example, Nieves (1993) commented on the potential 
for police partnership with social services to protect young runaway youth from prostitution, 
drugs, and pimps by strategies that did not include locking them up. The narrative emerged that 
police and social services partnerships could shift toward more sensitive interventions that 
sought to address problems of mental health and drug addiction by taking people to shelters 
(Morgan 1991c), “Meanwhile, we have homeless people with complex problems, including 
depression, alcohol and drug dependence, lack of family networks and lack of employment. The 
quality of life for everyone is going to get worse.” 
Cases like Dansby’s reinforced the fear of the homeless, criminal other that NYC faced 
during the 1990s. Particularly, stories legitimated arguments that supported Dinkins’ crackdown 
on homeless and crime. Though rhetoric existed, that acknowledges the homeless as victims and 
offenders, both images reinforced practices and policies of increased control in order to 
effectively address crime and disorder overall. The mid 1990s, to which we now turn, is 
characterized by “Giuliani Time” for zero tolerance policing and arresting homeless (Smith 
1998).  
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OPERATING ON “GIULIANI TIME” 
The politicization of homelessness continued during the Giuliani Administration (1994-
2001) as increased criminalization against the homeless and other measures to clean up NYC at 
times incited “political furor” (Bumiller 1999a). Politicization of homelessness occurred in two 
ways. First, Giuliani further cut financial support for S.R.Os however he did not completely 
dismantle them. Giuliani was forced to acknowledge that they provided management and 
containment that could not be replaced overnight and that their removal would not help the crime 
and disorder problems faced in the streets. Second, efforts to clean up the streets and shelters 
systems of NYC escalated to a “tough love” approach in arresting homeless in public spaces who 
resisted police coercion to go to shelters (Bumiller 1999a). Giuliani legitimated his policy calling 
the practice an “outreach policy” for shelters and service providers (Bumiller 1999b).  
We start with the S.R.Os in his early administration. Giuliani supported a new vision of 
S.R.Os that contradicted previous rhetoric to completely dismantle the S.R.O system. The City 
and Giuliani’s Administration moved toward removing the presence of “decrepit commercial 
hotels” from the City that would be replaced by supported S.R.Os. Supported S.R.Os introduced 
management groups that provided health care and substance abuse services on site six days per 
week. During the mid 1990s, for example, NYT reported on how the state and federal 
government planned to provide employment and health services, including medication and 
management of the population who stayed in renovated Euclid Hall (Purnick 1995).  
The political movement argued S.R.Os could exist if better managed and supported by 
city services, meanwhile providing housing demands that continued to exist. For example, Julie 
Sandorf, President of the Corporation for Supportive Housing, felt “united” with Mayor Giuliani, 
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as the Mayor supported recent efforts to renovate a welfare hotel that provided emergency 
housing with daily on site social services daily (Purnick 1995):  
It is costing the city money ($11.5 million) and seems to be costing the Republican 
Mayor whatever support he had on the traditionally Democratic Upper West Side. But 
with the same stubbornness that makes him a perverse political figure, eager to take on 
everyone from the City Council to his own Police Commissioner, Mr. Giuliani is 
supporting the transformation of Euclid Hall into housing for the homeless and others in 
need with services on the premises. 
Under this plan for S.R.Os, issues of crime and disorder would be addressed by private and non-
profit management services at each location.  
Neighborhoods and communities opposed the efforts, further reporting that Giuliani’s 
administration was not addressing the “middle class concerns” he had earlier promised to 
address. Communities remained “traumatized by a proliferation of ill-conceived shelters and 
programs that attracted crime and drugs” in previous years (Purnick 1995). However, Deputy 
Mayor Fran Reiter argued in support of the new plan to renovate old S.R.Os and turn them into 
supported S.R.Os where better management existed. Mr. Reiter argued (Purnick 1995), “I 
understand, neighborhoods are so disgusted they can't see the good from the bad. But some of 
the opposition is totally irrational, based on fear about the commercial S.R.Os, which are 
cesspools.” 
The need for supported S.R.Os for housing went hand in hand with aggressive tactics to 
get the homeless off the streets and to lean up the shelters. Police were instrumental in Giuliani’s 
management policies. Stories illustrate an emphasis on police management practices. One uses 
arrest power and unexpectedly connects them to social services. First, is homeless arrest policies. 
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By the late 1990s, the Department of Homeless Services reported Giuliani’s Administration fully 
implemented arrest policies for sleeping on sidewalks and presence in public spaces 
(Herszenhorn 1999b). Police were tasked with homeless removal policies removed people from 
the street and “forced people in city shelters to work in exchange for their beds.” Giuliani’s 
practice offered a coercive ultimatum that forced the homeless into jails or shelters (Herszenhorn 
1999b), out of public view. Anyone who attempted to sleep in the streets or parks would be 
subject to arrest (Herszenhorn 1999b). 
There was a second way police were instrumental in Giuliani’s plan for homeless. Under 
Giuliani, the city implemented undercover task forces to seek and apprehend criminal, homeless 
others. Police forces comprised of “plain cloth[ed] officers and their supervisors to work the 
streets from vans” used to “persuade” the homeless to move to shelters (Dugger 1994). One 
article commented on police methods as an “altruistic initiative to help the homeless” pointed out 
that (Dugger 1994), “…Until now, the city has primarily relied on nonprofit social service 
agencies and city caseworkers, psychiatrists and psychologists to work with the street homeless, 
who are often reluctant to seek refuge in shelters because they regard them as dangerous.” 
City officials stated the “prime motivation” to increasingly use police as a contact for 
homeless was to move people from the street to shelters because “it’s not safe on the streets” 
(Dugger 1994). Meanwhile advocates argued “police historically have hustled the homeless from 
sidewalk to park bench to subway tunnel” and that this is an extension of “the muscle of the 
Police Department to get the homeless out of public spaces” (Dugger 1994). Captain Jay 
Kopstein is reported as saying however, “the sidewalk is not a mattress” (Dugger 1994).  
Another way to remove the image of homelessness and their image off the streets 
emerged in context of the budgetary cuts by advocating services provided outside of the city’s 
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services. Non-profit organizations emerged with a greater presence in stories during the 1990s as 
police explored the assistance of outreach and service workers. One example included 
partnership between police and Homeward Bound. Homeward Bound is an organization that 
assisted homeless immigrants. Police and city social services referred homeless immigrants to 
Homeward Bound, who in turn provided immigrants financial support to return home instead of 
sending them into NYC shelters system (Kirby 1999). The assistance provided was framed as a 
useful, necessary tool during city budget cuts in the late 1990s. More police presence was 
increasingly used to provide a point in contact between the homeless and the rest of society, 
including outreach workers. Such a connection assisted in making the city safer (McKinley 
1990), according to local politics represented in the NYT. 
 
RESISTING GIULIANI’S PRACTICES 
Some New Yorkers resisted Giuliani’s seemingly caring and compassionate argument 
that favored partnership between police and social services, recognizing the partnerships that 
placed homeless families and youth under strict management and control of shelters and other 
organizations as problematic. Thus, a narrative emerged that continued to criticize the city’s 
authority and ability to respond to the homelessness problem. Media provided a space for the 
political debate about the controversial nature of Giuliani and his city management tactics. This 
is particularly illustrated in a story where homeless families in the shelter system were threatened 
by the Giuliani administration to work and meet all requirements or the city would intervene 
with child foster care services (Bernstein 1999). Child services would be called if the parent was 
not actively working, passing drug and alcohol screenings, and meeting curfews of the shelter 
system (Bernstein 1999).  
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Under scrutiny for practicing unethical treatment of the homeless, Giuliani’s 
Administration insisted those who were arrested committed crimes and were indeed criminals 
causing disruption (Herszenhorn 1999a). Mayor Giuliani defended aggressive efforts to remove 
the homeless from the streets, where he argued not all went to jail and that the effort led to “more 
than 500 people have been taken to shelters.” The Department of Homeless Services disputed 
Giuliani’s claims (Herszenhorn 1999b) and further argued the shelters were no longer filled each 
night (Bumiller 1999). Mary Brosnaban, the Executive Director of the Coalition for the 
Homeless (Herszenhorn 1999b) stated, “The numbers in the shelters have actually gone down. 
There is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that police are actually escorting homeless people to 
the shelters.” 
During the 1990s, the NYT reported on lawsuits that were filed to challenge the recent 
increase in police sweeps. In one important story, police stated that the sweeps were non-
threatening, non-discriminatory, and were legally justified. Lawsuits argued arrests are illegally 
made and Giuliani’s Administration has violated several First Amendment rights of New 
Yorkers (Sachs 1998). The continued disagreement over “management” techniques by Giuliani’s 
Administration are described as falling into “two broad categories” (Sachs 1998): 
One concerns the Mayor’s attitude – vindictive, in the view of his critics – to dissent. The 
other focuses on the inevitable tension between a government trying to manage public 
spaces and people seeking to parade, protest, preach and pitch their wares on public 
property. 
The story continued focusing on the harm these practices caused some groups and the 
difference from past practices. For example, it is reported that the crackdown on minor offenses, 
including occupation of public space, is justified in efforts of the Administration to control 
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public space, however this is taken too far when imposed on certain subpopulations experiencing 
homelessness. Further the story reports that though Mayors Ed Koch and David Dinkins faced 
the court for First Amendment violations in their eras, Mayor Giuliani has faced the court system 
more due to his overtly “aggressive and engaged” management techniques that impacted all 
homeless (Sachs 1998). In a different story, Giuliani’s Administration justified the management 
techniques as necessary to address threats to commuters and economic growth. Giuliani’s 
attitude is referred to as a largely problematic contributor to why New Yorkers responded 
differently to him compared to his similar predecessors (Herbert 1999).  
By the late 1990s, Giuliani was hardly reported as a favorite by NYC residents. He was 
referred to as aggressive, controversial, and accepted by the public as “Rudy being Rudy” 
(Herbert 1999). He was termed a “cold and remote and unforgiving” personality in City Hall, 
where he surrounded City Hall with police stationed in barricades. Giuliani was also coined a 
political leader who was “brilliant” in his fight against crime, yet politically motivated in most 
aspects of his responses to areas such as homelessness. His arrest homeless policies were labeled 
“heartless and vindictive public-policy moves” motivated by the need for authority. One article 
described Giuliani’s policies (Herbert 1999):  
This kind of [political] move, carefully and cruelly crafted by the Mayor, no longer 
astonishes anyone. When Mr. Giuliani acts reprehensibly, it is widely seen as no big deal, 
just ‘Rudy being Rudy.’ Only a nitwit or an out-of-towner could think that concern for 
the troubled individuals helped by the psychiatric center would stop this Mayor from 
shoving a homeless shelter in the face of the offending Councilman. 
The Giuliani Administration is critiqued for “trying to gain political advantage at the 
expense of the homeless” by using quality of life policies and police practices to manage the 
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social problem through the legal system (Bernstein 1999). Politicians also commented on the 
politically motivated, aggressive image of Giuliani in his homelessness response. For example, 
in one article former Mayor Ed Koch commented that Mayor Giuliani’s goal is to “dehumanize 
and demonize” people across the board (Herbert 1999). Giuliani, however, reflected upon his 
personality, policies, and practices to the NYT in a sentiment that reveals he is less concerned 
with what people think of him as his main goals was to address concerns in the city. Giuliani 
stated there was significant “improvements” for the conditions faced in NYC and justified his 
actions as those of “compassion” and “help” (Bumiller 1999). Giuliani commented on his image 
to NYT reporters (Cooper 1998) where he stated, “I think I'm taking NYC into the next century in 
much better shape than I found it. If people like my personality, thank you. If you don't, I really 
don't care.” 
Multiple narratives existed around whether or not Giuliani’s practices were humane. 
Community protestors questioned the policies by the Giuliani administration, with one Reverend 
Bob Cassels who accused “Mr. Giuliani of endorsing violence by the police against blacks and 
the mentally ill by raising the cases of Amadou Diallo in Harlem and Gidone Busch in 
Brooklyn” (Herszenhorn 1999b). Through these responses, an overarching narrative exists that 
criticizes the city for its overall responsibility in handling the homelessness and crime problems. 
Giuliani is celebrated in some regard, though rhetoric continued to criticize the city overall for 
the conditions of crime and disorder faced in shelters and on the streets.  
 
ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY IN HOMELESSNESS RESPONSE 
During the 1990s, reporters discussed the roles of Dinkins and Giuliani in responding to 
NYC’s homelessness and crime “crisis”. The crisis was identified as a “management crisis” that 
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impacted all of NYC during the 1990s. In context of declining resources, increased crime and 
violence, and the public sentiment that homelessness caused social problems, the management 
crisis called for increased measures of social exclusion. In the narrative that criticized the city for 
failing to responsibly find solutions to the social problem, the rhetoric turned to partnerships 
beyond city level figures to find solutions and radically overhaul the shelter system. The first was 
increased involvement with the state between Governor Mario Cuomo’s Administration and 
NYC Homeless Commission led by Andrew Cuomo [1990-1993]. The second sought 
community organizations and private companies to respond with services needed for the crime 
and disorder problems in the shelter system and on the streets. One article discussed the positive 
impact of privatized shelters in NYC as their staff is “trained specifically in areas of mental 
health, substance abuse and unemployment, while the city essentially relies on all-purpose case 
workers” (Holloway 1997).  
First, Governor M. Cuomo and NYC Homeless Commissioner Andrew Cuomo, under the 
Dinkins Administration, worked to recommend a “sweeping overhaul of NYC's troubled shelter 
system, including rent subsidies to help the homeless pay for housing” (Dugger 1992). In 
providing rent vouchers, the city and state would significantly alter how government housing is 
provided to the homeless, while also moving away from single room occupancy hotels and an 
overcrowded shelter system. The commission, headed by Andrew Cuomo, offered more services, 
including partnership with drug treatment, mental illness treatment, and job training programs. 
Homeless found in the shelter system could enroll in the service treatment programs in order to 
qualify for permanent options made available by government. The NYT reported this as a 
partnership between states and local governments to “strengthen enforcement of eligibility 
requirements for getting shelter” and ensuring shelters are only temporary (Dugger 1992). 
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Additionally, Governor Cuomo directed state funding to NYC in order to build new shelters with 
such treatment services at new building sites.  
A counter narrative existed that contested Governor Cuomo’s plans to build new shelter 
and temporary housing sites in neighborhoods. Reporters shared the neighborhood “fiercely 
contested” the building of the units near various “designated site[s].” Neighborhoods imposed a 
restraining order on developments until political leaders that considered the neighborhoods they 
would be built in provided “alternative designs, sizes and locations.” This restraining order was 
supported by the potential violation of state education law as the neighborhood proclaimed 
building the units would violate building “housing on land designated for educational purposes” 
(Feron 1990). Further, Cuomo’s proposal was criticized on grounds that the developers were 
“guilty of discrimination” by housing only mothers and young children in the units built. The 
dominant narrative appears to place responsibility on the City for not responding to 
homelessness in a caring or compassionate light. However, neighborhoods opposed shelters and 
hotels in their communities due to unsafe conditions continually faced. One reporter interviewed 
a homeless woman who shared, “shelters, where people sleep on cots in cavernous rooms, were 
dangerous and offered little privacy” (Morgan 1991). The politicization of homelessness in the 
1990s marked a contentious topic that offered criticism of the government and demand to 
address the homelessness and crime problem. Community organizations decided to act and seek 
out non-profit and private organizations to assist in control of the streets in their neighborhoods. 
 
COMMUNITY EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE RESPONSE 
Community organizations also responded to social problems while governments debated 
proposals for solutions. This is particularly illustrated in the reports on the organized community 
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civic league, Before Another Shelter Tears Us Apart (BASTA). BASTA is one civic league that 
openly advocated for affordable housing in order to minimize the impact of the shelter system on 
neighborhood crime and disorder. The group organized during the 1980s to “oppose further 
proliferation of shelters in the neighborhood” and to provide options that sought to break up 
congregations of homeless in hotels (Roberts 1990a, 1990b). BASTA described communities 
with shelters as places where, “hundreds of people [used] the neighborhood as a campus, and this 
drew all the other undesirables” into the Lower East Side of Manhattan. The undesirables are 
constructed as those who comprised the “41 percent of all drug arrests” that occurred in this 
section of Manhattan as those arrested “were individuals who gave their address as the Third 
Street Shelter” (Roberts 1990a). Rhetoric indicated the city did not provide safety and security, 
therefore the organization mobilized to provide this from within the neighborhood. 
As reported, BASTA was involved in addressing the crime and disorder problem in the 
neighborhood in two noted ways. First, BASTA began to videotape the streetscape of NYC, 
where one could see “a vista of enemy campfires at night” and “hundreds of crack pipes” lit in 
NYC streets at this particular site. Second, BASTA actively engaged the community to better 
services provided. This is illustrated in stories where BASTA advocated the nonprofit social 
service organization operated by Manhattan Bowery Corporation. Manhattan Bowery 
Corporation provided alcoholics and drug addicts with residential treatment programs, and 
community organizations like BASTA sought hope and success through incorporating 
Manhattan Bowery Corporation in the shelter’s programming. BASTA “condemn[ed] 
warehousing of homeless people and advocate[d] affordable housing,” further stating “this is still 
a pretty liberal neighborhood. We did not call for closing the Third Street shelter, but converting 
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it with programs that actually did something and run by someone other than the city” (Roberts 
1990a). Roberts (1990a) reported: 
…failures of the city's welfare bureaucracy in its own lower Manhattan backyard -- 
including lingering concerns about rats being drawn to the Third Street kitchen operated 
by the Human Resources Administration -- justified fears in other neighborhoods where 
similar projects were being proposed. 
The narrative existed then that the city had failed in its response to social problems during the 
1990s. The local movement by BASTA to monitor their own streets and by organizations such as 
the Manhattan Bowery Corporation is respected in an emergent narrative.  
In another story, we learn more about Manhattan Bowery Corporation. Manhattan 
Bowery Corporation was considered successful for their “set up [of] rigorous substance abuse 
recovery program[s]” in NYC shelter system. As politicians moved forward with partnerships to 
provide more of these solutions, the NYT reports that the community commends Manhattan 
Bowery for the structure the city failed to achieve. Homeless addicts found success in use of the 
Manhattan Bowery Corporation programs as they “progress” from detoxification to “education 
or vocational training, placement in permanent housing, perhaps a job in a nonprofit business - 
demolition, street cleaning, private security” (Anderson 1991). Emphasis on jobs came out in 
stories about Manhattan Bowery Corporation. Specifically, it is one organization that existed in 
part of a movement to provide homeless with jobs through use of the shelter system. One article 
reported practices of private companies and hotels to recruit transient populations from shelters 
and the streets. Companies included the Concord and Catskills who employed temporary and 
transient workers to provide low-skilled jobs for minimum wage, ultimately workers who were 
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seeking an “escape” from poverty through drug use and temporary work (Wolff 1991; 
Hernandez 1994).  
 
IMAGE OF THE HOMELESS OTHER 
As in the other decades, an image of the homeless is constructed found within articles 
that discuss other topics. During the 1990s, we see the homeless subject constructed in connected 
to narratives within the context of housing and crime. Stories of homeless subjects are used to 
further define certain homeless groups and define who is deserving of resources. Narratives also 
emerge that indicate services are needed for drug addicted and mentally ill homeless. 
Additionally, we see narratives emerge that advocate alternative options for families, children, 
and women who are victim to the homeless criminal other. However stories of the homeless 
other which are not connect to topics focused on in other articles further illustrate the need for 
safety and security in shelters in order to address the homelessness and crime problems. First, we 
begin with constructing the homeless mentally ill other. Second, we move to the homeless as 
victim and offender.  
First, one image that emerges is concerned with mental illness and housing availability. 
These stories illustrated once again that homelessness is blurred with other issues such as mental 
illness and addiction. Following deinstitutionalization of mental health facilities, mental illness 
became a concern in the city and is cited by the NYT for issues of crime and disorder during the 
1980s and into the 1990s. Increased resources and raised awareness is brought to political 
forefront for this segment of the population as the homeless mentally ill other needed prioritized 
services and management in order to address the crime and disorder caused by 
deinstitutionalization (NYT 1992). Importantly, these stories work to construct a homeless other 
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who is incapable of caring for oneself and who needs state intervention. The homeless mentally 
ill other is framed as responsible for crime and disorder on the streets, therefore prioritizing this 
as a social concern that needs state intervention worked to further forms of management through 
services.  
During the 1990s, the reports discussed mental illness as a reason why New York faced 
issues of crime and disorder. However, others challenged the connection choosing the focus on 
housing (Dulhane 1990): 
…the loss of single room occupancy housing, or S.R.Os, has had a serious effect on the 
numbers of people living on the streets and in shelters. Mental health research on the 
homeless confirms that this housing shortage is more critical than ‘deinstitutionalization’ 
and other mental health problems among the homeless. 
Dulhane (1990) argued that the mentally ill are only a portion of the overall population who 
experienced homelessness. The “real impact of lost S.R.Os on homelessness is that when a new 
segment of people became residentially unstable in the 1980's, they did not have this stock of 
cheap rooms to fall back on” (Dulhane 1990). Housing and mental illness are factors heavily 
considered, however a more holistic vision is needed in order to address NYC’s homelessness 
problem (Dulhane 1990): 
What might have been hidden in the old problem of skid row homelessness became a 
new problem of emergency shelter homelessness. That most of the homeless are young 
adults, not mentally ill and have never lived in S.R.O housing suggests wider causes of 
the homeless problem and more ambitious solutions than increasing the number of S.R.O 
units. 
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A second narrative found is related to homelessness beyond the city itself. The narratives first 
recognize that most people do not see homelessness as a problem beyond the city (Henson 
1990): 
 …most folks picture the homeless the television news loves to show us: those ragged, 
dirty bag ladies and bums who are passed out from exhaustion on benches in Grand 
Central Terminal or in the tunnels of the NYC subways. Most folks think of the homeless 
as a ‘big city’ population because of these portrayals. 
In this story, homelessness is framed as a problem that extends beyond Manhattan to impact 
surrounding boroughs. Awareness is raised about the problem of homelessness in surrounding 
boroughs. Below we see this described (Henson 1990): 
The homeless are not white or black, or yellow or red - they are gray, gray, gray. Sick and 
tired of being sick and tired, they all have a gray, homeless pallor… Like a gray plague, 
the homeless population in America is growing and growing, moving out of the cities and 
into all the towns, villages and hamlets. 
The image of homelessness as a crime and disorder problem included a range of those 
who are young, families, and women. Despite the range of conditions and subpopulations 
portrayed in the NYT, one article described a shelter outside the city limits as it provided for 
NYC’s displaced homeless. The story described the homeless there as a “gray plague” of people 
that sought “relief from the crime, drugs and hopelessness spawned in the city's tenements” 
(Henson 1990).  
A significant location just outside the city limits emerged over the decades in 
Westchester. Westchester is a particular location that often provided for the needs of many 
NYC’s homeless. One youth shelter in Westchester received positive attention for being 
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considered a “safer” shelter where homeless from the inner city could find refuge. It was 
reported that such “unfortunates” included those across race, class, age, mental health, and other 
various characteristics and life circumstances. Groups identified included: “homeless teens 
having babies”; “23 percent were found to abuse drugs and 17 percent had an alcohol addiction” 
though “all [were] not junkies”; those who “[carried] the AIDS virus” (Roberts 1990b), and 
“some of the homeless [were] old with no one to care about them.” The older homeless were 
identified as “old timers” and were identified as those who had been “drinking and homeless for 
years, dressed in layers of filthy rags no matter what the temperature outside”, often on the verge 
of death “if they stopped drinking at this late date” (Henson 1990). Physical health issues such as 
chronic liver disease, dermatitis, arthritis, etc. are reported ailments faced by NYC homeless. The 
fragility and health are emphasized as such homeless are identified as “victims of circumstance” 
(Henson 1990): 
Some of the elderly homeless lived and worked prosperous and productive lives, but are 
no longer able to care for themselves and have no family or friends willing to take on the 
responsibility. Many are true victims of circumstance - like the 70-year-old woman who 
had always worked and led a dignified life, only to lose everything she held dear in this 
world to a tragic fire. The day she arrived at the shelter she had lost her heart medication 
in the fire and, because the shelter was low on linens, she slept on a dirty, bare mattress. 
Despite the differences that comprised the homeless population, all homeless shared one 
commonality in mediated images: “all have the gray pallor. All are … bewildered.” Reporters 
shared stories of veterans and youth who stated they were “messed up”, “lonely”, “need[ed] 
someone to love” them. Meanwhile they expressed the “terrified” experiences of the shelter 
system, specifically how they are “terrified of the other people in the shelter” (Henson 1990): 
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Some of our homeless are those being released from prisons. Some are revolving-door 
criminals, whose periods of homelessness led to incarceration and who are released back 
into homelessness. Others of our newly homeless are being released from prison after 
years of incarceration for violent crimes. They are hardened, bitter and have trouble 
adjusting. They are not being sent into a world of freedom, but into the incarceration of 
homelessness. 
Finally, we see in stories a clear distinction emerge between the homeless “victim of 
circumstance” and the homeless criminal other. For example, in the case of Paris Drake, 31, a 
“panhandler” arrested in a recent “brick attack” that killed a young woman in Midtown 
Manhattan (Forero and Blair 1999). According to reports, “New Yorkers assumed assailant 
would turn out to be someone who had been heeding inner demons for years, bouncing among 
city shelters, jails, mental wards and the streets” (Bernstein 1999). Another article further 
discussed police actions (Forero and Blair 1999): 
The highly publicized attack immediately led to speculation by the police that a person 
who was homeless and possibly mentally ill was responsible, and three days later, Mayor 
Rudolph VCOPS. Giuliani's administration announced that the homeless had no right to 
sleep on city streets and would face arrest for refusing shelter. The police have arrested 
more than 100 homeless people since the measure was announced. 
Officials from the Mayor’s office and the Coalition for the Homeless disagreed on Mr. Drake’s 
identity. Although Drake is a “longtime petty criminal and crack user” he had “no known history 
of psychiatric treatment” and no history was found in the homeless shelter system (Bernstein 
1999). Mary Brosnahan, director of the Coalition for the Homeless, was “offended that anyone 
would depict Mr. Drake as representative of homeless people” (Bernstein 1999). 
	
	
	
	
	
127 
The man didn't have an address. He was living at the Port Authority bus depot and 
panhandling. He fits every description of homelessness. The fact is... he was homeless. 
He’s a thug’, she said, pointing out that three weeks before the woman, Nicole Barrett, 
was hit with a brick, Mr. Drake was arrested and accused of mugging a homeless person. 
Homeless people are far more likely to be preyed upon than to prey upon others. 
 
CONCLUDING A DINKINS AND GIULIANI ERA 
Defining homelessness is politically charged in New York these days. A word used 20 
years ago to evoke compassion for the poor is increasingly accepted as shorthand for a 
grab bag of undesirables, the deranged, disheveled, or destitute. Yet the same word 
applies to the largely unseen women and children who make up almost two-thirds of 
homeless shelter residents in NYC (Bernstein 1999). 
As the 1990s end, we see a constructed image of homelessness that recognizes diverse 
groups make up the homeless and each have different needs. Yet, the overarching narrative seeks 
to manage and control homelessness in ways that assist NYC in ending their crime and disorder 
problems. One does not need to go far to see rhetoric that indicated safety and security including 
tightened management strategies of the homeless are tightly bound to notions of care and 
concern. This is illustrated in the ways we talk about different subpopulations of homeless. 
Several themes appeared in context of homelessness and crime found in the NYT during 
the 1990s that furthered boundaries of the prioritized homeless subject and shaped responses. 
The presence of public officials and authoritative figures is noted. Specifically, the political 
climate called for shifts from welfare hotels to other forms of housing and shelters. Mayors 
David Dinkins and Rudy Giuliani are among political leaders and authorities discussed in the 
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homelessness crisis faced during this decade. Scholars often link Giuliani’s tough on crime 
policies with controlling the visibility of homelessness on the streets. While this is certainly true, 
Mayor Dinkins’ Administration is discussed in the NYT for practicing increased controls in the 
streets and shelter systems that disproportionately impacted the homeless. In fact, at the 
beginning of Giuliani’s term, the NYT indicated partnerships and unity advocated between the 
Administration and social services. However, by the end of the 1990s, conflict over whether 
Giuliani had responded to the crime and disorder problem without violating the rights of 
homeless citizens is heavily debated. The power of police expanded controls against the 
unknown criminal homeless other was demanded.  
In this decade, reporters discussed NYC and public officials struggle to address 
homelessness, crime, and disorder. In discussions of homelessness and crime, politicians and the 
public increased attention paid to the police role in responding to homelessness. While some 
articles advocated the police role in serving as both service members and social service 
providers, others critiqued and even protested the use of policing in responding to homelessness. 
Such ideas simultaneously exist, however the imagery of homelessness, as a population that 
requires structure – yet not too much structure, control and punishment – yet not too much 
control and punishment - is reproduced throughout this decade. The need for police power and 
governance in housing and on the streets is found in early years of this decade, as Dinkins battled 
the need to make dangerous shelters and streets safer. Meanwhile, the image of a dangerous 
shelter and subway system perpetuated ideas surrounding increased criminal justice response, 
particularly of police. The discussion of homelessness and crime becomes less about housing and 
more about defining the police role around responding to homelessness.  
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The politics toward minimizing visibility of homelessness on the streets are situated in 
the politics of crime and disorder. In a number of cases, the seemingly “random” victimization of 
homeless, and more so the “random” victimization of citizens by the homeless, are used to 
justify and legitimate the “muscle” of policing found in quality of life practices by city officials, 
particularly the Mayor’s administration. Protest and opposition occur, however rhetoric also 
indicated a sense of management and control of homelessness through the policing, and charging 
police with connecting homeless to housing and shelters. The image of the homeless other, as 
victim of crime and disorder or offenders, works to expand rhetoric toward increased control of 
populations across urban landscape. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SECURITIZING STREETS AND SHELTERS IN THE 2000s 
Following the peak in crime rates during the early 1990s, NYC continued to experience 
declining crime rates into the 2000s. Other social problems however did not decline. Overall, 
NYC experienced instability in terms of employment and a steady loss in affordable and 
supportive housing under Mayor Bloomberg’s [2002-2013] administration. Though crime rates 
were declining, Mayor Bloomberg’s term is marked by continued criticism of indicators of 
poverty and homelessness as numbers reached the highest NYC had witnessed in several 
decades. 
The decade with the most articles analyzed was 2000-2012 (N=572). Significant stories 
of the homeless subject as deviant and criminal other worked to further politicize homelessness 
as city practices increased surveillance and safety across NYC streets and shelters. Mayors David 
Dinkins [1990-1993] and Rudy Giuliani [1994-2001] played a key role in politicizing 
homelessness and crime in the 1990s, which continued as Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s [2002-
2013] administration continued welfare retrenchment and criminal justice expansion. Parameters 
for this chapter included those identical to the general study (i.e., in the NYT, in NYC, specific to 
the topic) from 2000-2012. Whereas the 1990s witnessed dominant emergent themes centered on 
expansion of policing and crime control practices (42-43%), discussions that constructed the 
image of homelessness (55%) dominated the narratives for the 2000s. Next, housing (41%) and 
neighborhoods (35%) were emergent narratives during this decade. Approximately, 28% of the 
articles discussed the expansion of crime controls and policing across streets and shelters. 
Politicians appear in 19% of the sample during this decade.  
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 Construction of homelessness appears as the dominant theme throughout the articles 
analyzed (55%). This is found both within articles that describe homelessness through 
descriptors of homeless subjects in addition to articles that are solely focused on describing the 
homeless subject through it’s conditions. During the 2000s, we see continued focus on defining 
different homeless subjects. Particularly, we see articles focused on homeless sex offenders 
following coverage of a few criminal cases where the offender has sex offense history and a 
homelessness or shelter history.  
Situated in relation to broader goals that discuss housing and policing urban space in 
order to provide safety and security, we see the fear of the criminal other, particularly in the 
shelter system, work to further measures of increased controls and tightened security. These are 
identified as narratives that further politics of governing through crime technologies and 
mechanisms of power. The imagery of homelessness is conflated to crime and disorder faced in 
neighborhoods in discourse that further promotes ways to control and manages the population. 
Technologies and mechanisms of power emerged through discussions focused in the 
neighborhood that advocated increased management and crime control in order to better police 
spaces occupied by homeless within the shelter and housing system. Ultimately, we see 
tightening of security, an increase in oversight and screening, and social exclusion practices 
advocated to further differentiate those who deserve care and compassion, and those who do not. 
In the sample from the NYT during the 2000s we continued to witness the politicization 
of homelessness management as the community dissatisfaction with the City’s response to 
homelessness continues. The conflicted and complicated sentiments between homelessness and 
crime that were constructed in previous decades continue to influence NYC urban policy during 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s Administration (2002-2013). Housing the homeless, with attention 
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paid to specific subpopulations, and policing visibility of crime and disorder through control 
implemented in housing and social services, persisted as themes.  
A dominant narrative emerges in the chapter that is focused on housing sex offenders and 
providing security through surveillance in existing shelter systems. Our gaze is drawn to the 
homeless sex offender other. Political and public attention discussed neighborhood concerns for 
protection against homeless sex offenders. Publicly framing this as a safety and security issue 
furthered political actions, including budgets, that provided increased surveillance measures in 
NYC shelters. Rhetoric continued to focus on issues of crime and violence in NYC 
neighborhoods, where homeless were subject to increased surveillance and control. Particular 
attention in the NYT is also paid to rhetoric surrounding continued protection for homeless 
children, families, and veterans from crime and disorder through separate services. We begin 
with understanding the housing and shelter crisis faced by Mayor Bloomberg’s administration, as 
it is the most dominant theme (40%) next to constructing the image of homelessness (55%). 
 
THE POLITICS OF HOUSING AND SHELTERS IN A BLOOMBERG ERA 
 During the early 2000s, Mayor Michael Bloomberg (2002-2013) shifted focus to issues 
of safety and security provided in housing and shelters for the homeless, while extending 
Giuliani’s “tough on crime” approach in NYC streets (Bernstein 2002). In particular, as will be 
seen, following the September 11th attacks in 2001, Mayor Bloomberg implemented new 
strategies for increasing safety and security in NYC. Rhetoric advocated increased surveillance 
across NYC generally. However, here we see how this rhetoric is applied to the important 
homelessness concern of housing and sheltering marginalized population. Mayor Bloomberg’s 
administration practices of security through surveillance included police evaluation of data 
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collection and monitoring found in the housing and shelter system. At the same time, fears of the 
foreign, terrorist other spread throughout the United States. Unsurprisingly, this impacted 
discourse surrounding homelessness and crime, as articles emerged that discussed the need for 
NYC to tighten controls and surveillance in shelters, on the streets, and in social service 
programs, all of which furthered “get tough” approach to crime. 
In terms of safety and security in the shelters, articles early in the decade show that 
police, city officials, and the Department of Homeless Services (DHS) advocated securitizing 
shelters. Securitizing shelters is important in order to provide safety and security in three ways: 
expanding data collection strategies similar to crime and justice techniques used by NYPD, 
providing increased security personnel, and tightening the screening processes in all areas of 
housing and shelter system. First, the use of police and data collection is argued as necessary to 
make the shelters “safer” (Fries 2002). DHS and police were instructed to collect crime data and 
evaluate security in 7 DHS operated shelters out of the 44 shelters for single adults in NYC. For 
example, one story reported that Mayor Bloomberg assigned Police Commissioner Raymond W. 
Kelly to “assess the state of safety in city-run shelters, seeking both to evaluate security within 
shelters” and to “address the longtime perception among some homeless who believe that the 
streets are safer places to sleep” (Fries 2002). In turn, Police Commissioner Kelly ordered 
borough commanders to “survey shelters throughout the city, talk with program directors and, 
from those interviews, decide what role the department should have in addressing safety 
questions at shelters” (Fries 2002). In addition, Mayor Bloomberg and NYPD Commissioner 
Kelly increased statistics tracking practices in order to “examine crime in homeless shelters as 
part of the Compstat tracking system” (Fries 2002).  
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NYC Department of Homeless Services faced pressure to track crime statistics in the 
shelters and to collect client level data on who is coming and going from the shelter system. This 
pressure is illustrated in reports that discussed a lack of safety and rampant crime in the shelters. 
For example, a popular men’s shelter in Manhattan, which served 19,915 men in 2001, reported 
“10 felonies: four assaults -- all against uniformed Department of Homeless Services peace 
officers -- five drug offenses and one robbery. Misdemeanors, including lesser assaults and drug-
related incidents, averaged two or three each month” (Bernstein 2002). This is discussed in 
context of how these numbers did not reflect the daily crime problems in the shelter system due 
to poor crime tracking options available to shelter staff.  
The introduction of police crime mapping is connected to the Giuliani administration 
(Lipton 2000) and continued into Bloomberg’s administration. A crime mapping system 
traditionally used to monitor serious crimes like robbery, rape and murder, is introduced into the 
shelter system in order to track crimes across NYC shelters. NYPD were tasked with tracking 
complaints about minor disturbances such as loud music to graffiti, public drinking, prostitution, 
panhandling and homelessness using the mapping system across the city. Giuliani and 
Bloomberg expanded this to include monitoring crime in the shelter system in order to enable 
police to “move quickly and aggressively…counter any trends” that need police attention (Lipton 
2000). The focus here is that the crime and disorder problem is a primary concern across the 
entire city, and we see it illustrated in stories that share the impact of expanded criminal justice 
technologies to monitor, control, and provide surveillance of marginalized populations. 
Robert Mascali, acting first deputy of homeless services, furthered the narrative 
advocated to control crime in shelters (Fries 2002) by stating, “We made security a priority and 
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we made this investment. Of course, anything can be improved upon, and any additional security 
would be welcomed.” 
In addition to data collection and monitoring, articles discussed increased budgets to 
provide more security devices, increased number of public police officers, increased lighting, 
and intensive screening processes in order to address safety concerns in shelters (Fries 2002). 
Other narratives emerged that discussed how to provide more security and safety changes to 
physical structures of the shelters and increased professionals or safety personnel on shelter sites 
is the solution.  
However, the overarching discourse advocates needs for increased security and 
professionalization, the ways to achieve this were not always agreed upon. For example, a theme 
emerged around the role of personnel in shelter for the purpose of security. By this time shelters 
already had unarmed security guards and some supported the practice to hire more security 
guards. However, the effectiveness of unarmed security guards was not the solution to the 
problem (Fries 2002). Fries (2002) wrote, “…an armed police officer would be more effective 
than private security in controlling large shelters.” Stories of violence and drugs worked to 
encourage support for the use of armed and trained, professional police. This was reinforced by 
homeless shelter resident, Peter Engler, 23, who shared with NYT reporter Jacob Fries (2002), 
who stated, “You can bring drugs in here, you can bring weapons in here, anything you want. No 
one does anything. The N.Y.P.D., that's what I'd like to see in here.” This is further illustrated in 
another article that discussed frequent calls by security guards and shelter staff for police to 
respond to crimes reported at the shelter (Kilgannon 2002).  
Another narrative counter to this emerged that discussed the potential conflict faced in an 
already “tense” shelter system if armed police were regularly present. This is illustrated in a story 
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which garnered attention about a 70 year old man arrested from his shelter bed at midnight and 
held in a cell until could see a judge the following day. His arrest was the result of a night raid. 
While rhetoric expressed concern that “abuse” had taken place in recent police night raids of the 
shelter system existed, the night raids were justified as necessary. The police were serving 
outstanding warrants for recent criminal acts linked to other more violent crimes.  
Despite hesitations over having police in the shelters, the dominant narrative tended to 
reproduce fear of the homeless other shared in the community and within the homeless 
population. Ultimately, the need for safety and security that comes from using police in the 
shelter system overshadowed the potential negative interactions that could occur. This is 
illustrated by one homeless shelter resident, Dawn Witter, 45, who shared with Fries (2002), 
“You got to have friends, you got to be careful. You don't know where these people are coming 
from. Sometimes people come in from prison and they walk around bullying people. You have to 
watch your back.”  
Not just NYPD securitized the shelters though. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
NYC began to significantly increase the number of professional police security into the shelter 
system, particularly those employed and trained directly under the Department of Homeless 
Services (DHS) and partnership with NYPD training facilities. By 2002, the number of DHS 
Police quadrupled. Their numbers continued to grow throughout the 2000s. Though officers had 
been present at various shelters in the past across NYC, then the number of trained and employed 
professional security officers significantly increased during the early 2000s. Partnerships were 
used to better provide expansion of criminal justice personnel between welfare services, such as 
housing and the shelter system, with police training programs. This is illustrated by the training 
partnership provided between Department of Homeless Services and John Jay College of 
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Criminal Justice (JJCCJ) in Manhattan. Here, we see the mission of the DHS Police clearly 
stated in part of the narrative to expand police services in order to provide security, safety, and 
surveillance (JJCCJ 2016), “DHS Police are charged with protecting the most vulnerable people 
in our society, the homeless. They are tasked with providing security services for all NYC 
shelters and other facilities under the Department of Homeless Services.” 
Alongside security devices and security staff such as NYPD and DHS Police, housing 
and shelter practices included increased screening and tightened eligibility requirements applied 
to families, children, and veterans (Secret 2011). Like other practices, screening and eligibility 
connects to Bloomberg’s desire to remain tough on crime. For example, in 2007, a program 
called Advantage was started in order to “help people in shelters afford their own apartments, 
provided they work or take part in job training” (Secret 2011). Rent subsidies were provided to 
those who passed screening in the shelter system and targeted issues surrounding those who 
stayed in the shelter system too long. Bloomberg did not “tolerate” homeless people in the streets 
and did not tolerate “dangerous shelters or lack of beds for people to sleep in” (Bernstein 2002). 
Bloomberg continued efforts to control the shelter system including screening through 
technologies of the criminal justice system throughout the decade.  
 
HOUSING HOMELESS FAMILIES AND VETERANS 
As Bloomberg continued efforts to control crime and disorder in the shelters, he also 
implemented practices that were less overt in their crime control agendas, and included rhetoric 
that advocated providing safety and security for veterans, families, and youth. Here, we see 
certain sub groups of the homeless population were often distanced from the image of the 
homeless criminal other and received priority in housing and social services provided by the city 
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and state; so long as they met requirements in being orderly and non-problematic to shelter staff 
and the neighborhood. This priority, however, often included increased control through tightened 
restrictions and supervision. Rules were enforced strictly and resulted in evictions from shelter 
and housing programs if not followed. 
This is illustrated in stories around the non-profit organization, Westhab. Westhab 
opened for homeless families, youth, and veterans during the 2000s (Brenner 2007). In terms of 
veterans, the need for veteran homeless services in Westchester and NYC was considered a 
priority as veterans returned home from Iraq and Afghanistan (Brenner 2007). Robert Sanborn, 
Westhab Vice President for Real Estate, commented (Brenner, 2007), “The need for housing for 
homeless veterans has always been there, but until recently, homeless families and singles 
demanded most of our attention.” 
As veteran homelessness became a priority, services focused on required screening of 
veterans in the shelter system and providing intense treatment program services for mental health 
and alcohol and substance abuse. A court case involving Brooklyn Manor received attention as it 
sheltered veterans with disabilities and mental illnesses without, it was reported, providing 
proper screening and services to follow (Kaufman, 2004). 
Lawyers and others who monitor the city's homeless population and the state's system of 
adult homes say that many of the men were transferred to Brooklyn Manor without being 
properly evaluated by either the shelter or the home and often without giving their full 
consent. They worry that the placements reflect shortfalls in the city's ability, at a time of 
near-record numbers of homeless, to ensure that those in the shelters are being sent to the 
most appropriate settings as they seek permanent housing. 
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Here, we see continued rhetoric that questions the city’s ability to address homelessness and 
crime issues. Responsibility and accountability are challenged as the community pushes for 
solutions to the problem for certain groups, particularly veterans, families, and children that need 
care and compassion from public services, so long as they comply with the rules and regulations 
put in place to counter crime and disorder.  
Care and control work to provide governance of homelessness and crime through less 
overt connections to other policing strategies. Within prioritized and “vulnerable” populations, 
the care and compassion only goes so far and certainly does not exist without mechanisms of 
control that expand overall goals of homelessness management. The overarching theme that 
further connects care with control and criminalization faced in the shelter system is the narrative 
that criticizes the city for its ability to carry out any of these functions.  
This is particularly illustrated when attention is drawn to an overcrowded NYC 
Emergency Assistance Unit. As reported, children and families slept on the floors of this 
temporary shelter unit. The floors were overcrowded and described as symbolic of Mayor 
Bloomberg’s homelessness crisis. Carmen Garcia, 37, an unemployed mother of four shared 
(Steinhauer 2002) said, “I never saw anything like it in my life: babies lying on the floor, even 
newborns. We filled out the papers. They told us to wait and we waited.” 
In order to address concerns with lack of temporary shelter availability, Mayor 
Bloomberg and the Department of Homeless Services opened a temporary shelter in an old jail in 
the Bronx. This further articulates the desperate times faced by NYC homeless service providers, 
from children sleeping on the floors of the Emergency Assistance Unit to being forced to sleep in 
former jails. The public resented the idea of “children sleeping on prison cots, just beyond a wall 
of razor wire and among strangers” and it certainly “underscores how few good solutions there 
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are to the city’s homeless problem” (Steinhauer 2002). Department of Homeless Services 
commissioner Linda Gibbs faced court for failing to provide beds for the city’s homeless 
following reporting on the Emergency Assistance Unit’s conditions. Meanwhile Bloomberg used 
the conditions he and DHS faced as a platform for increased focus on housing for families, 
stating “housing cures homelessness for families” (Secret 2011). 
Despite Mayor Bloomberg’s rhetoric and a newly announced five-year plan to reduce 
homelessness, the number of families who faced homelessness reached the highest it had been 
since 1982 (Kaufman 2007). Steven Banks, attorney in chief of the Legal Aid Society, attributed 
this crisis to mismanagement of the Bloomberg Administration, and administrations prior, that 
focused on shelters. Banks stated (Kaufman 2007):  
Homelessness is a horrible symbol of a failure of a whole broad range of government 
policies. Unfortunately, just announcing a series of programs that treat the most visible 
manifestation of the problem without getting to the root still leaves the children and 
adults we represent in desperate circumstances. 
Another example illustrated the lack of faith the community and homeless advocates had 
in the Bloomberg administration to respond to homelessness. In July 2006, NYC Department of 
Homeless Services was forced to use the much resisted hotel system in order to provide shelter 
and accommodations to rising number of homeless families. This occurred at Westway Motel. In 
the past, Westway housed a variety of transient populations that the community did not have 
issues with in their given time.	Including “tens of thousands of refugees from around the world”, 
“deaf Mexican immigrants laboring in slave like conditions”, families who were displaced from 
collapsed buildings in other areas of NYC and those displaced by Hurricane Katrina.  
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By 2006, though, the community was resisting the placement of homeless there. 
President of the local civic associated called the hotel a “festering sore” (Brady 2007). DHS and 
others providing services critiqued the claims by residents, stating the crime wave began long 
before the homeless were housed in the hotel starting (Brady 2007). Perhaps what changed the 
community sentiment was the lack of faith in the ability of the city to manage homelessness, 
particularly under the assumption that NYC homeless caused a “crime wave.”  
 
HOUSING SEX OFFENDERS 
During the 2000s, we see rhetoric expressing compassion and care, however we also see 
this work to socially exclude the homeless criminal other from the homeless other deserving of 
social services and compassion strategies. This divide became more apparent as increased 
discussion on security and safety from sex offenders characterized the 2000s. It is at this time 
that sex offenders appeared as a new “problem” population among the homeless. This is 
illustrated in three stories around housing and providing surveillance of sex offenders. Here, we 
see housing sex offenders become a politicized concern during elections of various government 
officials. The narrative is further politicized by the murder of a woman by a formerly homeless 
man with a sex offense history. The murder also garnered attention because it was ruled a hate 
crime, motivated by racial tensions.  
The general political discussion emphasized the necessity of 24-hour surveillance at 
shelters that house sex offenders and a location away from neighborhoods in order to ensure 
safety and security. Stories illustrating this narrative take place in three neighborhoods that are 
debated as potential shelter locations for NYC’s homeless sex offender population. The narrative 
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discusses housing the homeless in Suffolk, in Manhattan, and outside NYC city limits in 
Westchester.  
First, during the 2000s, officials announced the relocation of an 850-bed men’s shelter 
from Manhattan to Brooklyn. Bellevue psychiatric hospital had served as an intake for homeless, 
returning offenders, and those released from mental health institutions since the 1980s. At the 
time, the city announced to move in order to replace the building with an upscale hotel and 
business properties. It was also sited for housing a majority of NYC’s registered sex offenders 
(Chan 2008). The neighborhood was relieved to move shelter away from Manhattan and the 
efforts to build a positive image of NYC.  
A second story about sex offenders who are homeless is found in New York’s Suffolk 
County, near Long Island. Here, state officials housed “sex offenders in trailers” that were 
“moved regularly around the county, parked for several weeks at a time on public land away 
from residential areas” as they enforced “stiff curfews” (Kilgannon 2007). This practice is 
referred to as the “trailer method.” City officials commented on the motivation for housing the 
homeless using the “trailer method.” Greg Blass, chief deputy commissioner of the Department 
of Human Services stated “the county avoids having to burden any single neighborhood with a 
permanent shelter for them.” The trailers move one to three times every one to two weeks to an 
“undisclosed spot” away from “schools, churches, day care centers or nursing homes” and avoid 
the “large clusters of sex offenders amassed in certain neighborhoods” (Kilgannon 2007). Greg 
Blass also stated the motivation to conduct the trailer method was to “make trailer living Spartan 
enough to motivate the offenders to seek permanent housing” and he further stated “we don't 
want to become a haven…It’s intended to be temporary” (Kilgannon 2007). 
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Officials saw this method as justified and legitimate in order to consider neighborhood 
safety and to avoid risk of people using the shelter for long term instead of temporary care. There 
were reports of some criticism. This practice was criticized as a “stopgap solution that only 
makes reintegration impossible” according to a psychiatry professor at Columbia University 
(Kilgannon 2007). Nonetheless, the trailer method was practiced in NYC amidst fear of the 
homeless sex offender other. 
A third and final story involved Westchester County where politicians, such as Andrew 
Spano and opposing candidate Robert Astorino, debated policies and practices to address public 
concern over housing homeless sex offenders. At the time, Westchester County Executive 
Andrew Spano (1998-2010) announced plans to move a men’s homeless shelter from Camp La 
Guardia to a more residential area, near a jail, psychiatric facilities and a children’s hospital. 
Camp La Guardia had long provided NYC’s homeless population with shelter. Shortly after 
Spano’s announcement, he called it an “embarrassment” after opposing candidate Robert 
Astorino pointed out the number of homeless sex offenders at the location (Foderaro and 
O’Connor 2005). Robert Astorino claimed that if elected he would oppose moving the shelter 
due to the “threat and danger” of level 3 sex offenders that stayed at the 58-bed men’s homeless 
shelter (NYT 2005). Astorino noted level 3 offenders fall under “law enforcement classification 
for the likeliest repeat offenders” (NYT 2005). Residents protested, as the State proposed plans to 
house “child molesters” in a family neighborhood once it shutdown Camp La Guardia (NYT 
2005). Westchester residents claimed the city wanted to “chase the homeless” from one place to 
another and they protested their home as another “dumping ground” for the city (West, 2005). 
Spano argued the proposal meant to bring people closer to services and to integrate more into the 
	
	
	
	
	
144 
community, however the question of what to do with the homeless sex offender in the NYC 
shelter system overshadowed moving the men’s shelter that had existed since 1934. 
This story continues when Tim O'Leary, lead organizer of the group “No Way,” protested 
the shelter being shut down and relocated. His organization was supported by the Astorino 
campaign, among other republican affiliations. Sue Swanson, Republican, and former county 
legislator, wrote in an email (NYT 2005), “They put consolidation and budgetary considerations 
above the safety of Westchester residents… The county should keep the airport shelter open, 
where there's no threat of any Level 3 sex offenders in our neighborhoods and near children's 
facilities.” 
Spano claimed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requested the shelter to move, 
however the FAA shared with reporters they did not request this (O’Connor 2005). Spano soon 
dedicated increased funding to the surveillance of convicted sex offenders at the Westchester 
Airport Shelter (O’Connor 2005). Spano’s “damage control” policy would track “all sex 
offenders who are sentenced to probation with global positioning technology”. This surveillance 
was “used in at least two dozen states and can alert officers within minutes to an offender's 
proximity to a school or playground” (Foderaro 2005). Political debate between Spano and 
Astorino politicized homelessness. 
Connected to Westchester, increased surveillance of sex offenders was also pressured by 
the June 2005 death of Concetta Russo Camero, 56. The suspect, Philip Grant, a 43-year-old 
homeless man with a sex crime history, attacked the woman, Concetta Russo-Carriero, a 56-
year-old receptionist at a White Plains law firm in a parking garage. Though no sexual violation 
was reported, Grant’s 1980 conviction as a Level 3 sex offender, referred to as “the most 
dangerous” type of sex offender, was reported. Grant was convicted of a first-degree rape in the 
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Bronx (Foderaro 2005). Timothy O'Leary, founder of a local organization against the new 
planned shelter called “No Way,” commented on the murder (Foderaro and O’Connor 2005), 
“This is the nightmare scenario that we've feared all along, Our assertion has been that placing 
the most dangerous people in the county system in this new location at Grasslands is 
irresponsible and senseless.”  
On parole after serving his 24 years for the crime, Grant was released to the Westchester 
County Airport Shelter (Foderaro 2005) where he was then asked to leave for “having difficulty 
conforming” to the rules of the shelter and program (Foderaro and O’Connor 2005). White 
Plains and other residents close to the proximity of the Westchester County Airport criticized the 
city and state for bringing the problems of petty crime and violent crimes to the area. Jeanine F. 
Pirro, Westchester district attorney commented (Foderaro 2005), “Every day these predators are 
bused and delivered to the most populated areas of our community…where they are free to 
victimize innocent human beings.” 
Philip Grant’s case reinforced the notion that sex offenders were dangerous population 
that needed 24-hour surveillance in order to protect the public from random sex crimes 
committed by strangers, as this became a political point in debate by Spano and Astorino. 
District Attorney Jeanine Pirro and Andrew Spano agreed, “state legislature should pass a civil 
commitment law, under which violent sex offenders, after their prison terms, face indefinite 
confinement in a psychiatric institution" (Foderaro 2005). Westchester County responded to the 
death of Russo-Carriero with increased spending to monitor “all high-level sex offenders who 
use the county's homeless shelters” and implemented practices that “closely followed” sex 
offenders “at all times by people monitoring them” (O’Connor, 2005). Robert P. Astorino, 
opposing Republican candidate against Andrew Spano, stated (O’Connor, 2005): 
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Unfortunately, this has taken way too long. They were just dumping these people off into 
the city with no supervision and just allowing them to run free, hoping that they would be 
good people. That's what caused Mrs. Russo-Carriero's murder.  
Spano increased surveillance and tightened shelter requirements of the six sex offenders 
located in Westchester Airport Shelter. However, Westchester remained a point of political 
debate given recent crimes near Westchester and the political focus on Camp La Guardia over 
time. In the murder case, the victim’s family filed a $15 million lawsuit against Westchester 
County and the city of White Plains for negligence (O’Connor 2005). County officials faced 
pressure to increase surveillance at all shelters. The former barracks style shelter soon received a 
“state-of-the-art surveillance and alarm system” (O’Connor 2005): 
Nearly 40 video cameras have been installed throughout the building so that its residents 
are kept under close watch at all times. Security stations with panic buttons are on every 
floor, and police cars have been assigned to circle the compound day and night. The tight 
security, county officials say, is largely for this reason: Among the roughly 110 people 
scheduled to move into the shelter when it opens this month, at least 13 are convicted sex 
offenders. Eight of the 13 are high-level offenders, considered the most dangerous, and in 
November, their status prompted County Executive Andrew J. Spano to require them to 
be watched at all times by trained monitors…” 
In addition, police and patrol cars were “equipped with the names and photographs of the various 
sex offenders staying [at Westchester Airport Shelter]” in order to ensure optimal surveillance 
and safety (O’Connor 2005). Tim O’Leary, founding organizer of “No Way,” commented 
(O’Connor 2005): 
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The county says that this shelter will be safe, that it won't have any impact on our 
neighborhoods…That's an unrealistic view. The reality is that the shelter residents are 
free to leave the facility and can choose to go wherever they wish, including into our 
communities. 
Spano advanced plans to move forward and eventually shut down the Westchester homeless 
shelter in 2006 (Gordon 2006).  
Westchester’s Camp La Guardia shelter was eventually closed after the county sued the 
city, followed by a much-celebrated closure of the shelter (Gordon 2006). For many years, the 
community and county officials “blamed [Camp La Guardia] shelter residents for petty crime” 
(Kaufman 2006) and “drug and mental problems and criminal pasts” that often characterized 
residents (Fried 2001). Immediate residents who long resisted the shelter celebrated the closure, 
and city officials argue the move as positive due to the costly nature of transporting NYC’s 
homeless from the shelter located 70 miles outside of the downtown NYC. One article explained 
the longtime practice by the city (Kaufman 2006):  
In 1999, the county sued the city, saying it was dumping minor criminals and drug 
addicts at the shelter and polluting the quality of local life. The city expects to save 
millions more by not having to run a shelter outside its borders. The city said it had cost 
$19 million a year to run Camp La Guardia, which included more than $7 million a year 
for transportation to and from the shelter and for security measures required by the 
lawsuit settlement. 
Camp La Guardia’s shutdown was considered a “triumph of Mayor Michael R. 
Bloomberg's five-year plan to reduce the number of homeless in the city by two-thirds by 2009” 
according to his administration. However, it was not due to crime and disorder or the fact 
	
	
	
	
	
148 
citizens’ voices were heard in resistance efforts. The administration framed the closure because 
of hard work by the Bloomberg administration to address homelessness. Deputy Mayor Linda I. 
Gibbs of Health and Human Services [2005-2013] commented (Kaufman 2006):  
The closing of Camp La Guardia is a milestone that tells us our plans are working.  
Despite much resistance, the NYC boroughs are cited as the recipient shelters that will accept 
those from Camp La Guardia once it is shut down. One resident shared, “nobody wants these 
facilities in their backyard, but we recognize they have to go somewhere” (Kaufman 2006).  
 
POLICING HOMELESSNESS 
Securitizing the city as a solution to social problems emerged as a theme in the 2000s just 
as in earlier decades. This is revealed in two ways, securitizing shelters and securitizing the 
streets. We see the discussion on securitizing the shelters range from changing the structure and 
occupation in shelters to tightening surveillance in terms of who is in the system and where 
various subpopulations are housed across the city. This practice in the shelters is connected to 
efforts to securitize the streets through change institutional practices, such as that found in 
policing and the physical changes in streets such as increased surveillance technologies. Police 
play a particular role in responding to homelessness during the Bloomberg Administration, as 
they have in previous decades.  
City officials and police justified the need to change the landscape of NYC in order to 
enhance police crackdowns on minor offenses. New fencing, benches, and cleared encampments 
assisted police efforts to enforce laws against congregation of homeless and other disorderly 
populations. Surveillance is provided in order to change police technology presence in the 
streets. Partnership between Department of Homeless Services and NYPD to conduct police 
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sweeps in homeless shelters and city encampments was supported in order to extend the 
crackdown on “quality of life” crimes that included sleeping, eating, and sitting in public space. 
Mayor Bloomberg is quoted in the Mayor’s Management Report praising the city for the crime 
and disorder it moved away from (McIntire 2004): 
New Yorkers have much to be proud of when it comes to city services. The safest city in 
America continues to get safer. Our streets are the cleanest they have been in 30 years. 
We have made progress in educating our children; fewer families entered homeless 
shelters for the first time in four years; traffic fatalities decreased; potholes are being 
repaired quicker; and civilian fire fatalities remained at historic low levels.  
Police considered the “increase in quality-of-life summonses” to efforts like “Operation 
Silent Night” and “Operation Clean Sweep” which targeted noise disturbance, “prostitution, 
disorderly youths, and other chronic problems” such as homelessness (McIntire 2004). Other 
police practices extended the 1990's “tough on crime movement” (Tavernise 2005). Continued 
from politics by the Giuliani Administration, city officials and police coordinated midnight raids 
and arrests for outstanding warrants in shelters as part of Mayor Bloomberg’s crackdown on 
crime and disorder. Another response used by police included crackdowns on “unlicensed street 
peddling and fare-beating,” particularly associated with the homeless, as “arrests for minor 
crimes…lead to people the police are already looking for and deter more serious crimes” and 
proof lies in the “vastly improved statistics on serious crime” (Tavernise 2005). Police also 
conducted undercover operations on public transportation systems, where they acted as “a citizen 
chatting to a boyfriend or girlfriend” or a delivery person “holding a pizza box” in order to catch 
fare-beaters (Tavernise 2005). Well into the 2000s, the “tough on crime” approach is framed as a 
method that works.  
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Opinions of residents, advocates, and others in the city conflicted over the role the police 
should play in increased measures to manage homelessness and the crime problem in NYC. New 
Yorkers complained, “police officers had abused their authority through improper searches and 
unwarranted threats of arrest” (McIntire 2004). Sympathies were particularly provided to the 
treatment of non-violent homeless such as those experiencing addiction and mental illness 
(Archibold 2006). Lawyers argued the city created an issue when it implemented increased 
police task forces to arrest homeless for farebeating and other minor violations. Police 
spokesperson Paul Brown stated, however “it was not unusual for the police to focus on fare-
beaters to keep them from committing other crimes, and that the police often found people with 
warrants out for their arrest. The men are not immune from the law just because they are 
homeless” (Tavernise 2005).  
Though some consider police as potentially exacerbating problems faced, the counter 
narrative legitimizes police presence on the streets in order to respond to random acts of 
violence. A story of a homeless man with a history of mental illness that killed a homeless 
woman by “punching her in the throat and later threw her body from a Brooklyn rooftop” 
particularly illustrates this. Police reported that Clifton Goring, 19, and victim, Terana Street, 33, 
argued over a place to sleep on the roof. Goring punched Street, this ultimately led to her death. 
Then her body was thrown over the rooftop by Goring (Ramirez 2001). Here, we see stories that 
advocate a police presence is needed in order to intervene with homeless who face addiction and 
mental illness issues, and pose threats against other less violent homeless.  
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MANAGEMENT OF THE HOMELESS OTHER 
During the 2000’s, advocacy for increased control and surveillance practices reproduced 
the legitimacy of NYC crackdowns on minor offenses in order to prevent serious offenses. 
Articles focused on increased control and surveillance of certain homeless populations, 
particularly through care and compassion of veterans, women, and children, and through controls 
by the justice system directly aimed at homeless sex offenders. As in the earlier decades, there 
are also stories that strikingly reproduce an image of homelessness and crime. We see four 
stories that illustrate the value in framing a history of homelessness as a way to reproduce fears 
of the homeless justifying increased controls and surveillance of the entire homeless population.  
First, the dangerous wanderer is illustrated in the reports of nameless individuals in the 
shelter system that appears after a serious crime, often a sexual assault or murder, is committed. 
One example, is the case of Johnny Gamba, a man brought to the NYC shelter system who 
remained among “dozens of human enigmas [that] have lingered in the city’s homeless shelter 
system for years, lost or deluded people who lack the identification required for benefits to pay 
for better care or housing” (Bernstein 2002). Another example, reported on an unarmed woman, 
who had a past life in Connecticut, but stayed in NYC shelter system where she died. Stories of 
unidentified homeless reiterated the need for NYC shelter system to increase it’s surveillance 
and to better track those who enter/leave it. 
Second, this is further illustrated by stories that shared a murder, sex offenses, and history 
in homeless shelters with accompanying rhetoric that surveillance was necessary. Four in 
particular share the common elements to reproduce fear of the homeless criminal other. First, 
headlines reported that police arrested a panhandler serial killer with a drug problem. Vincent 
Johnson, 31, known as the Brooklyn Strangler, killed 6 women in NYC. All victims had drug 
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and prostitution related charges and were found dead, with little to no signs of struggle. The 
unpredictability of the homeless killer was reported as the murders he committed happened 
everywhere from rooftops to a mattress in a vacant lot to a private room of the victim. Past 
record included subway fare beating and minor drug charges (Rashbaum 2000). Second, another 
homeless man, Ishmael Holmes, 22, was arrested in the sexual assault of 8 women in NYC in 
2000. His history of criminal offenses and drug use were referenced, as reporters stated he stayed 
in a homeless shelter and had repeatedly stalked women. 
Third, another came about in a story where police arrested Julius Graham, 43, after he 
“stabbed and slashed” five people in “an outburst of violence all the more terrifying for its 
randomness” (Santora and Goodman 2012). Here, we see a violent homeless person randomly 
attack someone on the street. It reproduces fear of the homeless criminal other. Fourth, in another 
report, a mother of six, Diatra Hester-Bey (35), was sentenced to 10 years in prison for 
suffocating her baby, where she then left the homeless shelter they had been staying at with her 
“dead baby in a stroller” and threw the body in a dumpster (Hartocollis 2006). The murder 
occurred in 2000 and Hester-Bey collected $35 a month in welfare benefits in the child’s name 
while concealing the death of her child for nearly 4 years from social workers. Hester-Bey was 
charged with welfare fraud, grand larceny, and filing a false welfare application in the first trial, 
found deadlocked on negligent homicide in the first trial, and convicted of negligent homicide in 
the second trial (Hartocollis 2006):  
Justice McLaughlin sentenced her to up to four years on the homicide charge, the 
maximum possible. The judge in the first trial, Justice Robert M. Stolz, also sentenced 
her yesterday to up to six years on the fraud charges, a year less than the maximum. She 
could serve up to 10 years on the combined sentences. 
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Here, we see crime and disorder of a homeless mother who is able to harm her children and 
discard the body with little to no remorse in the case. This fuels the idea that morality is low 
when it comes to the homeless subject, therefore we need to control and manage such 
populations in order to protect from potential victims. Other articles appeared throughout the 
decade that framed the homeless criminal as a dangerous other, which in turn furthered the 
narrative that increased policing is needed and surveillance and safety are important issues faced 
by NYC residents. Each of the cases describes a dangerous, homeless other found in NYC 
shelter system or in unpredictable places across the city landscape.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The fear of crime and disorder continued through the 2000s as the mediated image of 
homelessness expanded to include different subpopulations with various needs. The criminal 
homeless other dominated as a major source of fear and discussion during Bloomberg’s 
administration. A mediated political debate emerges as the city seeks solutions to homelessness, 
crime, and disorder in streets and in shelters. This is particularly discussed in terms of 
securitization through use of professionals and surveillance technology as solutions to 
homelessness and crime problems. The professional included trained police provided in shelters 
and a data driven collection method to further manage who is in the shelter, understanding their 
histories and potential for risk in the shelter. 
Of particular interest concerning surveillance of high risk homeless criminals, we see 
rising concern for housing homeless sex offenders further reiterating justifications for 
surveillance of the homeless other. Our attention is drawn to the homeless sex offender through 
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political debates and public policies where campaign discussions about where to house the 
homeless are politically charged and situated in neighborhood politics.  
The notion to socially exclude, displace, and monitor is reproduced as well by stories of 
homeless criminals wandering the streets of NYC. Criminal histories, including sex offenses, are 
blurred with homelessness and mental health histories, in cases where the homeless, criminal 
other commits a violent crime and media coverage follows with political commentary on the 
prevention provided through surveillance. Certainly, it is important to acknowledge the notion of 
increased surveillance measures found in NYC shelters following insecurities faced following 
9/11 played a role. However, NYC had long voiced an interest in tightened restrictions and 
management techniques of the homeless. This management through tightened control applies to 
homeless children, families, and veterans that are prioritized in social services, as such 
populations face screening processes and treatment program requirements to continue services 
through the city. 
During the 2000s, Mayor Bloomberg is faced with a “historic homelessness crisis” and 
NYC is criticized for failed policies that took away federal and local housing assistance 
programs. Much like his predecessors, Mayor Bloomberg is faced with crime and disorder, 
though crime rates continued to decline over the decade analyzed. Rising homelessness during 
the 2000s compared to those faced by previous administrations in this analysis is linked to 
Mayor Bloomberg’s harsh cuts in the Federal housing programs and tightened controls for 
screening and acceptance into the limited resources made available. This left record highs in 
terms of homeless families and children forced into NYC shelter system or in the streets where 
the fear of crime and disorder is discussed. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The beginning of this study observed a recent pattern where a number of cities declared a 
state of emergency (SOE) in response to their homelessness crisis. Many question arise about 
why some declared a state of emergency, such as those on the West coast, while others did not 
declare one despite having a large number of homeless (i.e., NYC and New York). The political 
motivation to declare homelessness as an urgent priority of local politics assists in temporarily 
overcoming longstanding budget and bureaucratic barriers. It increases the power of local 
authorities to address a social problem. Undoubtedly, governance of homelessness occurs in both 
the welfare and criminal justice system, where a declared SOE motivated by the visibility in 
homeless encampments, will experience an increase in controls. New York Times (NYT) articles 
from 1970-2012 are used to problematize current responses to homelessness in order to 
interrogate our understanding of homelessness through history. It helps us understand the vast 
array of responses ranging from care to criminalization, situated in efforts to manage a particular 
population. 
Through a focused study on homelessness and crime, this research extends criminological 
literature on the social control of crime and poverty. Specifically, it draws on theoretical insights 
from David Garland (2001), Jonathan Simon (2007), and Loïc Wacquant (2009). What emerges 
through mediated images of homelessness is a transformation of social practices where care and 
criminalization are blurred and exist simultaneously in spaces used to contain marginalized 
populations in NYC. Through media analysis, insight is provided into public and political 
processes that shape the governance of marginalized populations over time, such as welfare 
housing and shelters. 
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SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
The study begins in 1970s, as major shifts in neoliberal policies, welfarism, and crime 
control occurs. The focus in this decade is on gentrification and urban renewal. Particularly the 
forces that construct boundary making in the city landscape across marginalized populations 
(i.e., race, class, etc.). In the 1970s, businesses and residents report on ways homelessness and 
crime impede the revitalization of NYC. During the 1970s, we see constructions of homelessness 
used to further forces of gentrification and urban renewal. The unpredictability of random 
violence in NYC is constructed as part of every day life, thus furthering urgency to change the 
crime and disorder conditions faced by NYC. This is illustrated in stories of troubled homeless 
youth, a rise in youth gangs who are said to come from such poor conditions, and the visible 
presence of homelessness and drug use found within the Manhattan Criminal Courts Building. 
Moreover, this is connected to narratives on the decay and deterioration of buildings that 
culminated into moral decay and the deterioration of people.  
During the 1970s, discourse suggests gentrification is a force that shapes control of 
people and places across class. Those outside productive social classes are pushed out of spaces 
across the city through rhetoric advocating efforts to clean neighborhood and streets. 
Gentrification shapes boundaries and territories that are continually debated, and provides 
examples of housing policies that parallel practices of the criminal justice system. Such policies 
assist in boundary making process that increasingly aims to remove undesirable, particularly 
lower class other. For example, Greenwich (i.e., the Village) faced being a dumping ground for 
homeless despite efforts to revitalize the neighborhood and its businesses. The “plague” of the 
homeless and criminal is conflated to a singular undesirable “other” that harms the 
neighborhood’s image and businesses.  
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In order to rehabilitate the city, discourse focused on youth and the recent youth gang 
problem. Alternative pathways are advocated in order to intervene on youth headed towards 
serious criminality and gang involvement. One way is to provide juvenile justice services that 
provide improved management of the population through employment and community services 
to better build morale. Meanwhile, shelter for youth is not prioritized in discussions that reveal 
budget cuts surrounding such services for homeless youth. In this decade, a narrative emerges 
that seeks to differentiate youth from adults in order to prevent serious criminals through 
increased early intervention and social controls on youth. Meanwhile it is acknowledged that the 
state needs to provide services and support for youth, as parents fail to do so thus resulting in 
issues of crime and disorder. 
During the 1970s, homelessness and crime are identified as issues faced by formal city 
offices such as the NYC Housing Authority and the Criminal Courts Building. For example, the 
Housing Authority is noted for eviction policies if adults, and youth in families, commit criminal 
acts found in their supported housing programs. This foreshadows city management of criminal 
and disorderly people. The justice system and community are not entirely in agreement with the 
consequential practices found in the housing system. For example, the community expressed 
concerns with consequences of eviction policies by taking the NYC Housing Authority to Court 
over the eviction of families due to juvenile delinquency. A counter narrative emerges that 
acknowledges eviction of the marginalized other disproportionately impacts the criminal and 
poor and is justified through the powerful forces of gentrification to clean up the image of the 
city. As we see in future decades, identifying the homeless subject becomes increasingly 
important in mediated images and works to further ideas of who is worthy of management 
services versus jail. Situated in forces to clean up NYC’s buildings and people, the drug 
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addicted, deranged, delinquent, and dangerous other works to determine who is displaced and 
where the displacement occurs. Further, it builds the narrative “anywhere but here” throughout 
time and place in NYC.  
Relatively little emerges in the 1970s that includes political powers of the city and 
political agendas of various mayoral administrations. In fact, in future decades, we see a greater 
theme emerge where Mayors Koch [1978-1989], Dinkins [1990-1993], Giuliani [1994-2001], 
and Bloomberg [2002-2013] are engaged in media discourse on defining homelessness and crime 
problems, particularly in finding solutions to it. The late 1970s included Mayor Ed Koch’s 
administration, where an increase in political authority and voice on the subject is found in the 
NYT. Themes throughout all mayoral administrations focused on housing, policing, and the 
image of homeless. This is witnessed as politicians express authority and expertise in areas such 
as policing the housing system and the streets of NYC. Rhetoric that advocated crime control and 
quality of life measures in shelters and the housing system during Mayor Koch’s administration 
in the data analyzed, and continued with a significant shift toward policing the streets is 
witnessed during the Dinkins and Giuliani administrations. Later, Mayor Bloomberg focused 
funds on making shelters safe and cracking down on crime and disorder found within the 
housing system, similarly to Mayor Koch’s 1980s practices. However, Mayor Bloomberg’s 
policies align with the socially exclusionary practices of the 2000s that seek to define and 
socially exclude certain worthy versus unworthy homeless populations.  
During the 1980s, fear and anxieties about crime and disorder build as politicians engage 
in the discussions to find solutions to homelessness. Mayor Ed Koch provides political authority 
on the subject as the NYT documents the ways his administration talks about homelessness and 
solutions to it. Here, we see a continued struggle for the city to find successful solutions. 
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Powerful insights are provided where community organizations and local businesses resist the 
city’s efforts to find solutions through housing and shelters. Business owners and residents often 
criticize solutions that keep the homeless other within their community and neighborhood, while 
also criticizing the city’s failures to provide care and compassion for specific homeless 
populations, such as youth.  
Here, a hierarchy reveals itself. Powerful political leaders, such as Mayor Koch, publicly 
engage in solutions to understand and address homelessness. We see neighborhoods and 
businesses resist S.R.Os and shelters as solutions to homelessness due the crime and disorder 
each bring as “bad business.” The question becomes where to move the homeless? As 
neighborhoods resist, the question is transformed into where to best displace homelessness and 
crime problems in an “anywhere but here” narrative. Koch explores a number of solutions in 
major NYC boroughs, including rebuilding existing S.R.Os to include more safety and security 
measures, moving temporary shelters outside city limits, restructuring housing options for 
families and children to provide for the orderly homeless, and importantly, administering all 
solutions with traces of crime control technologies that address anxieties and fears building 
throughout the 1980s. Here, we see foreshadowing of an increasing policing state, where police 
presence in the streets and in the housing system is commonplace in debates to finding the 
solutions.  
Homelessness is increasingly politicized during the 1980s and continues through 2012. 
Though homelessness itself has always existed, the Koch administration foreshadows voices of 
those engaged in finding solutions to homelessness and the crime problem. Garland (2001) 
argued a shift in the politicization of crime control occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. Such a shift 
in crime control “transformed the structure of relationships that connects the political process 
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and the institutions of criminal justice” (Garland 2001:13). In the provision of housing and 
shelter during the 1980s, we see the administration of safety and security technologies become 
commonplace. Political engagement in the management of populations using the welfare system, 
including housing such as S.R.Os and shelters, and expansion of the use of police bodies and 
police technologies is normalized and legitimized. This process reproduces the notion that 
homelessness is a crime problem that needs crime-oriented responses. 
During the Dinkins (1990-1993) to Giuliani administrations (1994-2001), NYC faced 
rising violent crime rates compounded by drug problems. Fear of crime and disorder certainly 
escalate in the NYT as solutions to such social problems are explored. Solutions target removing 
the criminal other and the threat of crime from the city and shelter landscapes where crime and 
disorder work to further construct boundaries and hierarchies. The dominant narrative was fear 
of crime and disorder that advocated increased control of people in the city, including zero 
tolerance policies in order to finally achieve the urban social order New Yorkers longed for in 
previous decades. Reproduction of power relations between state officials and local advocates 
continued as rhetoric in the NYT called for increased policing and criminal justice measures. The 
public demanded safety and security in at risk communities, in collaboration with political 
agendas that transformed our understanding of homelessness as part of a crime problem. This is 
also illustrated in the sheer increase in articles on homelessness and crime returned for each 
decade. 
Repressive policies, zero tolerance, and quality of life policies were often associated with 
Mayor Giuliani’s Administration. In fact, Mayor Ed Koch’s practices and policies shared 
rhetoric to clean up shelters, single room occupancy hotels, and streets by cracking down on 
behaviors using police force. During the late 1980s, Mayor Koch ordered the “involuntary 
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commitment” through police force of those who pose an immediate threat and danger to self or 
others. This resulted in lawsuits headed by the New York Civil Liberties Union. The narrative 
overshadowed resistance to forced practices such as involuntary commitment to hospitals and 
jails. Specific to homeless, Koch, Dinkins, and Giuliani sought to remove homeless from the 
streets due to crime and disorder problems. Koch’s strategies focused on cleaning up S.R.Os that 
gradually shifted to focus on the streets during the Giuliani administration. Giuliani’s rhetoric 
included threats to arrest homeless on the streets that refused shelter were considered markedly 
less forgiving, less compassionate, and overtly tough on crime in the streets.  
Situated in the context of the free market expansion witnessed during the 1970s and 80s, 
we see the prioritization of private groups such as businesses, alongside consumers and residents, 
which engage in economically productive lives. The rise in economic priority found in the 
articles analyzed witnessed a major theme that discussed mayoral budgets as it related housing 
assistance programs. Additionally, the mayor’s administration was increasingly discussed in 
terms of how they failed to regulate rents amidst gentrification and urban renewal, however this 
was not the dominant narrative. More frequently, budgets were discussed in terms of declined 
housing assistance budgets and increased crime control budgets for securitizing and policing 
amidst the high crime rates of the 1980s and 1990s. This narrative is normalized, as discussions 
on budgets indicate welfare cuts and criminal justice expansion continued into the 2000s, despite 
declining crime rates that began in the 1990s.  
The problematic and consequential results of such social exclusionary practices are 
overshadowed by a need to follow the practice for crime and disorder solutions. This produced 
little to no room for alternative options. The politics of homelessness demanded increased 
rigidity, toughness, and exclusion in the housing management strategies for those that are 
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socially deemed low risk enough to remain within city limits (i.e., families, children, and 
women). Homelessness as a crime and disorder issue works to further manage populations within 
the city as it defines and reinforces social boundaries. Technologies of crime control found in the 
housing system are a prime example of the coercive forces used.  
As we progress through the 1990s, we see an increased need to define the homeless 
subject in order to determine our solutions. This is theorized as due to the increased need to 
define subjects across homelessness that we should fear and those who are able to be managed 
under controls found within the housing, shelters, and addiction treatment programs. Particularly, 
this decade finds the overwhelming narrative to end crime and disorder under practices by the 
Dinkins and Giuliani administrations.  
In this decade, reporters discussed NYC and public officials struggle to address 
homelessness, crime, and disorder. In discussions of homelessness and crime, politicians and the 
public increased attention paid to the police role in responding to homelessness. While some 
articles advocated the police role in serving as both service members and social service 
providers, others critiqued and even protested the use of policing in responding to homelessness. 
Such ideas simultaneously exist, however the imagery of homelessness, as a population that 
requires structure and management is reproduced throughout this decade. The need for police 
power and governance in housing and on the streets is found as early as the administrations of Ed 
Koch and David Dinkins. However, Rudy Giuliani certainly receives attention for swift and 
severe measures. The image of a dangerous shelter and subway system perpetuated ideas 
surrounding increased criminal justice response, particularly of police. The discussion of 
homelessness and crime becomes less about housing and more about defining the police role 
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around responding to homelessness. Housing is still discussed at times; however, more 
connections are drawn between the police and housing. 
The politics toward minimizing visibility of homelessness on the streets are situated in 
the politics of crime and disorder. In a number of cases, the seemingly “random” victimization of 
homeless, and more so the “random” victimization of citizens by the homeless, are used to 
justify and legitimate the “muscle” of policing found in quality of life practices by city officials, 
particularly the Mayor’s administration. Protest and opposition occur, however rhetoric also 
indicated a sense of management and control of homelessness through the policing, and charging 
police with connecting homeless to housing and shelters. The image of the homeless other, as 
victim of crime and disorder or offenders, works to expand rhetoric toward increased control of 
populations across urban landscape. 
The fear of crime and disorder continued through the 2000s. Stories dominated the 
mediated political debate to control certain images of homelessness and crime. What is unique to 
the 2000s is how securitization and safety are achieved. Specifically, we see the rise of 
professionals, trained and armed police, and surveillance technology as solutions to 
homelessness and crime problems. The discussion here works to find solutions in providing the 
best surveillance technology and monitoring of at-risk homeless groups, such as homeless sex 
offenders in social service programs. A specific location this occurs is in making shelters safe 
through professionally trained and armed police. Professionally trained officers and specific staff 
dedicated to policing the shelter system is considered necessary and justified in rhetoric to 
manage homeless sex offenders.  
Surveillance of high-risk homeless sex offenders is a particular concern that emerges in 
various ways during the 2000s. Here, we see rising concern for housing homeless sex offenders 
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in neighborhoods with shelters. The city defends their solutions in context of having few options 
available. Therefore, surveillance of homeless through the shelter system becomes the solution 
where all homeless are impacted. Thus, budgets continue to increase for securitizing shelters. 
Our attention is drawn to the homeless sex offender through political debates and public policies 
where campaign discussions about where to house the homeless are politically charged and 
situated in neighborhood politics. The notion to socially exclude, displace, and monitor is 
reproduced by stories of homeless criminals wandering the streets of NYC. Criminal histories, 
including sex offenses, are blurred with homelessness and mental health histories, in cases where 
the homeless, criminal other commits a violent crime and media coverage follows with political 
commentary on the prevention provided through surveillance.  
However, NYC had long voiced an interest in tightened restrictions and management 
techniques of the homeless. This management through tightened control applies to homeless 
children, families, and veterans that are prioritized in social services, as such populations face 
screening processes and treatment program requirements to continue services through the city. 
During the 2000s, Mayor Bloomberg is faced with an “historic homelessness crisis” and 
NYC is criticized for failed policies that took away federal and local housing assistance 
programs. Much like his predecessors, Mayor Bloomberg is faced with crime and disorder, 
though crime rates continued to decline over the decades analyzed. Uniquely, rising 
homelessness is during the 2000s, as compared to those faced by previous administrations in this 
analysis, is linked to Mayor Bloomberg’s harsh cuts in the Federal housing programs and 
tightened controls for screening and acceptance into the limited resources made available. This 
left record highs in terms of homeless families and children forced into NYC shelter system or in 
the streets where the fear of crime and disorder is discussed. 
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Our cultural and political understanding of homelessness as an issue of crime and 
disorder has expanded across decades. Specific notions of crime control are used in discourse 
surrounding homelessness and crime. Garland (2001: 23) argues, “crime control is reconfigured 
complex of interlocking structures and strategies that are themselves composed of old and new 
elements, the old revised and reoriented by a new operation context.” This is illustrated in stories 
across the decades that continually advocate safety and security measures in shelter and housing 
system to protect the community from ill impacts of those in the shelters. As early as Mayor 
Koch, we see rhetoric focused on the need for safety, security, and increased budgets to do so, 
while housing programs and other services faced significant budget cuts. This rhetoric is 
common throughout the decades as the need to control crime and disorder is legitimized, 
resulting in budget allocations toward crime control. What is different is that rhetoric takes a new 
shape and form in the city as it shifts from at risk crime places (i.e., from the shelters to the 
streets and back to the shelters). In addition, it takes new shape as we define a new at risk 
homeless, criminal other: the sex offender. This redirects our attention to securing the shelter 
system, to controlling who receives the limited temporary services provided, and who can be 
managed by the housing system. The criminal justice system is appointed to handle the rest.  
 
SOCIOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT: SECURING STREETS AND SHELTERS 
The 1970s marked a dramatic shift in late modern punishment, particularly in 
understanding the rise in mass incarceration and a shift toward punitiveness (Garland 2001; 
Simon 2009; Wacquant 2009). By the1980s, rapid growth in the criminal justice system 
foreshadowed increased police expenditures during 1990s and 2000s that contributed to mass 
incarceration faced in the United States. The following discusses the work of Garland, Simon, 
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and Wacquant which explores the contextual factors that gave rise to the consequential 
expansion of punishment we see today.  
First, Garland (2001) argues the fear of crime is pervasive in daily activities and 
increasingly impacts our social interactions. U.S. zero-tolerance policies receive global attention, 
where media have played a significant role in framing this. Crime control is a part of everyday 
politics and social life in need of management. Zero tolerance policies often discussed in terms 
of the streets are also found in shelters and the housing system. During the 1970s, crimes 
committed by youth resulted in entire families being evicted from housing assistance programs. 
As the decades progressed, rhetoric seemingly resists NY Housing Authority’s tightened 
restrictions that negatively impact families; however, the restrictions take new shape in the form 
of drug and alcohol screenings found in shelters and housing programs. Zero tolerance is 
practiced throughout the decades and individuals are forced to get help or get out. Garland 
specifically discusses how the war on drugs recreates a new focus for old practices. This is 
illustrated in restrictions and eviction policies found in the housing system during the 1970s. 
However this shifts as the narrative is legitimized shelters or housing to avoid jail, and then 
threatens with eviction and exclusion through tightened regulations constructed around crime 
and drugs. 
Garland (2001) argues social controls have become increasingly privatized. This is 
particularly found in the form of corporate and private entities that are tasked with more 
effectively and efficiently running former city shelters. For example, during the 1980s Manhattan 
Bowery Corporation is tasked with running formerly run city social service programs. Private 
organizations are considered to have better trained, focused experts that are able to manage the 
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crime and drug problems faced in NYC shelters. Manhattan Bowery Corporation is one example 
of this discussed in the articles. 
Additionally, Garland’s notion of responsibilizing individuals and the community to 
address homelessness and crime problems helps us understand the governance of homeless 
populations in New York. The city is, again, criticized for not finding solutions. However, 
community organizations and the homeless are tasked with self-policing and self-protecting in 
ways that displace responsibility formerly placed on the state. Police are tasked with managing 
those who cannot be policed by the community and private organizations increasingly found in 
shelter and housing systems. Partnerships exist centered on the task of controlling criminal and 
disorderly other found in the city as budgets decline to provide welfare services. 
According to Garland (2001), the politicization of crime is enabled through several 
factors. NYC faced increased crime rates through the early 1990s, and then witnessed a 
significant decline. However, this research shows how increased media coverage of 
homelessness and crime over the years would suggest the problem is getting worse or that the 
problems are more interconnected than once before. What we can critically draw from this is the 
power the media holds to construct this fear and shape public policy. The politicization of 
homelessness and crime are consequential as new understandings of homelessness and crime 
emerge that work to normalize their relationship and further demonize the homeless criminal 
other. Fear of the homeless criminal other results in consequential measures of social exclusion 
that relegate marginalized groups to the fringes of society.  
We see this illustrated in a powerful set of stories that emerge in the 2000s centered on 
the fear of the homeless sex offender other. This is best illustrated in the election of Astorino and 
Spano where plans to house homeless are at the political forefront. Astorino publicly criticizes 
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Spano for shutting down a shelter on grounds that Spano did consider where the high-risk sex 
offenders would go once the shelter shut down. Though the numbers were small (less than 10% 
of the shelter population), this piece of information becomes political ammunition against Spano 
by Astorino during their political campaign, in which Spano quickly provides an apology and 
solutions to shut down the shelter and house sex offenders through surveillance at a new location 
in another community. Shortly after this political debate between the two, Concetta Russo 
Camero was killed by Philip Grant, which is discussed in the 2000s.  
Garland (2001) traces the rise in crime in the streets rhetoric found in the U.S. This is 
particularly illustrated in aggressive policing styles during the Giuliani “quality of life” sweeps 
discussed that are targeted at criminals and drug users broadly, but that include homeless. This 
extends to the shelter and increasingly so over the decades as tightened controls and surveillance 
in shelters are advocated as solutions to crime and disorder problems. This relates to Garland’s 
(2001) argument that the criminal other is shifting and changing, as the public is engaged in the 
process to differentiate a “sub-citizenry undeserving of fundamental liberties.” As the decades 
continue, it is increasingly common to differentiate between homeless children, families, and 
veterans, versus less prioritized groups. However, the homeless criminal other is the most 
undeserving, where crackdowns and aggressive police tactics are justified. The attachment and 
stigma of homelessness and a criminal record enables more broad shifts towards punishment and 
away from welfare support and rehabilitative services.  
Next, Jonathan Simon’s (2009) Governing Through Crime discussed the transformation 
from governing crime to governing through crime. According to Simon, governing through 
crime occurs where a strategic issue exists across multiple institutions that are used as a category 
to legitimize intervention in areas that were not previously conceived as criminal justice matters. 
	
	
	
	
	
169 
Specifically, we see how technologies, discourses, and metaphors of crime and justice become 
more common. This analysis on mediated images of homelessness and crime reveal how 
homelessness is governed through matters of crime and disorder. 
 The analysis reveals how homelessness is increasingly discussed as an issue of crime and 
disorder over time. Simon (2009) argues fear of crime has transformed schools, families, and 
workplaces to place more emphasis on crime control. In a similar sense, we can see how shelters 
and other temporary housing offered to the homeless become mechanisms of control and 
containment of potentially risky populations. This transformation has shifted to areas where 
disruption is responded to with zero tolerance practices such as write-ups, detentions, and 
expulsion in schools and the workplace. We also see this with eviction policies and tightened 
screening tools used over time, particularly during Mayor Bloomberg’s administration. 
Violations, such as failed screenings and breaking curfew, can result in exclusion from shelter 
services for 30 or more days. Simon (2009) argues this is pervasive in the lives of children in 
schools. The application of crime control to children vulnerable as offenders and victims justify 
and legitimate increased controls of children in articles analyzed. 
As a result of constructed imagery where children in schools are either potential targets or 
potential offenders, justification and legitimization for technologies of crime control exist on two 
grounds – as potential targets and potential serious offenders. Similarly, the homeless subject is 
viewed as an offender or victim. In the process of constructing homelessness in such binaries, we 
see many impacted by a set of polices and practices geared at a few persons. Though the reality 
of victims and offenders is relatively small compared to the entire population of children, fears 
and anxieties of potential crime are so pervasive they are applied to all. A culmination of such 
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three important developments resulted in new opportunities for the governance of every day life 
through crime control technologies. 
Lastly, Wacquant (2009) links the expansion and glorification of criminal justice 
institutions as a response to social insecurity rather than criminal insecurity. Wacquant (2009) 
offers a class based understanding of homelessness and crime that Garland and Simon do not 
necessarily offer. Wacquant (2009) connects social insecurity, such as wage labor issues and the 
disruption of ethno-racial hierarchy, to social controls produced in the city. In this study’s 
historical analysis, we see housing insecurity continually reproduced across decades where 
criminal insecurity works alongside other insecurities. Management of those who fall outside the 
norms of work and productivity occurs without necessarily addressing limited wage options 
available to homeless. Wacquant (2009) would argue this is how we explain the phenomenon of 
penal expansion across time, despite contradictions found in declining crime rates.  
Wacquant (2009) argues the need to reconnect social and penal policies and treat them as 
variations in order to understand the contemporary politics of marginality. Here, by extending 
beyond the “typical” criminal subjects, we see subjects that are governed through crime and 
criminality under notions they are groups that may be at risk for such behaviors because of their 
social status and marginalized position. The constructed image of homelessness and our 
responses to it reveal crime control strategies, yet these strategies are conceptualized as places of 
care and compassion or part of the welfare system. For example, housing and shelters that 
provide privatized treatment to populations that ultimately extend state intervention. 
Additionally, penal and social policy forces us to confront what Wacquant (2009) refers to as the 
downsizing of public aid and a shift toward temporary, subpar work as conditions of support. 
Here, we see social services offered to mother’s in the 1990s under the condition that they must 
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‘work’ in order to continue receiving support. We see youth required to participate in volunteer 
community services within their neighborhoods during the 1980s in order to receive shelter 
services from Koch administration. Wacquant (2009) would argue this is a form of “double 
regulation of poverty in the age of deepening economic inequality and diffusing social 
insecurity.”  
Wacquant (2009) further argues the resurging prison state is not about crime or crime 
control; rather, imprisonment becomes a way to contain and patrol the boundaries between 
productivity versus unproductivity, deserving and undeserving, etc. Over time, we see rhetoric 
that discusses limited city resources and continued welfare budget cuts. This increases the need 
to define who is/is not deserving of services and housing available; the rest, who are less 
deserving, are left under management of police. Throughout the decades, police are cited for 
using the “shelter or jail” method to clean the streets. Ultimately, this impacts what sociology of 
punishment theorists are concerned with in terms of mass incarceration. In particular, Wacquant 
(2001) connects the management of urban poor through control continuums results in growth of 
the carceral system:  
Resulting symbiosis between ghetto and prison not only perpetuates the socioeconomic 
marginality and symbolic taint of the black subproletariat, feeding the runaway growth of 
the carceral system. It also plays a pivotal role in the remaking of `race', the redefinition 
of the citizenry via the production of a racialized public culture of vilification of 
criminals, and the construction of a post-Keynesian state that replaces the social-welfare 
treatment of poverty by its penal management. 
This is important to consider regarding homelessness and the practices of management at the 
intersection of poverty and crime. Coercive practices that focus on “shelters or jail” make it 
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difficult for homeless and at risk homeless to operate outside the options provided by the state, 
that are presented in terms of care and criminalization. Simply stated, if one does not accept the 
forms of care provided through shelters and housing system, the likelihood of ending up in jail is 
increased. While care itself has compassionate intention, here we see it in coercive form that 
deemphasizes agency of the homeless and forces such populations into a shelter system. 
Meanwhile we acknowledge the crime and disorder found in the housing and shelter systems 
over time. However, these are the options in order to manage the image of homelessness and 
other images of crime and disorder from the streets. 
 
CARE AND CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS  
Though rhetoric did not appear until the later decades analyzed, a recent phenomenon 
that gained attention is the “criminalization of homelessness.” Particularly scholars examine how 
urban areas practice this method as a first response to homelessness often using police to fine and 
jail homeless people. Scholars beyond the field of criminology criticize limited studies on 
homelessness (Wolch and Dear 1993; Huey 2015), where conceptualizations are narrowly 
focused on criminalization processes, such as for sleeping, sitting, using the restroom, bathing, 
eating, and much more. In this study, we see police, communities, advocates, and businesses 
share very different agendas in terms of practicing criminalization measures.  
As city and state powers move towards criminalization practices, this is paralleled by an 
increase in formal organizations charged with providing care, compassion, and resources to 
address homelessness. Many cities have Office to End Homelessness, in addition to various 
coalitions to end homelessness. Ultimately, these two forces come together with a similar interest 
to end homelessness due to its impact on the community. How do we see the partnerships of 
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these forces play out? Often, police and service providers work together in their efforts. Given 
the recent declared SOE in Seattle, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Hawaii, what is the role of 
the police and crime control technologies? Particularly in the context of rising concerns about 
encampment visibility and knowledge of a history where police and service partnerships are used 
to advocate displacement, providing the ultimatum to move along, go to a shelter, or go to jail.  
Often, we conceptualize care and criminalization separately. However, responses of care 
and compassion simultaneously exist in the same space alongside criminalization. Partnered with 
agents of crime control, the overarching result in efforts to care and provide compassion is highly 
coercive and control is practiced by the city, non-profits, and various organizations tasked with 
provide social services. Ultimately, both care and criminalization act in similar notions to end the 
visibility of homelessness. Though conceptually different, we see similarities in strategies toward 
care and criminalization. This has a great impact in the normalized talk around services to end 
homelessness. For example, police are nearly always present in the implementation of services 
that seek to help the homeless. As we see homelessness conflated to a crime and disorder 
problem, police and justice system presence in the administration of social services is 
normalized. This has problematic implications from talk to practice in how we socially respond 
to homelessness, where care and compassion are shifted and transformed by overarching 
anxieties to crime and disorder. In providing shelter to the homeless, for example, police 
presence is necessary to control the potential for crime and disorder found in shelters. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study adds insight into discourse constructing the image of homelessness that is 
increasingly conflated with issues of crime and disorder. Further, this study provides insight into 
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responses to the homeless subject where crime control policies and practices are normalized in 
similar spaces previously conceptualized as spaces of care and compassion. It brings 
homelessness to the forefront of crime and poverty studies, making homelessness and responses 
to it a subject of social control studies. Homelessness is conflated with a crime and disorder 
problem. As such, it constructs a powerful political force that is governed through crime and 
shapes boundaries across the city. Newly found “crises” or social problems are reproduced in 
order to legitimate further management through securitization. Particularly, this study shows how 
governing through crime is found in the housing and shelter system. In shelters, surveillance is 
constant and normalized in the name of care and compassion, and criminalization and crime 
control strategies exist double fold to manage populations that cannot remain within the shelters 
due to rules and regulations imposed. The imaginary created reproduces insecurities about crime 
and justice and social insecurity, where Wacquant’s (2009) Punishing the Poor brings together 
forces of gentrification and urban renewal found in populations characterized by work and 
housing instability. Historically, homelessness is understood as a class issue where class analysis 
is important. Thus, Wacquant (2009) provides insight into the management of poverty (i.e, race 
and class) found in the subject of homelessness. Particularly as analysis of solutions and 
consequences to it are provided. Here we see the conflating of homelessness to a crime issue that 
provides political power to draw our gaze to this social problem and justify management in two 
ways: through care and criminalization, where both appear increasingly similar. 
As decades progress, we see connections between housing and the criminal justice 
system that illustrate how the fear of crime has transformed welfare, housing and social services 
as a state project. Police presence is found in the streets and in shelters in order to respond to the 
homeless, criminal other that poses a risk to society. It justifies and legitimates the need for 
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partnerships between groups that are charged with the well being of homeless; however, in turn, 
this provides the police power in interacting with homeless and furthering displacement to 
another place in the city or to shelters or to jail.  
Additionally, we see subjects that were defined as deserving of care and compassion 
offered through homeless services and housing. We see subjects such as children, women, and 
veterans who are discussed in terms of how to protect them from pervasive crime and disorder 
problems. However, in turn, this care and control takes the form of control that has its own set of 
rules and regulations and can result in exclusion from services. We also see how certain groups 
are used to police one another in an effort to address crime.  
This study most clearly points to the processes of politicization of homelessness found in 
the media over time to produce and legitimate the need for increased controls and management. 
The beginning of this dissertation introduced the current crisis of homelessness management 
faced by major cities across the United States and the recent rend to declare homelessness as a 
State of Emergency (SOE). The rationale behind NYC policies is often connected to political 
value in recreating the “homelessness crisis” in order to overcome bureaucratic barriers and 
increase funding for emergency shelters. However, where we see this play out is in response to 
those concerned with the visibility of encampments. What we learn from NYC is the creation of 
a homelessness crisis has been done throughout time. It is created to minimize the visibility of 
homelessness, and dismantling signs of homelessness as crime and disorder problems certainly 
work within these motivations. It does not, however, address longstanding structural issues. In 
fact, it creates policies and practices that further city powers to displace populations. Concerns 
are expressed that this could happen as cities continue to declare states of emergency concerning 
homelessness. The policies that result are control motivated and provide temporary power to a 
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city and ignores the injustices brought on by gentrification and social exclusion. Although it is 
still too soon to necessarily see what happens with the declared SOEs, it is worth being aware as 
a social science researcher interested in policy and rhetoric that the underlying the rhetoric of 
care and compassion behind SOEs is political. The consequences often result in increased 
controls of populations, ultimately impacting the lived realities of homelessness.  
Policy should first recognize the increased use of criminal justice technologies to control 
the urban environment that exist beyond strictly criminal justice institutions such as police, 
courts, and corrections. In addition, acknowledgment of the broad social, political, and historical 
processes surrounding homelessness shed light on the structural injustices reproduced through 
control strategies that utilize criminal justice technologies. Policies that impact homelessness 
should need to respond to homelessness as a structural failure, rather than an individualized 
crime and disorder problem. Discourse surrounding homelessness and crime in NYC 
increasingly focused on policies that provided security and safety through the removal of 
homeless subjects from the streets, to increased surveillance of subjects in the shelter system, and 
eventual social exclusion of homeless subjects from society through incarceration and complete 
abandonment. Policies in place, even when frames as care and compassion, utilize criminal 
justice technologies to increasingly force homeless subjects under social service management 
and impose restrictions that further alienate homeless subjects.  
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